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
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
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IN THE BEGINNING

REMARKS ON CERTAIN MODERN VIEWS
OF THE CREATION

PART II.

BY

RICHARD HILL SANDYS M.A.

of Lincoln's Inn Barrister-at-Law

Dissentientis
. exemplo trahenti
Perniciem veniens in ævum.



LONDON
BASIL MONTAGU PICKERING
196 PICCADILLY

1876

Part I. in 180.f. 155.

71.

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
BASIL MONTAGU PICKERING

196 PICCADILLY

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IN THE BEGINNING.

SINCE the final severance by show of hands, of morality from doctrine, and the assertion at the same time by those who should know best, of the free merits of humanity, the main battle between belief and unbelief absolute, has become little better than one of compliments on the one side and concessions on the other. "Yea, hath God said? Nay, but surely God doth know that the world is what we say it is; only do not be so very objective, and we shall agree well enough."

Not many of much mark or true scholarship now attack long received beliefs, without repeated assurances of distinguished consideration, and an occasional well-bred whisper in commendation of the First Cause; but underlying all is an intensity of purpose and self assurance of success never yet surpassed; and there is withal abroad generally a complacent looking on, an indifferent weaving of victor's crowns for first comers, not slightly discouraging to those who earnestly believe for themselves and for others.

There has never been a time when less complete homage has been paid to Revelation than there is now. In the Court and Times of Leo the Tenth, the chill that preceded the dawn, associated with the revival of Greek letters and frivolity, there may have been more unavowed infidelity absolute; but even that lay rather amid an entrapped and unassured priesthood, themselves nearly dead with weariness of ceremonial unrealities, and a few highly-placed scoffers, with their ever deadly imitators and parasites of the board. The idea was not familiar, nor under the influences of high art, the shadow of the Keys in politic hands, and the long custom of submis-

sion, generally welcomed. Religion, indeed, if not too obtrusive, gives a zest to the refinements of luxury.

There was merely the conceited old philosophy, on newly gilded crutches, repeating itself to a few friendly critics in a careless world. A partial belief was a thing unheard of. The text once accepted, the entire doctrine, however perverted by whole communities, followed as of course, and was professed with varying want of earnestness by all.

We know, indeed, the despairing restlessness of Luther, under the teaching, not at first rightly apprehended, of St. James in his Epistle of straw, as it was termed by some, the most popular of all the Epistles, the refuge and apology of the unzealous and unready in all times; arising, in Luther's case, from the cross lights thrown on the same truth; from the one side by St. James addressing Jews, "the twelve tribes scattered abroad," possibly over secure in an election, in their view the fulfilment of a promise to themselves personally, and their own exclusive privilege; from the other by St. Paul, the fearless and aggressive Apostle of the Gentiles, declaring to them for the first time their equal rights from the beginning to the same election, which although at first a saying "hard to be understood," might unless unfalteringly, even fiercely asserted, have had less than due weight, and left his preaching incomplete for all time. This ended with Luther, by reason of his earnestness, in a more confirmed faith; but with less than that earnestness, must have brought him surely home at last, to that cold, self-ordering, self-limiting, self-excusing, "Lord I thank thee" morality, which after all is, even with the best, but a well-bred scholastic despair.

Science, at the time referred to, there was none to speak of; there had been no advance. But now Science is come, in very deed, with Philosophy, newly dressed and decorated by distinguished artists, at her side, not, it is said, to abolish Revelation, but to clear and improve it, to meet the adult requirements of our more intellectual and self-reliant age, our "*minime incuriosa suorum ætas*," and such indeed is now the demonstrative and heartily co-operative yielding on all sides, that it really looks something like it. Felix no

longer trembles, nor does Paul in bonds require King Agrippa to believe all that the Prophets say. Positions only timidly and stealthily whispered, in this country at least, during the last century, are now the familiar after-dinner flourishes of many a quiet churchman. We are caught by the dazzle of modern discoveries, as pheasants at roost are by mirrors, or enticed into preserves to be there shot down by the Princes of modern thought, or otherwise used up at pleasure. Yet time and the hour may show, even in these our days, that these discoveries are as facts in perfect accord with the positions chiefly assailed; that is, with the Mosaic account of the Creation, viewed as it should be in relation to man to whom it was given, and the singleness and exclusiveness of the human race.

It is well and necessary so to state the question, because that præscientific account, possible, credible, probable, is the base of all later Scriptural teaching, and the key to the law of the Sabbath, and to the mysteries of sin and of death. The want of the earlier portion of the Book Genesis would leave a blank, and give a suddenness to the later Scriptures hard to realise. Time is not, except in relation to something, and the birth of the first living soul is the true beginning of our world, age, seculum, time, and not what is in that book said to have preceded, and did in one sense precede it.

These same discoveries, however, now opening upon us from day to day in such exhaustless variety, and yet not without a certain sense of repetition or sameness now and then, however marvellous, are only new in the sense in which the accumulation of like details is new.

The order amid variety in nature, safely above all imputation of weakness or poverty of invention in the Creator—the gradations of beings, at times so close, in the extremes so widely distant,

Usque adeo quod tangit idem est, tamen ultima distant,
have long been familiar to the least observant. All animate beings throughout the earth are composed of common dust or elements, have common needs, and possess therefore analogous organs to supply those needs. The senses differ in degree according to the natural requirements of each

species, but not in kind. There is no assured trace of a sense in any other species that we do not possess ourselves ; nothing that has ever been noticed in any of them that cannot be accounted for on this principle. We might thus expect *à priori* this graduated resemblance, and we find it.

But it is less arbitrary to accept this as the original stamp of one creative mind, than, literally going further to fare worse, to seek to degrade it into an empirical scrambling development, under conditions confessedly unknown, of order from disorder, of disorder from nothing, of one nothing from another nothing, and the issue may properly be here taken.

It is well known that some few of the first, many of the second, and vast numbers of the lower classes of debaters, openly assail the government of Jehovah on the score of its alleged fierceness and cruelty. All, therefore, who in any degree set themselves to impugn His Revelation, make common cause with these, and have in them allies, whom,—wince, protest, and strive, as they may,—they can never shake off, and whose good report and bad report they are in honour bound to share.

Nor is it not just thus to associate them ; for if it be indeed harsh in a perfect Ruler and Governor to punish for disobedience to a law which he has declared, and contempt of promises which he has made, what can it be in the Being of like attributes, of the more influential classes of Theists, to afflict, as we plainly see and feel each man of us that he does, for non-observance of a law which he has not made perfectly known, and for compliance with which he has provided no means, and assured no reward ?

The banners of progress bear now inscribed, those in the front, "A Clear Heaven and no Favour ;" those of the tumultuaries in the rear, "No Heaven and no Favour," those of the believer, "*οὐ γὰρ παύσῃνομαι*," which has a significance, and demands a courage in these days which it has never had or needed since those of Julian the Apostate, who, if brought back to life by the iron lyre and vehement regrets of his admirers, might now pass for a reasonably good churchman.

May it not be that we sometimes render unto Cæsar that which is not Cæsar's? that, overborne by the magnificence of the unknown, now more magnificent and more unknown than ever, we a little over venerate the undisclosed Familiar of the man of science, the retired, wonderfully apprehensive, but very talkative, Adept of the Abstract, the dogmatic censurer of all dogma? To these two, the improvers and workers up of the raw material of all things in the heavens above, the earth beneath, and the waters under the earth, we owe almost all we have, and many other mighty great things besides. But all this will not make either of them, with all his splendid specialities, the representative or model man, the true "battle or cavalry of the field."

The chief treasure of man is not, as Satan was the first to say it was, a limitless power of acquiring all knowledge, nor the lawful knowledge which man has acquired, or which has been amassed for him; but a well-balanced mind, a sound judgment properly to use and apply, and also properly not to use and apply, that knowledge, and by which alone can saving truths be surely reaped and safely harvested. But all know,—though practically it is a disregarded truth, and there is a pride some people have in slighting plain things,—that an intense and continuous strain on the mind in one direction, and especially excessive application to a single science, whether an exact, or only an abstruse one, or even a mere makebelieve, tends to disturb that balance, to strengthen part at the expence of the whole, to starve the understanding with sameness of diet, to narrow rather than to enlarge, to invite the tyranny of a fixed idea. As it is from day to day, so it is through life; for day to day to us is life.

In dealing with questions of doubt and difficulty, the mind becomes fatigued, droops, repeats ideas, and is at last overwrought and invents no more; and there is no further advance until the morrow, nor then, without rest and variety. But working life itself has no morrow, no revival; and thus rest comes too late; and the ambitious, one-ideal, half-way-up-the-ladder student, is suddenly brought to a stand, with his hod and unshaped materials, ill-poised and tumbling about him, in an attitude not apparently of his

own selection, there to remain, lame, angry and didactic, to the end of his days, but to advance never more. If it may ever be, it must sometimes be, that a needle, however fine, is only a needle, good for stitching, but no munition of war; and that our Faquir Philosopher by the way side, perpetually taking flattering alms of himself and his smaller counterparts admiring around him, for ever mentally fixed in one position, and mistaking perhaps at times the dwelling on one idea for a concentration of powers, comes at last to agree with his censor bearers, that his wallet of scraps of the unknown and tautographies must be the storehouse of the whole world; to accept and join in their worship, and regard all else as the fine and valorous bird in the fable, did the jewel, and as intellectually of *mauvais ton*. Unless this were so, there could never have been so many schools of Philosophy in the world; nor would they have been all, without any single exception, from the divine Plato, who indeed found, or perhaps stole, a diamond, but damaged it in the working, and earlier, down to the latest clerical misfit in our own times, as to all matters relating to Theology, dead and ridiculous failures. There has been no advance from the very beginning. Answers, indeed, and promises of answers, are never wanting; but then they always begin in the same way, and do not end at all, as thus—"Thought, Ω Ανδρες Θεοι, in its differentiating and integrating activity, advances under terrestrial conditions, from the conception of one-sided determination, through the differentiating of subjective and objective, to the conception of mutual determination. Therefore —," *The Morning Land*; and this is, and always has been, the present state of the question.

Whatever may be alleged by some, and much more is haughtily and disdainfully said by mere outsiders, than is at all requisite or allowable in fair argument, of the homeliness, or, if they will have it so, the unhistorical character of some of the Scripture narratives, there is in the Word itself as declared in those Scriptures, nothing mean, nothing puerile, nothing subtle; nothing that is not at once simple and immeasurably grand, and equally adapted to all civilizations, the highest and lowest alike; but, and here is the grand stumbling-block, neither is there in it any respect of persons. Man, when once

man that is, being man through all ages, we are apt to reason in historical matters without due regard to effecting and disturbing causes, and to forget that the free and unconditional acceptance of the one religion introduces a new element into the discussion; for as there is no other than immense disproportion between the inducements and assurances of that one religion, and those of all others since the world began, so can there be none between their effects and influences on man and his conduct.

Reason,—not a simple faculty, but a combination of many, and each susceptible of error,—is doubtless a grand thing to work with, and if the finite could but measure the infinite, or were not the day-springs and course of the higher truths, above and beyond the range of our ideas,—might be almost omnipotent, and go far to justify the self-reliance of a certain Angel crossing the Abyss to better himself by tempting Eve with promises of undenominational knowledge and the suffrage.

But Reason, like that Angel, sinks helplessly and angrily down the instant it gets beyond its proper bounds; and if you invoke too strong a Genie, unless you have Solomon's ring, he will tear you. Guides are the most conceited of men. Reason and pride are seldom far apart. No one has less patience with his inferiors, or more thoroughly despises them, than the philosopher; to whom, for all his professions, the brotherhood of humanity in its comprehensive truth and integrity, beyond the cold conceits and exclusive hard fast line of Plato's dying Socrates and his interviewers, is now and for ever unknown.

Social dulness is a sharp thorn, and to none more so than to the brilliant and highly-trained Philosopher, who yet must encounter it every moment of his waking life, that is not spent in absolute seclusion. True charity, the crown of all virtues, is rare to find, hard to practise; for why should the philosopher who deserves so much and who always goes intellectually full dressed, regard the dirty extremes of humanity, who deserve so little, and are so afflictively tiresome? and yet, if he does not strongly and ungrudgingly regard them all, and that without any exception, there is no charity. The

First Great Commandment, unknown to Philosophy except as a magnificent abstraction and pleasure of the imagination, is the only preparation for the Second, "which is like it." Without the perpetual contemplation and observance of that First, the Second is impossible. There is no communion and absolutely no tie throughout the whole moral universe to bind man to man, and self can never be effectually eradicated, or true charity begin.

There is a wisdom, that makes a way out of the wilderness; there is another wisdom that makes a way into it. The horizon clears, but only because it contracts. The Well of Syene no longer receives the full meridian ray, but is ever part in shade; and the seeming gain is loss. The known but disregarded mischief is, that the unequal practice on a brain with various functions and powers, but all limited, and herein the constant and long-cherished habit, amounting almost to fanaticism, of requiring strictly logical, that is, scholastic, artificial, hole-and-corner proof for every position whatever, first disinclines, and at last disables from receiving any other, to the exclusion of high and ennobling truths, disdainful of such mode of proof; and all to end in a sententious scepticism, a deadly chill; for it is the vain self that works, and vanity is hemlock to all goodness. Secular pursuits too exclusively followed effect a like end by indifference and obliteration; but the danger in the former case is greater, because the fault is presumption.

Dr. Newman, in his "Idea of a University," taking rather a Royal Academy view of the matter, would assign "the seeming antagonism between Reason and Faith" to "a devotion to the study of the material, visible, sensible glories of the universe in their infinite vastness, complexity, comprehensiveness and harmony, creating an indisposition to the authoritative teaching of Revelation, from the sense it awakens of the ineffable distance of the faith there taught from the view of things familiar to the student; its strangeness, its rude simplicity, and its apparent poverty, as contrasted with the exuberant life and reality of his own world." But is this so? or is it all? Is not the idea of a living Spirit, with all the Jehovistic attributes, an added splendour to these glories?

"6. Whither shall I go then from thy Spirit, or whither shall I go then from thy presence?"

"7. If I climb up into heaven, thou art there. If I go down to hell, thou art there also."

"8. If I take the wings of the morning and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea ;"

"9. Even there also shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me."—*Psalm* 139.

The antagonism is sufficiently real, for what peace can endure, what olive-branch but must wither, between an assured reliance on a promise from without, and a speculative conclusion of Reason, kept together by some showy debateable syllogism, its only holding power? But the subjects are not related throughout. The contemplation of these material glories is common to both, but the one opens and maintains at once and for ever a view of spiritual glory compared with which these material ones are of no more account than the dust we tread on; and if we will abide for ever in these last, the mere scenery and carpentry of the outer universe, we do but bend our thoughts downward with Mammon to admire, with no sense of worship and communion with an unseen but assuredly present perfect Spirit, "the riches of heaven's pavement, trodden gold," to the exclusion of far higher objects, and thus in our laborious, engrossing, vainglorious analysis of the material, lessen, and, as we proceed, lose all sense of the spiritual, in a mere barren admiration of externals, things bounded to us, after all, by our own limited ideas and faculties.

Looking back, however, with Philosophy some few thousands of years, we find an earth without man; some certain other thousands, and we have the reign of Behemoth; yet a few millions, or say milliards, more, and nothing but zoophytes and jellies; and then a general wash; until we arrive at last at that primitive matter without parts or qualities, which Aristotle says "blushes to be seen naked, and is never beheld except clad in some form;"* that is to say, is of such a nature

* He had first matter seen undressed;
And took her naked all alone,
Before one rag of form was on.

Butler's Alchymist in Hudibras.

that it has all the predicables of nothing, and yet is always something.

According to the Apocryphal book Jezirah, the authorship of which is attributed to Abraham, in the text, "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters;" by the term "waters" is meant this primitive matter, void of all quality until received from the Spirit so moving; and it is said by the Rabbi to have been so called because, in any medium denser than water, there is no true or free motion.

We may accept this "water" because, by the stripping process, we must come to it at last; but we must reject this Spirit of God, or power working from without, because this water or primitive matter is of so fine a nature, that it needs no such aid, but is its own quickener, and its own God; (*Liber Cosri, Part 5, s. 18*), that is to say, it is something that was before form, but of which form is a phenomenon; then, if a personality, we have found Him whom we sought, and with Him, will, design, power, and eternity; if not, we being personalities, are phenomena of what is not a personality; which may be; but at any rate, we were not always, and may therefore ask, what was before us? form—and what before this form?—matter without form, and life actual or potential without will or personality; but without form, will, or personality is neither time nor eternity; and creation was innovation, change, the beginning of form; and again, what was before this beginning?

The first step from this assumed primitive matter, whether a phenomenon or the cause of phenomena, or whatever it may be, carries the whole question; for the first assignment to it of certain predicable qualities is the beginning of Time and of Space. If it had life in itself, but without personality, then creation was a self-effecting change, without design or purpose, in something existing, and the first change was the act of Creation, from which everything else has followed, and what we understand as the beginning of all things. But when was this beginning, and what was before it, and why did it begin? This is the true difficulty, the question which Mephistophilis, who believed, blinked, and counted blasphemous in Faust, who did not believe, for asking, and which no Theorist of

any nationality, however advanced, has ever since even affected to answer ; and yet the question of all others which must be answered. This primitive matter, which we cannot conceive, because without quality, by which alone we can conceive anything, must be the same matter which we now see in the concrete around and about us, and in and of which we are. It therefore existed, if alone or without an Innovator, with all its present predicable qualities potentially before this concrete, thus creeping by degrees into what we now find it to be. But if it always so existed, the first change was the act of creation, and one of change or succession, and a suitable point in infinity proper must be found for its beginning and place ; and it must be shown how it came to have that beginning and place.

But this beginning is not to be found by drawing æons* upon Time for ever. Least of all has this been done by the "Give-it-up Communists of Philosophy," to whom all things are a rushing Chaos, that has chanced in the course of time into its present order, to chance at any moment into some new kind of Chaos ; neither the rushing, the Chaos, or the time, being given, or at all accounted for.

According to this cheerful Theory, matter, space, motion, and time are absolute merciless realities, and exist necessarily of themselves, without control or aid of any. Then, before order was disorder, but a disorder tending to order. Then, when in infinite time, which has no unit of measure, was the first step to this order, and what was before it ? Disorder ; that must mean a specific disorder, a disorder in the concrete ; and what before that ? another disorder or another fragile order in the concrete ; and so on for ever. That is one view. But try another, What was before this first act of creation ? There was nothing before it, for there was no time ; but at the Creation was an Eternal Spirit, whose being is not measured by or subject to time. But in relation to the thing

* Has it never occurred to these more or less graduates, that "εις αιωνα" conveys a simple idea in good and intelligible Greek ; but that "εις αιωνας," without the support and qualification of some special context to alter the primitive meaning of the word, that is, "being" ὁ Ων, Jah, I AM, is a self-contradiction in terms and indeed nonsense.

created, and its incidents, time and space, and according to our ideas, this Spirit was before and will be after them. As without change, that is, succession, there is no time, so without consciousness, that is, a conscious Personality, is no eternity.

The number of ways in which a game of Chess may be played is incalculable by us, but not infinite. According to Stuart Mill indeed, all musical combinations are now nearly exhausted, and the world of sound played out. If a subject be limited, and a vacuum of matter is a limit of matter, so also must be the changes of its parts and accidents; and this material dance of atoms cannot continue for ever, but must at last work a great circle; and then there must have been a former grand circle, and a beginning; and then something before that; and again, when was that?

If this assumed primitive matter, being itself inert, had an Innovator from without, that Innovator, not being itself matter, or commensurate with or subjective in matter, must have been Spirit; indivisible, without parts and without limits, these being forms of matter only; then this matter being, "ex hypothesi," no phenomenon of this objective Spirit, nor any part of it, if this Spirit will, or if it be a law of this Spirit, as this innovation had a beginning, so, it is agreed, must or may it have an end, and the plastic inert matter, the plaything of the Spirit, must either revert to what it was before, or take or remain in some other form; and yet the quick Spirit, by its own laws, abide as before, and subject neither to place, for that is a quality of matter only; nor to time, for that is the succession of dependent or connected phenomena, and ideas are not necessarily successive; and eternal, for that which is, and yet is not subject to or in time, must be so; and absolute, unless it meets with another Innovator, and that it would be only reasoning in a circle to contend for.

If we accept the view that Spirit, dwelling alone in eternity, when time was not, of and by his own free will created—that is brought into being, not out of nothing, which is insensible, impossible, but of Himself—this existing or this primitive matter, with all its potential and after disclosed

qualities and accidents, and that this matter therefore only exists in and through the consciousness, will, and design of Him who, having thus created, can alone sustain, and therefore is and must be always and entirely present everywhere at once, now and for ever, there is no assignment of or beginning of time as an independent reality, taken out of an infinity made up of time; nor is it a new conception or act of the eternal will, but an eternal and yet immediate decree and act in one of an Eternal Personality, from and in whom the past and present and future, not themselves eternity, or any complement or parts of eternity, but always co-existent in Him, wholly spring and subsist, so long as He will, and, speaking only as to our own possible conceptions, as one instant, one eternal Now. Then the course of nature, or what we call and esteem such, assumes for the first time a real life and purpose, and one which under a blind material law it could never have had; and then too such a seeming deviation from that course as a miracle, say that of the Ascension—in which a perfect man, restored from actual natural death to life, was removed out of our universe, though a discontinuance of the observed ordinary course of nature—is as much part of the true course, the one continuing original design, as the daily rising and setting of the sun, which very rising and setting were ordained, established, and maintained by the same Power, with all other things in the world, from the beginning, to be a mere machinery or preparation, leading up to that miraculous act of Ascension, and to the return of the ascended Person hereafter; without which Ascension and return the whole human race, the Creator's chief apparent care, is utterly and for ever lost.

By the first act of disobedience, a miracle at some time became a necessity and a certainty; for man fell, not by command, but by and for himself; the original design was broken, and could not be restored without some new starting-point and change from without; that is, without some extraordinary interposition or new creation; the first breach of the moral involving thus a necessary departure from the natural law.

But the whole scheme of the Creation must have been fully marked out and designed by its Author, if an Eternal Personality, from the very beginning; the birth, fall, and redemp-

tion of man, the accomplished and the accomplishing, by one thought. Then, the first state of this man in an earthly Paradise, being less than his capabilities, must have been but a preparation for that which it would have become in an orderly and painless course of events, if he had stood firm, and which is now promised to ourselves under the new covenant; and then, as on the one hand it might be a shortcoming of mercy to withhold from any being a good or enjoyment fitted to his nature, so on the other it may be conceived that this first preparatory state could, consistently with perfect wisdom and justice, or except by a blind good will have been offered only to one under conditions and possessed of some degree or kind of will to accept or refuse those conditions to him the appointed means of advance, and to choose between obedience and rebellion, that is, as regards the first man created sinless, between good and evil.

If so, either those conditions must have been altogether nugatory or the fall must have come at last, if not to the first man, to some of his descendants; that is, man could never have stood by his own strength; that is, could never have stood, that is, could never have been at all; for it is impossible that he should have been created by one the owner and Lord of all, with an absolute intent that he should fall, and so defeat the very cause of his being. But it was designed, and wisely and benevolently designed, that he should be, and it was known that he would offend and fall; and therefore a remedy was provided, open to all in turn, by one who did not fall, but who nevertheless suffered the penalty for all who did. By just Decree man died; by Will, that is by Grace, was restored: that is, there was mercy designed him from the very beginning; for the Decree, Will, and Creative Act were ever at one.

If we could suppose it possible for man to have been placed in the Garden of Eden, subject to no command and absolutely without any will or power of transgressing, his position would have been that of a being as perfect in his degree as the irrational brutes are in theirs, but without either tendency or desire to advance, or any perceptible further use or purpose in creation; a servant without duties, a priest without an offer-

ing, and it is hard to conceive how in such a case he could ever have prepared himself, or even desired or hoped for a higher or better state, why such a state should have been designed for him, or why deferred.

If we accept the visible universe, the outward veil of Truth, as created and existing, by and in the will and consciousness of the Creator, it follows necessarily, and it is a limitation of Omnipotence to deny it, but not a thought to be long usefully or lawfully dwelt on by us, that there may be other worlds and systems of worlds innumerable, as tangible, sensible, and in every respect as material, according to our understanding of the term, as our own, each existing unconsciously to the inhabitants of all the others, in another space and in another time, with inhabitants, either under like conditions of life with ourselves, or under others wholly different and absolutely impervious to our senses, and beyond our faculties even to imagine, and yet through a common Fatherhood, of necessity our brethren, and members of one communion with ourselves and others, and all of whom with ourselves may sometime, in another state of being, meet as such.

Goodness and holiness, being inseparable attributes of the Creator, must be common to all his creatures, to whom he has given the capacity, and the same in all; but beyond this, and the knowledge and worship of Him, it may be that these inhabitants, possibly far our superiors in faculties, have not one idea in common with ourselves. They may have no idea of extension, of time, of vision, or any of the objects of our vulgar senses, the inlets of our slight knowledge, and where then is the universality of science? And what becomes of our vaunted reason that can neither comprehend or deny this?

We all speak glibly enough of other worlds; but, when we do, we mean this without knowing it. We often wander in a dream as in a new world; give a little more strength and consistency to that dream, and where in space is that world?

We readily attribute to the Creator a present absolute knowledge of all past and future events and of their conse-

quences for ever ; but not so familiarly the like prescience of the consequences which would have followed if the past had happened in a different way, or had not happened at all ; yet this is a necessary and proper attribute of Omniscience, and faintly mirrored in the operations of our own minds, when we reason from consequences in the investigation of any truth, presses strongly home the conclusion of will and personality in the First Cause.

In very truth this question of personality is the only one. Do all things spring from a creative mind, perfect and absolute in wisdom and power, with an intent and purpose, or from an impersonal creative quality underlying the whole as a base, working without design to an end good or bad, even yet unknown throughout all creation, and which, not springing from an eternal will, must have had its beginning in time, which time before that beginning could not have been ?

The argument is handled on one side with something at least of the reverence due to the Revelation to which it relates, from those who have an assurance of its truth ; on the other, with irreverence and ridicule as weapons. Yet with a fair field the matter might be easily reversed, for no one has written greater nonsense than the Divine Plato, the toiling and spinning Lily of Philosophy, except perhaps certain moderns, who have fairly added a grace to the Lily by re-introducing the heavier kind of ghosts, unable wholly to quit the body, and haunting and occasionally dimly seen in darkened vaults and dining rooms, and calling themselves rational and happy.

The heaven and earth spoken of as created in the beginning are understood by all as our visible universe ; and, by some at least, as springing from the will of One who before that was not, and after that will not be, but who always is, the only essential reality, in and by whom, not only ourselves, but all things material and spiritual, even all we can conceive of an invisible world exist. Of His general attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness, there is commonly no dispute among those who allow him any attributes at all. He does not reason, for that is the laborious process of limited faculties, but knows, wills, and acts, in one. With

Him can be no time or succession of ideas, or replacing of one idea by another, but all is always present; the future is now. Without this would be mutability, change, *μεταβολα*, that is, imperfection.

The six days of creation are generally accepted, not as natural days, but as rests, divisions, intervals of time, when time was, undefined and unequal, or at least not necessarily equal in duration; and there is not commonly much objection taken to this view; but then it is asked, why such a long endurance of the formless and void? and why such slow steps to the completion? and why rather was not all created, as we should have done it, in one instant, perfect in all its parts, and absolutely fitted for its original design? and what is this Sabbath? this hallowed seventh day or interval, of any purpose of which, look where we may, we can find no trace?

There is no apology in reason for the Sabbath, which is of command and promise, and without reason has been observed in the remotest lands far beyond the memory of man. But do we indeed know that all was not, as regards the Creator, made at once? May it not be that we call that duration, which is not duration, from the imperfection of our faculties, and because time is the law and necessity of our present being, and we cannot with any clearness conceive, either when time was not, or what is, when time is not, and thus impute that to the Creator, which is proper only to the created? May it not be that all this seeming duration is but an assertion to us that He who was at the beginning is also the Lord of Time so long as it pleases him that Time shall be?

Cause and effect are twins, born in the same instant of an Eternal will; nor is either sovereign, nor, except in time, itself a phenomenon with a beginning and ending, and servile attributes, is either of them before or after the other.*

* According to some Rabbi, the creative will, the design, and the act, form the three "debarim" or words by which the world was created, and are one in the Divine mind. Plato had been in Egypt, and so had Jeremiah before him, and at any rate the Jewish idea in theology could not have been unknown in that country, and the idea itself is intensely theoretical and didactical.

The laws of nature are thus not laws, nor second causes at all; for matter, though it exist to us, yet being unreal, can have neither property or action, except through the perfect present will of its Creator, acting immediately upon it. Then, we observing the constant order and regularity of these properties and actions, attribute them to the matter itself, and formulating them as such, step merrily in to explain and reprove the designs of the Creator, very much as did Job's three friends, the first Theologians not under direction on record.

It pleased the Creator, however, to act by what we, through this prejudice, call second causes or laws of nature, upon elements, whether analogous to Aristotle's primitive matter or not, created by Himself, and working thus, in what to our apprehensions is long and wearisome succession, to create the earth "formless and void," the deep, "on the face of which was darkness," that is, mere negation, and moving on the face of these primitive created "waters," to make or cause light, the antagonist of this darkness, by giving the inert matter at once through all the visible universe those special properties, and that activity in itself, which should produce or receive light with all its incidents and properties, advancing from the more simple to the more complicated forms, until the whole has become what it now is, in its progress, doubtless, towards further changes and perfections in all its parts, as yet unknown. But all this seemingly infinite duration of time, to us as incomprehensible as in an opposite direction are the wonders of the microscope, must have been to the Creator Himself, not subject to time, but as a single instant, and so must it have been absolutely, before there was sense of duration in some being subject to and under the law of time, and yet looking for something beyond time.

This completed the first day, when, we are told, there was a rest or pause, but plainly not one to be measured by our ideas, for there was then no being in, or native of, our universe (and with others we have at present no concern) sensible of duration, and the expression "day" in the text is a mystery associated with that of the Sabbath.

The second day is that of the Creation of the firmament, the assignment of place in space; and where are these that

before or at that creation were not? In the Eternal Mind, in and by which they exist, and which we persistently err in assimilating to our own, and there only. We gaze upwards and think that we are looking into infinite space; but we are doing no such thing. What we perceive with our senses is truly enough what we perceive with our senses, that is, something objective to ourselves, but exists and affects us only through and according to the will and design of the Creator, which will has adapted one to the other as parts of one entire system, existing together and yet apart—that is, for all the purposes of the visible universe according to His design, beyond that not at all. He who established the firmament, and afterwards made the dry land appear, created also from and out of the same material dust, which is truly dust to us, though existing only in and by His Will, and on these conditions may be properly styled and treated by us as material, the beings that inhabit it, and gave by moulding or addition or both, to each of those beings its proper and individual life and sense; bounded in all by certain laws dimly and in part only discerned by us. But whence came that life and sense, unless as children seem to think, direct from Him, let them declare who know.

Few probably will dispute that the entire Solar and Stellar Systems, whether of design or by chance, must have originated simultaneously. On no other hypothesis that we can frame, could the observed balance of natural forces have been established or maintained as we now find them; and if so, it is but reasonable to infer that the process and advance of creation in each of the bodies that compose these systems have been and are, stage by stage, analogous to those of our earth.

The third day works the separation of the land from the waters, and the creation of the insentient parts of the earth; that is the inert earth, possibly under the operation of light previously created, received form and qualities such as under the operation of the so-called second causes referred to, have led to what we now see in full force and effect around us; that is, organism, sense, intellect, the living soul, united all,

but each wholly and essentially distinct, and created, if the last were created, in sequence rather than succession.

We hear much of the advance of intellect, and we readily enough accept the flattery ; but whence the moral sense ? and is it a discovery, and therefore absolute ? or an invention, and therefore tentative and improveable ? and which was first, morality or immorality ? and which after all is the best ?

Reason, ever taking bribes of Occasion, slowly, painfully after many defeats, and in part only, controls and guides the quick will by debateable *ex post facto* laws ; and conduct therefore in the uninstructed, is either unprincipled and casual, or merely imitative ; yet in what was the highly developed Socrates a better man than the Shepherd of Salisbury Plain ?

If the moral sense be a development and not itself life, as in a lower degree sensation is life, the want of it was not at first a vice, and the will was before the command ; then, why has not this sense kept more equal pace with the faculties now subject to its rule ? In the development of the sense of vision through the eye, with the delicate iris, came with equal pace the shielding cornea, the protecting lid and lash, the cleansing tear and the pigment to veil off and subdue too strong a light. But why does analogy halt at this point ? What natural guardian has morality ? Reason, that tells us that vice is a hideous thing. But the beginnings of vice are not seen, and Reason, though professedly at command, requires awakening by motive ; and whilst it slumbers the mischief, and that an irreparable one, is done ; for we can no more of ourselves efface the stain of sin once admitted, than we can recall the past, or enforce with the conscience that follows, a covenant of peace which ourselves have broken with that which precedes our acts. We shrink instinctively from what is physically hurtful ; but, if this slumbering reason be all, from what and how are we to shrink ? The moral sense, if a development, has been a development or consequence of our faculties and their relations ; and these faculties, as they accrued, so may they be stripped off one by one without or before the actual destruction of life. But in neither process can any special point be fixed for the birth or death of a moral sense. Certainly, in the infant embryo, the moral

sense and all the faculties are nascent within it, and will mature together in due natural course, and we cannot determine the instant of the birth of any ; but the angry infant, the little murderer in will, speaks but too clearly of the fall and its consequences.

Morality must be perfect, without stain or blemish, or it is Immorality. Then, if it be the result of reason, that too must be without error or weakness, or natural cause of either, or sin must be venial and of weak consequences. If the moral sense were the last crowning gift to perfect man, we can conceive, apart from considerations of will and foreknowledge, which belong to a more advanced question, that being bound to no hard duty, he might and should have stood firm in the right. But if it be the mere offspring of the natural faculties, then amid the war of forces, helpless and fretful through an infancy of so many thousands of years, Plato's orderly steed was mated with too violent and restless a yoke-fellow, and could have had no chance from the beginning.

It is conceivable that this visible universe may have been created, as we know it to have existed, six thousand years ago, literally within the period of six natural days, and that we are now reasoning back from signs and appearances which it always bore ; very much as the Palace of Aladdin may be imagined to have borne all the marks and indications of having been actually constructed by human hands and skill. This hypothesis will doubtless find favour with few, and it is only mentioned here, because it has been advanced by some entitled to great respect ; but, be it what it may, it is neither more idle nor less probable than the least extreme of all the scientific theories that exclude a Personal Creator ; and if something be, and philosophy in its entanglement amid will and power, and evolution, and unchangeable laws, and with all the means and appliances of advanced science at command, has wholly failed to construct this something, it can only bring the weight and splendour of defeat, against positions standing upon wholly different supports, though as free with the rest of the world to assail those supports as a shower of hail is to shatter an iron roof.

The visible world is truly and objectively material to us

and our senses ; but in reality, and together with ourselves in all our separate individualities, only exists in and by the mind and will of the Creator, who made and peopled it with various forms of beings, material in the above sense, but at the same time sentient, under certain conditions; and in this view, and on this understanding, quite consistent with the truths of exact science in all its branches, matter and its properties may be and are correctly formulated by us. Our very individual consciousness of good and evil, with every act and thought and impression of pleasure and pain, now and for ever, are as much in and through Him, His will or permission, as the senseless material dust of the earth. If the world were now to come to a sudden end, as it would if He who made and sustains it were to turn His thought away from it but for a single instant, it would not fall back into a fabulous Chaos, but simply with all its life cease to be. The creation of the first rational or at least sentient being, under the conditions of our universe, is to that universe the beginning of time as distinguished from an eternity not measured by time. The expression " eternal duration " is a vicious blending of unrelated ideas.

In the third day appears salient and unmistakeable the unity in variety of the insentient world ; the manifest stamp of one creative mind. The plants and herbs of the earth, composed of like elements, all obey the same general law, and under all circumstances the distinction of species is, notwithstanding an occasional but plainly limited hybridism, by the sure recurrence of active laws fully maintained.

But must all beauty be indeed discarded from creation ? Is Philosophy so inexorable ? " Charybdis tam vorax ? " Is it really so hard to conceive the first spring time of the earth ? The ground softening under the influence of the new light and heat, to yield passage and afford nurture to the swelling germs of the primitive herb and tree of the field ? and if, as some at least, even of the outsiders of Revelation do not very strongly dispute, there was a design in the First Cause, and that design a wise and benevolent one, is it reasonable or superstitious to infer that, by that design, each herb and tree sprung, throve, and yielded the first " seed of its kind " even

where it was placed, in the soil and climate best suited to the conditions of its life, well being and organism, thence to spread by well-known provisions throughout the earth? But if this be so with the herb of the field, so must it be with beast and fowl, and so also with man, each dating from the first of its species with certain powers of what might be called development, if the term had not been so much abused, but far removed from all risk of confusion.

On arriving at the fourth day or period, we are met at once by the idea of space bounded by space—that is, by space studded with lights for ever; for it is idle to affect to say, “Thus far” to the one, and not to the other. Space in itself without contents, or some material point in some place, is nothing—not even an idea—for you must have an idea of contents before you can gain one of space; and if of contents you have quality, and have got beyond your primitive matter, and again we ask when did you do this?

Vastness is only relative, and there is no unit of measure of the infinite, though we pile æon upon æon, and molehill upon molehill, until we swoon again with anger and bewilderment. Time began and Time will end; and between these two terms is infinite as long as it lasts.

The stellar system does not extend throughout boundless space, for except in idea and as part of a design, there is no such thing, but exists in the mind of the Creator, and so far and in such form as He wills for His eternal purpose, and no further. We cannot assign either form or bound, but there is a wide difference between that incapacity in us, and absolute or necessary infinity.

But what then are these lights in the firmament, one of which is with perfect propriety in relation to our earth declared to be “the greater light to rule the day,” and another “the lesser light to rule the night; but which in relation to nearly all the others, are no such things?”

We know what science tells us of the solar system, and we now reasonably enough infer that the fixed stars are the centres of like systems and of like elements with our earth; and the same science almost compels us to assign inhabitants to these bodies, although of what kind, or under what conditions of life we are utterly unable to say, and indeed by common con-

sent speculation on the subject is abandoned by all, as inconsequential and idle. But knowing the vast power of self-adaptation to circumstances of nature in our own earth, and the simplicity of the means so often exercised for great purposes, we may surely herewith rest content.

It is said to be vicious reasoning to refer to Revelation itself, as affirmative evidence in the argument. But is not this reversing the case of Galileo? We must at least see what it is.

This comparatively diminutive earth was the actual scene of the Atonement. This very Atonement entered into and was part of the original design of the visible universe, at the very instant when God said, "Let light be, and light was," and the belief in it is the point of divergence between Christianity and all other religions whatever, whether idolatrous, rational, or optional.

But to what end are these lights in the firmament, with all their magnificence and seeming infinity? What if they be but Playthings in the hands of the Creator? manifestations to us of His riches and greatness, and silent assurances of His care for us, and nothing more, and of less worth in His estimation than one human soul? for what He has done for that soul, for aught we know, He has done for none besides.

But it need not be doubted that they are peopled worlds; and if so, the present homes of intelligent and responsible beings; and if these beings have needed an atonement, an atonement we, being such as we are, may be sure has been accorded them, and possibly—but this is mere human speculation—even by the one great act done on this earth, just as we ourselves have on conditions the benefit of that act, though neither actors nor eye-witnesses of it, nor of the blood of those that were.

Fret as we may, no surer answer can be made to the question by man, who can but deal surely with their secondary uses in relation to himself.

Without the fixed stars would be a loneliness and desolation hard to be realised. A sun, a satellite, and a few planets, whose times, orbits, and even weights and compositions are known to us; and all besides utter darkness, negation, nothing.

Without a habit of reverence there can be no complete morality in one who is bound to a service, and being imperfect, cannot become perfect without aid. But if the source of that aid be a Person too high for our ken, we need something from without to keep him worthily in our thoughts, and we have it abundantly around us in these quiet lights, which in these their secondary uses, alone in creation, give us the idea of a universe, and an assurance of communion with the Creator, but must not be worshipped, because to worship the dead is death. But if they suggest worship, and yet must not themselves be worshipped, we are led, and almost irresistibly and with awakened thoughts, to the true object of all worship, the Creator of them and ourselves.

It is said that He has left himself without witnesses. A poor unnamed lace-working woman in ill-health in a garret, wrote this to John Wesley:—"As to the not working, I cannot prevail with myself to agree to it, as I have not yet learned how long a woman can be idle and innocent. I also do not know when I have had happier times in my soul than when I have been sitting at work, with nothing before me but a candle and white cloth, and hearing no sound but that of my own breath. With God in my soul, and heaven in my eye, I think myself one of the happiest of human beings. I do not repine because I am not a fine creature set up to be gazed at, but I rejoice in being exactly what I am, a creature capable of loving God, and who, as long as God lives, must be happy. I get up and look out of the window, and gaze awhile at the moon and stars, the work of an Almighty hand. I think of the grandeur of the universe, and then sit down and think myself one of the happiest beings in it."—*Foster's Life of Bishop Jebb*.

The fifth day or period is that of the creation of sentient beings. To this point, or even later, with a sentient but brute creation, who have no thought beyond an uninformed instinct of the future, and apparently no calling memories of the past, the question of time as duration hardly presses, as regards beginning remains untouched. The advocate of Development bespeaks so much favour by the profusion and pleasantness of his illustrations of what is not disputed, in itself a species

of flattery, a ministration to our self-love, as almost irresistibly to draw away the attention from the true difficulty, that of placing the beginning, without which all reasoning fails. This indeed is the haunted room of the argument, shunned by all, bricked up, and said to have nothing in it.

But this tracing back of second causes no more works a step towards the discovery of the First Cause, than pacing the deck forwards is an advance on our voyage. For, try conclusions a little with these incomprehensible beginnings: *Æon* brooding over primitive matter ; that without mind is not eternity, but nothing ; next (next to what ?) quality ; that is innovation, beginning, motion, light, colour, vision ; but colour is not vision, any more than the brain is a landscape. A ray of light touches a nerve, a dull, sloppy looking object in itself, and we see ; but the bright ray and dull, sloppy-looking nerve are bound by different laws to one effect ; and who adapted these to work together ? The picture on the lens is a transcript of the distant brought near ; but why do we see ? what second cause has ever been found for this form of sense ?

The sixth day or period brings all to a conclusion ; and from this point the Theorist runs jubilant along, happy and glorious, something in this way, " Yes, to be sure ; no such thing ; didn't I say so. ? Causes produce effects, and there is no effect without a cause ; therefore any cause will produce any effect, for which there is no other cause ; therefore there is no First Cause ; therefore fitting causes will all in good time be found to account for the varying colours of insects, and the white bellies and brown and tawney backs of the sole and flounder, and the red spot on that of the plaice, and the changing colours of the chameleon ; and therefore also for the beginning and development of sight after generations upon generations of blind ancestors ; therefore there is no First Cause ; and Sir Edwin Landseer was only a little in advance of creation in giving his dogs the human eye ; and his pictures will in time become exact transcripts of the reasoning animal of the future, and prove incontestably that the dog of the 19th century was a rational animal, and much dwindled in size and ferocity from what he was in the days of Snyder

and Cerberus ; and action and reaction are equal in opposite directions ; and therefore there is no First Cause ; and causes produce effects," &c., &c.

With some, the First Cause being impersonal, is a touch lighter than aught conceivable, of nothing, coming once upon a time before time was, from nowhere, and thenceforth by a demonstrable system of action and reaction, in which it becomes itself an effect, working all things into this admirable concrete around us, peopled by beings now by degrees "ex mero motu," and by their own proper merits becoming intelligent and happy. Others, however, and perhaps of the more influential class, not entirely approving of these premises and their consequences, assent in terms to a Creator, with all the attributes of Jehovah, except that of being Jehovah, and then they say, "Here is an eternity, and here a beginning."

That is not quite so sure. If there is defect in any one attribute, there must be weakness in all. The completeness of the character is lost ; and in an instant the First Great Cause is gone, and with Him all knowledge, might, power, goodness and wisdom, and eternity ; and the circle is again complete ; and once more, when was the beginning ?

This Creator cannot be doubly disposed, but must be either wholly good or wholly evil, cruel or merciful, else there must be a strife within himself ; that is, change, weakness, defect in will, wisdom, or power, for blind power is confusion. Then, if the disturbance of a generally benevolent design, in which we clearly perceive all nature "to groan and travail," be not in fact consistent with absolute goodness and mercy, there is a defect in the Creator himself. His ways with us have not been equal. He must have repented, or been mistaken, or angry or pitiful and changeful, not figuratively, but even as we ourselves ; or if not, there was a double purpose of good and evil, that is, a divided, conflicting, defective will in the Creator from the very beginning. But how can such a changeful Creator be eternal ? and what is Time but change ?

But this disturbance has never been accounted for, nor consequently has the wisdom and goodness of this magnificent abstraction of a Creator ever been established by aught in Philosophy ; nor can it ever be otherwise.

So long as Sin is kept in the background in the argument and its inseparable horrors veiled, the question is neither fully nor fairly stated. But Philosophy cannot so state the question, for it cannot speak of sin as disobedience, and reprobacy, that is alienation from good, as a necessary consequence, without yielding the question, and the rapidity and suddenness of daily observed falls from seemingly slight beginnings to the lowest extremes of vice are far too strong for the flimsy compromises of human casuistry.

No answer then can be given to account for this disturbance except from History, that is, from Revelation ; but it may perhaps be stated here as a necessary inference, that if man had not fallen, the whole earth would have been still an Eden ; for we cannot conceive man as innocent, that is, fulfilling the law and purpose of his Creator, and yet thrust into an earth "cursed for his sake."

If the beginning were by the operation of an Eternal Will, so also must be the continuance, position, and movement of every senseless atom, the fall of every sparrow, the passing thought in every mind now and to come for ever, be by the same active and present will or permission.

But the ground, as we know, even without being told, is cursed ; the problem is to find for whose sake, and why ? and philosophy being manifestly out of Court, the question shifts from the plausible and ridiculous to the credible. But then comes the grand scholastic argument of antecedent incredibility, which is said to be too great to be surmounted.

But if it be so, the cause is in the mind which reasons, and not in the subject itself ; and the objection is but *argumentum ad hominem*, the weakest of all, and commonly a mere flourish, a yielding to and nursing of prejudice ; and what does it come to ?

Says the burnie,
 I come from haunts of coot and heron,
 I make a sudden sally ;
 And sparkle out among the fern,
 To bicker down a valley.
 For men may come and men may go,
 But I run on for ever.

And we have heard and seen it bicker and run so long,

that we accept the fact ; but one night the mercury sinks into the bulb, and the burnie is all ice and icicles ! True, there is a natural cause for this ; but the argument against the burnie's stopping is precisely the antecedently incredible one against miracles, which never yet made a true convert.

The question is, as to the present, continuing will of the Creator in his works, and the chief objection is to the word development in its modern acceptation, as implying effort of the creature, rather than such present continuing Will. But it is neither reasonable or harmless to apply any such Theory to responsible moral natures, as it is impossible upon any hypothesis of development or creation by tendencies, to show a beginning of this responsibility that shall harmonise with any idea of absolute power, benevolence, or justice.

This Theory of selection, this Mi-Careme, this little Carnival between the two heavinesses of the doubt of the past and the dread of the future, this dropped leaf from the Naturalist's Common Place Book, has no part in any serious question.

There is indeed a laughing Banshee in this new, or rather this revived School of Philosophy, that breaks out before every death in the house, every little catastrophe in the argument. Thus; it is a heavy discouragement that the Apes, our cousins, will always be so spitefully deficient in that very faculty which is the chief source of our strength and the secret of our progress ; for though quite capable of arguing for a short time " in platoons " on either side of a question, and very imitative and sympathetic under the lash, of all animals that be, they are the least able to fix their attention on any object for any time or purpose whatever ; and this may be observed as well in the caged as in the uncaged specimens. The incapacity seems to be absolute. The Carnivora, the fishing birds, the spider, the Trafalgar Lions, will watch the same spot immoveably for hours together, but not the Ape ; the very Aspen of animal life, his whole waking time is a succession of head jerks, from one trifle to another, to a degree per-

fectly irritating, and quite unsuitable to his position in the argument. Thus far the Banshee; but then comes the more serious conclusion, that by the operation of a principle of selection, which is an active one or nothing at all, certain faculties have developed themselves in these our "poor cousins" which were not there, or at any rate not in operation there before; but that the will to use them has not developed itself in any corresponding degree; that is to say, the faculty came before the will, and the principle has either not worked at all, or not carried true.

The argument is, that as the Peacock improves the breed by the gratification of stretching himself and thereby spreading his plumes, and thus pleasing his dingy discerning Hen, so the male Nightingale, a fine bird, will in time, through the spread of taste and intelligence amongst the hens of his kind, disclose the colours and vivacity, and acquire the musical science of the Piping Bullfinch, another fine bird, who will in turn, preserving, or say improving, his fine feathers and musical skill, gain the richer tones of the Nightingale. It is even thought by some, that by analogy, on the concession of the Female Suffrage, hen birds will begin to sing, as promised by Plato in his Republic, although one question, namely, what effect the excessive development of masculine qualities in women may eventually have upon child-bearing, has somewhat strangely been hitherto overlooked, except, since this was written, by some alarmist in America or elsewhere.

This law of selection by the strongest is by no means so general as it ought to be, to support a process of creation, and is subject to most vexatious and unconstitutional disturbances. We indeed improve breeds by working on this principle for our own purposes, but domestication lowers the instincts, and dulls the powers of self-providing. The Milch Cow, the wet-nurse and healer by act of Parliament of all mankind, is the most helpless being throughout creation, and a mere monster, an idiot amongst her kind, and would be incontinently poked to death as a disgrace to her sex, if she chanced to fall in with her wild sisters of Gillingham Park.

We know what selection and training will do for the horse ; though it is by no means certain, as any ostler will tell us, that the changes we effect by our art for our own purposes will be permanent ; but we learn at the same time that the barrenness of mules—things, it may be observed, not very common in a wild state—is a fixed and certain law, the meaning of which can hardly be misconstrued.

The selection does not always rest with the right species. The robber Bee—this is one of the newest spangles on the robe of this science, carries away and mixes the pollen of flowers, and perpetuates, and by cross-fertilization improves, the species of the plant ; but the Bee did not select its back or belly, or even its proboscis, for any such purpose. Again, Parasites are the Rule and not an exception. The ichneumon fly, the gardener's friend, must find its proper caterpillar in which to deposit its eggs, or become extinct ; and he who kills this odious caterpillar wrongs this friendly fly ; but this caterpillar must be so constituted as to receive and sustain this apparently unpleasant lodger rent free, and hardly upon any principle of selection on the part of the caterpillar. Again, certain parasites, familiar to man, are dislodged by a comb and perish ; then the man who invented the comb was a disturber of the economy of nature, for these disagreeable familiars are a species attaching themselves only to the species man, and on being displaced by him wholly disappear from the face of nature, to return perfect in their faculties immediately on sufficient consideration, but not before.

But not to overwork the Banshee, this parasite on its expulsion must either become extinct, or lie dormant, or pass into and acquire the characteristics of some other species. In either of the two former cases there can be no development. In the latter there is no sufficing evidence of the transitional state, and its return in its former perfect and normal condition and numbers on all occasions, is too sudden to admit of such transition. Here then at least, is some restriction of the principle of selection.

When did the delicate and fragile Ibis first take to killing snakes, of which all nature beside is afraid ?

There is a bird with the bill of a crane, except that the lower is somewhat longer than the upper mandible. Now this bird, seemingly so ill provided, ought by rights to starve ; but it lives upon oysters, for extracting which from their shells, as they lie at the ebb partly gaping, and for which only, it is admirably adapted. Then, either the bird and the mollusc must have been originally designed for each other, or the bird must have developed deformity and defect, and all for an oyster, a thing now said to be perishing off the face of the market, thus leaving the poor bird to redevelopment or death.

If life be found associated with matter, there has been a quickener, and the result has been life ; but it has never been shown that this quickener is aught subjective in the matter itself, and it is easier to conceive it as something acting upon than arising out of it. That is the first and simpler idea presented to the mind, and all beyond is mere unauthoritative surmise ; and in any view, dredge and stamp and churn as we may, and have done for centuries, no reliable trace of aught intermediate between life and the First Cause has ever been discovered.

In detracting from an eternal Personality and Will, without parts or succession, we give perforce an absolute independent atheistic reality to the phenomena that surround us, including Time ; and at every change in these phenomena, tracing back from the last to the first, we are free and compelled to ask what was before that change, and what its cause, at the very instant that we destroy the possibility of an answer by denying that Personality and Will.

If all things that now are were developed from an original matter, life must have been a late development—that is, an effect taking the mastery of its own cause ; possible, but curious ; and there must have been a beginning or something before the first ; impossible and still more curious ; and then what is man ? There is no such thing. He is not even a species, or anything more than an unfinished

specimen, something half-worked out from some kind of brute with pointed ears, risible muscles, and a head between shoulders ; and by parity of reason there are at this very time other brutes without either pointed ears, risible muscles, or heads between shoulders, working up by degrees to equal privileges with us though in different forms. *See Sir Humphrey Davy's Consolations of Travel.*

Without a sure and certain hope, an absolute conviction of the individual identity and consciousness hereafter, which hope and conviction, is the present actual privilege and possession of every faithful inquirer, all to us is lost ; and the earth, with its outward beauty and harmony, and all the charms of divine philosophy, is but a gilded stye, Thought an impertinence, and Truth a metaphysical quicksand. Even our highest affections must deceive us, for the objects of them are not what they seem to be, but mere phantoms, to whom we ourselves are but phantoms in turn. These affections therefore, ill-directed, ill-proportioned, and ill-retained, can but seem to raise the more effectually to cast down, exhaust and destroy ; and then, the worst of all, comes the beginning of that moral death when—

Ἀνὰ ποταμῶν ἱερῶν χωροῦσι παγὰι,
Καὶ διχα πάντα παλιν στρεφεται.

Where then is this full and complete assurance to be found ? in demonstration or dogma ? By Reason or Revelation ?

But demonstration has never been forth coming. He who accepts the demonstration of today is simply overborne by the skill and acuteness of one disputant, to be overborne by the counter skill and acuteness of another tomorrow, or perchance by finding and taking up the dropped end of some overlooked or forgotten truth ; but, in the meantime, the man may die in his uncertainty and despair.

That which simply remits dust to dust, and ashes to ashes, and the separate consciousness to the great soul of the universe, of which it is an emanation, there to re-

main undestroyed and indestructible for ever, is but another name for annihilation : for if it cannot signify to the individual what he was before his birth into this life, neither can it concern him what by the operation of the same law, he may become after his death or departure from it. If unconscious of the one, how should he have hope of the other ? or what better is his case than that of the self-seeking raven, flagging to and fro over the slime of the deluge, while the dove with the branch of promise has long ago returned to the ark ?

The conclusions of the reason are only probable, but probability and improbability are not always so very unlike, and the question lies between annihilation, and, as the ever awakening thought declares, of judgment ; and to propose our patch-work merits, our weak irregular compliances by fits and starts with one or two pet commandments, as a claim to unconditional mercy, is the very neck verse of Philosophy.

It is a gladdening thought that the credentials of the promise are not conclusions of Reason, but the still small voice from without, that was neither in the whirlwind nor in the fire, speaking to the inner man with authority and power of its own, and working an absolute assurance marked by an inward entire change of disposition, but beyond that offering no further proof. He who, notwithstanding their steadfast unfanciful results, holds these to be but tricks of the imagination or heated fancies must so think, for he can do no otherwise without the aid of the very thing he rejects.

Who in his time has not been utterly confused on these points by the sudden questioning of a simple child ? and what is that which can be thus baffled ?

"Deo erexit Voltaire," "and this did Araunah to David, as a King to a King." What has Philosophy ever mastered on these points from the days of Plato to our own ? and what has Plato ever done for his followers ? Leo the Tenth was a Platonist or nothing, and died driveling. Cato of Utica, when this world was, according to his way of thinking, lost to him, after reading Plato,

committed suicide ; but did it, as Plutarch tells us, in his desperation roughly and awkwardly, and died ingloriously screaming for aid to put him out of his pain.

If these leaders of modern thought would but look a little to the results of their teaching upon lesser men ; if they would but mark the bearing and conduct of their followers and interviewers, those loud disorderly travesties of themselves that now meet us with more and more licence at every turn, those cynical retailers of their chance sayings, those hard bargains of all-day-long mast-headed midshipmen beguiling the time by cracking weevilled nuts and making faces at the quarter deck, those cheap Jacks of odds and ends of infidelity, which they toss and catch as a conjuror does his blunted knives, these Master Spirits might even yet be brought to answer—"We have enfranchised this Helotry in vain. The victory is not with us."

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IN THE BEGINNING

REMARKS ON CERTAIN MODERN VIEWS
OF THE CREATION

PART II.

BY

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of Lincoln's Inn Barrister-at-Law

Dissentientis
. exemplo trahenti
Perniciem veniens in ævum.



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IN THE BEGINNING.

PART II.

OF the grandeur and improvement of the intellect we have long heard abundantly; of the use of it, except from the impracticable maintainers of certain dogmas not resting on any recognised scientific principles, little or nothing; and either in consequence or in fact, there is even now something wanting to the most complacent thinkers.

Looking indeed, first at the common or conventional intellectual standard of those around us, and then, with the scared incompetitive wonder, the unfruitful patrimony of lesser men, at the unapproachable excellencies of the great speakers out of the thoughts, words, and deeds of the time, we may find little reason to doubt, that the powers and capacity of the mind have been strengthened and enlarged to the utmost, and that Progress is truly an influential reality. But the advance has not been in all directions, and certainly not in all alike; and if, as we cannot well help seeing, there has been, in some of our pursuits great and uniform success, and in others, at all times, and under all circumstances, failure, absolute, forlorn, angry and hopeless, there must have been misdirection at the outset, either in the aim or of the means, and as it is the same excessively indefatigable mind that is at work in all, the cause of the difference is to be looked for in the former rather than in the latter, in the choice of the subject rather than in the conduct of the inquiry. It is a poor harvest that garners nothing but hard words. Seeming success is often only failure in a mask, and as a general rule, the less we advance, the more we gesticulate.

But if there has been this misdirection, there has been blame attaching both to guide and followers. The novices in Philosophy, except those who take it naturally in its severest form, are almost always advanced scholars, reasonable and accountable beings, with the like natural powers of discerning truth from error, that all men have of distinguishing the perverse from the upright in conduct. There is a living principle in every man, that with honesty of purpose, will enable him quickly, quietly and surely, to detect the sophistries of the most confident teachers. It is, under Providence, nearly as hard a thing to mislead plain common sense, as it is to unmislead entailed party nonsense.

Almost all sceptics, of any mark in these days, have at first, either from early associations or because it lay in their path, accepted in some form, a religion, gracious but exacting, and exchanged it at last for an abstraction of a more optional character, and a volunteer, decorous, picturesque morality, highly satisfactory to a host of skilled witnesses, whose approval, openly decried, is in secret greatly desired. But true religion is a thing apart and has no witnesses, and must be courted by observances or it will fade from the mind; and men thus become, religious in the abstract, philosophic in the concrete, retaining, like vases that have held rose leaves, a little of the fragrance of the first, but working with all the pungency of the latter quality. But these men, the best of them, that is, little dream how much they really owe to what they now count their early delusions.

But as the one wanes, the other increases, and with it all the perils of the unknown, not remote, but close at hand; not at the end, for there is no end, but in the passage. The parties to the dispute take their positions much as they did at the Confusion of Tongues, and separate to their respective tents, never to meet in peace again.

The question itself is simple enough; the Universe of mind, sense and matter; what it is; when, how, and why it began; what its First Cause; and what the nature and quality of that First Cause. This we demand to know, and this we will know, and this we shall know all in good time, unless in the very extreme case of our happening to find in the search,

that the First Cause is a Personality, and that He has made a Decree, and so limited our faculties, that we shall not know more than He has set down for us to know, and that this is not among the things set down. But then on the other hand the very question is, whether those faculties were ever His to limit, and our successes in science and art have been so splendid of late, that no one in his senses can doubt, that we are now in full advance towards the discovery of the North West Passage, and with that, of first forms, that is, of the First Cause and all about it.

There are some, who, not flinching from the controversy, but feeling their own inefficiency to construct a system out of their own resources, accept and gladly maintain one presented to them by and resting on an authority not admitted in the argument; and this is denounced in them as prejudice; but hardly with fairness, unless all choice is prejudice. Besides, a prejudice is not necessarily false, and Prejudice in the abstract is as swift as thought, and indeed much swifter, for it comes before thought, and he has no experience in argument or of the course which all reasoning takes, who does not know, that there is a double-headed Prejudice with clipped wings, at the head of every Thesis, and that there is always at the beginning of a controversy, as much of prejudice on the one side as there is on the other. There is a yielding prejudice, and there is a resisting prejudice, and both are seldom absent from the same mind at once.

There are others who with the best intentions follow these, long, patiently, and approvingly, but reject this authority upon a point of honour. They have gone on thus far in their own strength, and so they will endure to the end. They stand still at last, wearied out and helpless, at a door invitingly open; they have no where else to go to, and know not what to do, but enter they will not. There they have stood, Theory after Theory, time out of mind, and there they now stand, each on his own square, their king checkmated, but always ready for another game, which the players generally begin by sacrificing a bishop. There you may leave them, and there, should you want them, you will be safe to find them. Good intentions avail but little until they lose themselves in act, and are intentions no longer.

By the wayside of these stand-stills is an air-tight coffin. Open it, and you will find a body, perfect in lineaments, life-like, calm, serene, beautiful ; but ere you can touch it, ere you can get one good look at it, it yields to the new light and air, and crumbles into shapeless and impalpable dust and ashes.

That is Materialism. All materialists, some without knowing it, argue in this way. "There is Something that God did not create : therefore Something is God : therefore God is Nothing."

Those firstly above spoken of, place the beginning, that is, the creation of this triple universe of mind, sense, and matter, in the absolute will of One, not subject to, and having Himself no beginning in time ; and these refer the end to the same will of that same One, who having no beginning, has in His essence no end.

"Quid faciebat Deus, antequam mundum faceret?" This has an air of sarcasm, of a scroll issuing out of the mouth of a caricature, rather than of aught argumentative. It might indeed have weight, if the First Cause were matter, because every movement of or change in matter, is in succession to something, and there was therefore always something before the first given change. But if the First Cause be a Spirit, the taunt fails ; for thought and consciousness are properties of Spirit, and neither of them is in or subject to time. They are indeed vouchsafed to us, who receive ideas in succession by means of which we acquire the impression of time, but in themselves they are not so ; and he who cannot conceive an eternal thought and consciousness in a Spirit the First Cause of all, must necessarily conclude that there are no thoughts but our thoughts, and no ways but our ways, and can only be heard in the question *honoris causâ* : for how can that which is a thousand years to us, be as an instant to the First Cause, unless the whole thousand years be to Him, one and indivisible ?

This reference to a revealed attribute of the Supreme Spirit is allowable, because, however it may be denied as a fact, it cannot be said to be inconceivable.

To this One Spirit, to whom, not being subject to time,

the will, design, and creating act are necessarily one, these, reasoning *à priori*, or partly perhaps and unconsciously guided by the authority above referred to, assign the creation out of Himself, abiding alone in eternity, of the substance or seeming substance of the earth, objective and material to us, but always and entirely subjective in Him. To this substance we,—drawing from our ideas, our sole possessions,—ascribe form or quality. Of course there may be form beyond the range of our ideas and conceptions, but where form ends, this substance,—be it or not the floating nonentity, the primitive matter of Aristotle and the Alchymists,—either ends with it, or, whatever it may be, retires into the Divine Mind from which it came. It is a pregnant fact, that even to this day, it is a discomfiting question with some Alchymistic minds, whether this matter without form is something or nothing.

From matter with some form to organization without life, is an easy stage, nor is it hard to conceive, or a novelty to represent, the whole insensible universe as existing in and wholly governed by a Divine Mind, always and entirely present every where at once, now and for ever. The proposition itself is as old and familiar as any thing can well be in Philosophy, and he who has never proved it within himself, as at least a conceivable idea, has either never passed the threshold of study, or missed his vocation altogether, and must be always nowhere in the question.

So far then, there is no great difficulty; but some arises at first with the world of sense; to conceive how the separate individuality of every living thing, with all its sensations, thoughts, ideas, pains and pleasures, now and for ever, can have and maintain its being, only in the same Mind, and by and under the same will and law as the senseless crust of the earth; how there can be in that Mind, itself incapable of pain or evil, the perfect and entire consciousness of the sense and appetite of every living thing, of every thought and idea, every emotion of pleasure or pain, every suggestion and working of good and evil in our minds, as and even before it arises, now and for ever, and throughout all the universe visible and invisible at once; how it can be, that there shall be throughout a creation teeming with such, neither

sense, appetite, thought or idea of any kind, that is not derived from and does not exist wholly by and in the will and consciousness of One who in His own Personality has none of these things as they are in us; how the individual can appear to himself to be alone with his own thoughts, how he can have, as he deems, full will over those thoughts, and yet possess within him, One, objective to himself, yet to whom himself is always subjective, not a witness merely, but at one and the same time, the author, sharer and chastiser of those thoughts, unseen, unknown, unsuspected, yet without whom no thought can ever be. Yet all this is an inevitable conclusion from sufficiently clear and familiar premises, admitted by all who are not scandalized at the Personality of the Creator, that is to say, the position that all things were made and are governed, by the absolute will and power of an all-knowing and all-powerful Being. Of the Personality of this Being a word or two hereafter.

The case cannot be properly stated, because it can only be even attempted by drawing on our own scant ideas. Perhaps it may be tried thus:—The will, knowledge, and power of the Creator are at one; for there is nothing but what He wills, and as He wills; His will was, that the world should be, and the world was; that life, that is, that enjoyment should be, and life was. But the life of brutes, the one for special reasons after mentioned, here spoken of, could not have pre-existed, because the Creator, being a Spirit, had in his own Personality no bodily sense; and this sense therefore must have been created in each primitive individual of his kind for the first time, at the very instant when the body began to live. But, if the body be wholly subjective to the Creative Mind, so also must be all its incidents and properties, including life: and that Spirit, not subject to bodily pain or pleasure, must yet know, and that, not from report, but consciously, inwardly, entirely, the very taste, form and pressure of every throb of pleasure or pain in every creature that lives, at the very instant it occurs, past, present, and to come. He must know what He has created and Himself alone maintains; and what He knows He must know entirely and thoroughly. In this way He must know the strength of every temptation, the form

and kind of every sinful act and thought, or how else should He justly punish? Every thought even of Satan himself must be known to Him, to whom thought is act. David in the spirit said, "If I go down into hell, Thou art there also." This no doubt must be taken to mean the hell of the Apostles' Creed, to which our Lord himself descended; but it is the place to which all, the good and bad alike, at first descend; and where the bad are, there also is Satan.

We are warned not to vex the Spirit, which we do by every sinful thought; then the Spirit is in us, or how should it be vexed? and always in us, for it is a thing neither of time nor place, though there is neither time nor place without it. We are further cautioned, in a metaphor, not to quench it; but, if we do, it is still present as before, but no longer with favour. He is not and cannot be sullied by our evil thoughts; to maintain this, would be to present a phase of anthropomorphism unbearable, monstrous, and horrible; but it is a necessary consequence of His knowledge and power, that He without whom nothing can be, should be thus present with and conscious of them. Even in the utter darkness hereafter, He will in this way be present.

We cannot realise this absolute omnipresence to ourselves, because we are unable to comprehend the nature and fulness of that will and consciousness of the Creator, which we nevertheless perforce admit, and which is indeed clearly implied in the not unfamiliar expression "created intelligences." We willingly enough concede that He must be all-knowing, all-powerful, ever-present, in relation both to mind and matter, and that without Him was not anything made that was made, and that without Him is not anything that is; and then, with all this grand truth filling our minds, we set ourselves to trundle dry mops and chronicle the sprinklings, to frame Theories of our own; and this is one of them, a very popular one, and by no means set down in malice—"Yes, certainly; He created the world and all that sort of thing, true enough, but He has delegated the government (why not say "the labours of government?") to laws and second causes, and these are now the true rulers of the world; and being themselves senseless necessities, carry with them neither duty nor choice."

That is to suppose the material world to have been first half created in the rough, and impressed with certain properties working to change, and then sent rolling into space to work out those changes of itself; to carry with it the will of the Creator in a material case as it were; to suppose the dead to have life; to confound cause with effect; for these properties, wrongly through poverty of language called second causes, are but effects of the First (the only) Cause, or Force; and unless that be a present or continuing Force, the effect must cease.

A cannon ball shot from a gun, if without resistance from the air or the attraction of the earth, will go on in a right line for ever; but the moving force is not in the ball, for the ball has only *vis inertiae*, and *vis inertiae* is only a hard name for nothing, but was communicated by the gun; and it is a continuing force effecting a continued movement, and at every point of the ball's course the same objective force as at the beginning. In the same way may be traced back the cause of this moving force that originated the ball's course, which again is not the explosion of the powder, but the cause of that explosion, that is, the will or mind of the man that fires the gun; and here as always, we find matter and motion controlled and directed by mind.

But the ball is in fact deflected to the earth by the same law of attraction that maintains the earth in its course round the sun, and it is said, that this must be, and visibly or sensibly is, a property residing in the two attracting bodies and the cause of this centripetal deflection. We certainly perceive by our senses, that what we call matter is attracted by matter, and we think fit to call this a property of matter; but it is not a property of matter, but a force impressed, or rather Force, the cause of all, in action; and as that Force is constant, it is a law; and if a law, there must be a Lawgiver, and that Lawgiver enforcing His own law, is the cause of this deflected motion; and the argument is the same in both cases, the only difference being, that in the one, the directing cause, that is the gunner, is seen, in the other, unseen but known from its effects.

It never has been and cannot be shown, except equivocally,

that matter in itself has any property whatever ; least of all can it be shown, to possess, until communicated, either motion or attraction, which are but observed transitive phenomena, the causes of which, if matter be matter, are still to seek. It would be just as reasonable to say, that it is the property of a pen to write, or of a stone to hew itself into squares, and build St. Pauls.

Even thus it is, that in his search after first forms, the materialist is ever getting nearer and nearer to immaterial forces, which at last unite in one, and that one, Mind.

But further, this scheme for fatalizing Providence, this half creation and rolling into space hypothesis, leaving as it does, the disturbance in the moral world wholly unaccounted for, is one fraught with every vice. It is to suppose a system with a beginning and no end, or if with an end, without a purpose, and therefore the work of a Creator not eternal ; for if the Creator be eternal, such also must have been His purpose, and time, though in it, is no part of eternity. And here lies the distinction. Heaven and earth, that is the visible creation, which had a beginning, such as we have seen, shall or may, as we may think best to construe the words, pass away, but the Creator's word, that is, His purpose, shall not pass away but be fulfilled in eternity.

Another of these Theories, these occasional outbreaks of intellectual *enragés* within their prison walls of adamant, is Pantheism, a self worshipping and yet self-denying ordinance, not always openly asserted by many of its favourers, and chiefly to be noticed in its place for this, that it is an advance upon materialism ; and the uninstructed are almost necessarily materialists, not upon any conviction, but simply from their inability to apprehend the true question when presented to their minds in any shape.

The position meant to be here contended for is this ; that the scheme firstly above presented, not being of any human invention but founded on and standing the test of the Scriptures, and so far only as it agrees with them, is the only one possible ; that it carries with it absolute conviction, and that, from the first premise to the ultimate conclusion, all in it is certainty and truth, unassailable by the severest rhetoric, untouched by the finest irony, and, above all, that it is the only one presenting

and rendering possible, and therefore requiring back a perfect morality ; and that all other schemes whatever, and herein especially all forms of materialism, being of human device, are *muscæ volitantes*, the mere "pin and web of the mind" and talk of the tongue, and in fact and of necessity, baseless, absurd, and mischievous. This will be called arrogance ; but it has another name, and is indeed the identical soft answer turning aside wrath referred to by Solomon.

If, as the balance and relation of his faculties alone suffice to show, life be a gift to man, it must be one with a purpose and under conditions, and if so, there must be a duty other than what man owes to man, that is, to the Giver of that life, which must be the law of the man's being, to which all else must give way. Many a one may be, and is tolerably just to his neighbour, or if he wrong him may, and does make him ample amends, and all is fairly written off balanced and forgotten ; but where, except amongst the very meanest and basest, the absolutely stupified with vice, is one to be found whose conscience is not at times troubled as by a wound past healing, with thoughts that come upon him when alone, of wrong done, not to his neighbour, but to himself, and not to himself only, but to One far greater than himself, forgotten, but ever present ? for if man be indeed alone, he must be lord of himself, and then whom should he fear ? for whom should he be disquieted ? before whom ashamed ? The repentance of man to man is a repentance of straw, a trouble of the hour that passes, a delusion and a snare ; for as there is a Providence that guards all, man may wrong but cannot injure man.

What if the Creator be evil ? That is a lawless suggestion reserved for these days. That is the sudden thought that assails the half lunatic, which if not at once grappled with and absolutely suppressed, may quickly master and destroy. Touch not ; taste not ; handle not ; fear not. The evil which we feel in, and perceive around us, is a consequence of what ourselves have willed and done, and is for a time only, and must at last, and, if we but truly will it, at once die out.

To suppose the Creator evil, is to suppose Him wholly so ; for He cannot be both good and evil ; and if all His works are not evil, neither can He himself be so, in the least degree.

The moral sense is a form of expression of the will of the Creator, who gave it to man for his guidance to do that will. But if so, the essence of all true morality must be unconditional obedience to that will when once clearly ascertained, either by our own lights or direct command, without challenge and without regrets.

We assuredly find this test unsparingly applied during the entire history of the chosen race, down to the abrogation of the ceremonial law. Not only are the great leaders and prophets of that people, all of them, even Elijah, men of like passions with ourselves, and all, it may be observed, and especially the ever lapsing David, however archaic and out of place the expression may seem in these disdainful days, prayerful men, recorded as continually performing acts in obedience to direct command, opposed to the natural moral sense, but often as rewarded more highly for obeying and punished more severely for disobedience to that command, than for the greatest morally good or bad actions. David was directly as grievously visited for presumptuously numbering the people, as for his offence in the matter of Uriah; nor would the sceptre have departed from Saul and his house, but for his stubbornness, first, in offering sacrifice unlawfully, and next in sparing Agag against direct command; offences, humanly speaking, leaning to the better side.

The work for which the Jewish people were set apart, the preservation of the true religion, and ultimate redemption of all the world, could if entrusted to man at all, only have been carried into effect by sinful men, for none other were to be found, and the Jews were stubborn, *σκληροτραχηλοι* (stiff-necked) above all others. These, such as they were, came thus at times under a double law; the one, the moral law common to all mankind, the other, a supernatural one, communicated from time to time by signs and wonders and sign-working ministers, without a constant observance of which law, the Divine purpose could not have been effected by the appointed means; and these two laws were at times in seeming conflict; the one, at all times suggesting mercy, the other, on occasions requiring harshness and, judged by our casuistry, seeming cruelty.

But to whom does this last give umbrage? and to whom is this harshness and cruelty imputed? Not surely to the instruments, not to those who merely executed a command which they could not disobey, but to One with whom we are at war, but who nevertheless cannot be questioned. But in what is the sword more cruel than the pestilence and famine? Yet who taxes the sender of these through the land with cruelty? It is said indeed by some of those who delight in dealing with little remote causes and effects, that these two last are traceable to natural avoidable causes, and remediable by our own exertions. But not only do these causes and remedies take a long time to learn, but there have been calamities, such as the Lisbon earthquake, clearly not so traceable; others not preventible by human means; others stayed only by supernatural agency and warning, and others working in the end to good. The seven years' famine in Egypt was not preventible by human means, and but for the spirit of prophecy and wisdom accorded to Joseph, would have slain half the inhabited world. The Crusades, a bitter delusion unwarranted in its purpose and cruel in its means, broke up in the end the power of an unimproving iron Chivalry, and gave life and strength to burghs and communities, the condition of whose very being is that freedom of thought and civilizing tendency, the want of which is a thing now hardly conceivable by us; an instance this of seeming evil working to good, and an argument that if, for reasons to us inscrutable, permitted for a time, they are yet guided in mercy to a gracious end at last.

To those who would arraign the Supreme Governor of all for harshness in His dispensations to us, on the ground apparently of the unfulness of sin, no perfect answer can be given other than that which will be referred to presently, and which is rejected, scouted rather, as unreasonable, which, in so far as it passes reason, it certainly is. But what is Reason in such questions? Can she who said in the plain of Shinar, "Go to, let us make brick and build us a city and a tower which shall reach unto the heavens," set up Jacob's ladder? or wrestle with his angel? She stands self-convicted of weakness the instant she opens her lips, on three

counts, the major, minor and conclusion of every syllogism she constructs, an Achilles with three vulnerable heels.

But it is objected, that men necessarily become hardened and demoralised by custom of cruel deeds. This is plausible at first sight, but there is a material term omitted.

The indictment is based on what has been called by some, the terrible Hebrew veracity of the Old Testament.

The promised land belonged to the Jews by a title paramount to all human authority, and they were under command to enter and take possession, to originate a dispensation, that should thereafter save the whole world, and to that end they were to destroy the existing inhabitants, whose incorrigible sins and corrupting idolatries rendered such a thing just and necessary. This, any more than the natural pain and death which come to every man, cannot be perfectly vindicated to those who deny the Godhead of Christ, because such denial takes away the willingness, and slurs the infinite merit of His suffering for us, and only adds a created being who did no wrong, to suffer greatly and beyond the measure of our capacities for those who did much. But it may be observed that the perpetual relapses of the Jews themselves, notwithstanding all their miraculous safeguards, into the worst of the enchorial idolatries, rendered this extermination and destruction unavoidable, if the Divine scheme, which was one of immediate retribution and ultimate mercy, was to be effected or aided in any degree by human instruments.

For this purpose then, and to prepare for this advent, the Jews were chosen and brought out of captivity, with signs and wonders, and by a strong hand. By miracles, they were fed from day to day and sustained during their wanderings in the desert; by a visible miracle of the most striking description, they passed the Jordan; by another of the like kind, the walls of Jericho fell before them at the very moment appointed; and by an extraordinary, if not miraculous aggravation of natural phenomena, they gained their crowning victory at Gibeon, where, it may be observed, and it is not irrelevant to the charge of cruelty against them, more of the Philistines are said to have been slain by the hail from heaven, than by the sword.

Whatever therefore the Jews did in their wars and at other times in accordance with their peculiar institutions and obligations, was done by them in obedience to a direct command, the Divine authority of which was evidenced to them and impressed on their minds by the sight, hearing, and memories of a succession of signs and wonders, and the continual presence among them of privileged and miraculous persons; for such was Joshua, and such were Samuel and Elijah, and such was every prophet among them to the end of the dispensation; and there was not a man among them all who did not feel sensibly in his heart of hearts, that what he did by and within command, was in the immediate presence, under the very eye, and by the direct ordinance of his Supreme Ruler. Whatever he did in accordance with a command so declared must have been right

No one disputes that an habitual observance of the moral law is essential to the health and well-being of the mind and disposition, and that any breach, and especially any presumptuous breach of it, must have the directly opposite tendency. But an act done at the express command of the Supreme Ruler, is not within, and no longer to be measured by that law, and is in essence and quality no longer the same act; and if it be His will that the law of mercy and forbearance be at any time suspended, and that man slay man in disregard of that law, such suspension by Divine interposition is of the nature of a miracle, and in such a case it is not to be doubted that He will entirely preserve the servant who well and faithfully obeys His command from all harm, and keep him from sin even in thought, during and in the contrivance and act of what without that sanction would be a cruel and unjustifiable deed.

The Jews, indeed, often went beyond their warrant, and were proverbially cruel. That was because they were men, and like men, took no due care to order their steps aright, and were therefore left to the proper and natural consequences of all sin. All men are exposed to temptation, none to more than they can bear, and with the temptation are always provided the means of resistance or escape. All secular pursuits chill; nor one perhaps, not being an unlawful one, more than another

but to all these, being, as they are, assigned duties, there is given a perfect safeguard against this chill and all other evil influences ; and this, if the Jews had performed their appointed duties worthily, they would have had abundantly. But they did them unworthily, and they are assuredly not placed as we now find them "for envy."

This digression is forced into the subject by the childish cock-crowings and catapults, the taunts of supererogation so profusely indulged in by those who persist in confounding the Israelites with the Crusaders, and recognise no distinction between Joshua, aye, and a greater than Joshua, and Peter the Hermit.

The position intended to be here taken is in perfect agreement with the neglected first verse of the Book Genesis. "In the beginning," that is, when there was nothing anywhere in being but God, God, an eternal Spirit, "created the heavens and the earth," that is, our visible universe. What follows is the detail of the subsequent moulding of that universe, proceeding from simpler to more complex forms. There is thus in truth only one real wonder in the case, namely, that there should be such a thing as an Eternal Spirit at all. But that He is, and that "He is that He is," is known to us by His works, which though not in themselves eternal, for they had a beginning, sprung out of eternity for an eternal purpose. These works we may examine at will ; but He is the First Cause or nothing, and to search for the cause of an eternal cause is absurd.

Always it is forgotten, that the human intellect is a nicely balanced instrument for a certain end ; and that it is one of limited powers appears from this : that it is linked to the convolutions and pulp of the brain, wearies, sleeps, and dreams as it lists without any control of our own ; that we can analyse and define its faculties ; that these are specifically the same in all, and increase and wane from childhood to age, in every individual according to certain laws, the same in all ; and that the community of mind is thus made up of perishing constituents. Paralyse or remove one of these faculties, and there is no more advance ; take away memory, and there is nothing but a rush of *parvenus*, tumultuary ideas, a drift of

waifs and strays, a stampado of Carnival Follies ; without the faculty of combination, nothing but disorder remains ; destroy invention, and the power of suggesting arguments, that is, of reasoning is gone ; and the like may be said of many, if not of all, the others.

There is an instruction in the Mosaic account of the creation, which is generally overlooked rather than absolutely rejected.

He who in the beginning created the heavens and the earth, the latter at first without form and void, must have been present also in His creative will and power, during all the six days or periods assigned to the completion of His work, nor more so at the instantaneous creation of light, than during the long intervals of time occupied in the completion of the rest of His works in detail ; at every new creation, upon and during every creative change, absolutely, entirely, uninterruptedly, without a moment's break. In six days or periods, being thus present, He ordained and caused them to be and become such as under his continual care they now are. Then whether these changes or some of them were or not developments, if He was present during these six days or periods with and in all His works, when did He cease to be so present ? Where is He now ? and why is that change which we think fit to call development less a manifestation of His continual presence and act as Creator and Ruler, than the first creation ?

In the fifth day or period first appears life ; when "the waters brought forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that flew above the earth in the open of heaven."

Well, here at last is a grand triumph for Philosophy ; for certainly there seems something wrong about it, as there was in the case of the hare chewing the cud, for a bird is assuredly a more perfect and beautiful creature than many a terrestrial reptile produced on the sixth day, or developed since.

There was an old tradition among some of the Dorian Races, and all tradition was once the authorized Gazette of the day, that birds were the earliest living things, and that they were flying about in the air long before the earth was perfectly formed or hardened, and when consequently there

was no rest for the sole of the foot of either dove or raven. All scholars will remember, the choral ode of the Birds in Aristophanes, and some perhaps the *ἐπιτυμβιδιοὶ κορυδαλλοὶ* or sepulchral larks of Theocritus, which, as the model founder of the model city of *Νεφελοκοκκυγία* or "Cloudduckooland" in the same "Birds" tells us, thus flying about in space and not knowing how otherwise to dispose of their deceased parent birds, made catacombs of their own skulls, and buried them there.

This is seriously and strictly pertinent to the subject ; because it fully accounts to all intents and purposes, reasonable and unreasonable, for the tremendous fact of skeletons being found embedded in limestone ; because skulls and bones in general are composed chiefly of lime, and that, if there is no other, is doubtless the way the skeletons got there.

Why should the sisters Urania and Thalia be always apart if they sometimes agree ? and what after all is there in modern philosophy that may not be as well dealt with by one of them as by the other ?

If matter as an independent reality, whose First Cause is in itself be conceivable, that First Cause, being matter, must pervade itself and be itself, and be therefore extendible and divisible, and then every component particle of it must have been as much the First Cause of itself and all the properties existing in itself and everything else, as the whole universe of matter could have been ; for as we cannot in decency separate the First Cause into parts, if that First Cause be nevertheless extendible and divisible, the whole must be every part and every part the whole. This is intelligible of spirit and not of matter, and therefore the First Cause is not spirit.

This materialistic position is as easily conceivable, and as perfectly satisfactory to minds of unlimited capacity, as any other throughout the whole Pantheistic argument. It is indeed a very simple one. It is only adjusting the universe to a Metaphysical Stereoscope, when, if all goes well, after a little *Fata Morgana* haze and confusion, the perfect image comes out clear at last with a kind of start ; we know not why ; but it is an inductive process set against a deductive

one, and being inductive cannot be altogether arbitrary, and therefore must be right.

It is less difficult to conceive an Eternal Spirit, than the infinity of matter either as to space or duration. We can comprehend neither, but one of them we must believe; and to that the question must come at last.

We find in the Mosaic account, first, the creation of the heavens and the earth; and next, the statement that the earth was without form and void. What this earth then was we do not know, but it could not have had the properties which we find now abounding in it. It had not those which constitute light, for it was before light; nor had it those which worked the division of the waters which were under the firmament from those which were above the firmament, or the waters under the heavens from the dry land, for all this too was of later creation. But it must have lain an inert mass, or seeming mass, without any recognisable properties, when there was nothing moving but the Creating Spirit.

It will of course be said that these properties were latent in this inert earth so created from the beginning, and were developed subsequently. But that word, latent, has never been very successful either in science or philosophy. If the earth lay without form before light was, light must have been caused by some force impressing the inert earth, or acting upon its properties so as to produce a certain effect, that effect being light. But these properties howsoever latent, were not light, nor would they ever have become any part or constituent of light, if such they be, without the action of an objective creative force effecting qualitative change. The absorbing and refracting properties which produce colour by re-acting on light, may well enough be said to be latent in certain bodies; but they have been so, not from the creation of the earth of which they are a part, but at the earliest, from that of light, which was a subsequent and distinct creation. But this "Latent" is here only an inconsequential disclaimer talking very loud about something, like Banquo's Ghost, visible only to himself.

Spirit is conceivable as existing in Eternity, which is without

beginning or ending, extremes or mean; because thought in the abstract, has no succession, and at the creation was one eternal thought in the Divine mind, comprising all things present and to come. There was then no past, for there was no time. But matter cannot be so conceived of, because every action of matter is in time: and how can spirit which is not in time, act upon, or be a phenomenon of an independent matter which is?

Nevertheless it is proclaimed, with all the emphasis of a Pragmatic Sanction establishing a new line of Sovereignty, that matter is itself Force, the creative Power. This however only leaves us just where it found us, still to search, still free and compelled to ask what is that Force which has all the powers and qualities of mind, and yet is not mind but matter, or, in plainer terms, if matter be force, what is matter; and we are thus brought pleasantly round to the original point of divergence of idealism and materialism. All inductive reasoning fails, for the facts to be dealt with are unrelated. Life is life, and clay is clay. It is one thing to build a house, another to build a man to live in it.

The question is whether the materialistic, or Mosaic view best explains the matter. According to the former, this matter-force is the once famous pre-established harmony, by virtue of which, being found and made a note of, Voltaire wrote his *Candide*, and the world is what it now is, and could never have been otherwise; according to the latter, the Creator in the beginning, Himself Eternal and dwelling alone in Eternity, not before, but when time was not,* caused the earth to be, that is, created it; at first without form and void, reserving in Himself the further force that should give it form in His own good time and order; the first act of creation being equally one of force.

Passing over the first assignment of form and play of physical forces, as the specialities of Science, a very deserving thing in its way but not so, out of its way, we find at last life and sensation, subjective in the individual, objective to all

* We may remember here the argument on the Double Procession at the Council of Nice.

beside, indissolubly attached to some material bodies; indissolubly, that is, in this sense, that so long as a certain organization subsists, these properties remain; when that is broken up, they cease.

It is well to bear in mind, not only how much, but also how little we know. We know, that there are fluid bodies, and we know that there are solid bodies, but why they are respectively fluid and solid we cannot even approximatively learn. We observe, that at a certain temperature, water becomes ice, that is, the fluid becomes solid, and that by the combined and duly proportioned action of certain known elements, and of others unknown, plants germinate and give their increase, and that the like phenomena are in progress largely and widely throughout the insentient physical world; and that all these work harmoniously together, according to certain fixed laws, so as to carry into effect, what seems to all but the extremely discontented, a grand design so far as regards the insentient earth. But that is all. None of these have any ascertainable connection with life or sensation, which they leave as facts to be otherwise accounted for.

We can name and assign the second causes, why an apple falls, why the earth moves round the sun, and even almost why grass grows, that is, we know just as much about this last as our gardeners tell us, and in the same way and to a very respectable extent, we can explain how food received into the stomach, is there digested, and by the action of certain chemical and other processes and affinities, taken into and becomes part of the living body, but why that body lives, or why it suddenly decomposes, and these processes and affinities stop altogether and at once, at the very instant of death, in other words, what is the difference between a man immediately before and immediately after he is hanged, or what the principle of life, we cannot by any means learn. The organs and chemistry concerned in the matter, are catalogued and formulated by us, in a way, puzzling only to those who choose to be puzzled; but there is something more in it than chemistry, and that something is a blank to all of us. We lift an arm, and think, as we suppose, at will, but whence that will and

thought, is a mystery to all. The materials ensible then suddenly becomes insensible, and that is the end of our catechism.

If, as some maintain, life be a phenomenon of matter, it should be shown how causes that are mechanical and chemical, produce effects that are neither mechanical nor chemical. If life be a phenomenon of Spirit, that Spirit, the Creator of, and pervading all life must have will. An apple shaken from the tree has no sense and no will, and must fall for the good of science; and for like reason, the delicate flower that turns its face to the sun, must so turn, even as the sunny side of a peach ripens before the other. A thought will raise a blush on a beautiful countenance, and that blush will come and go with the thought; but the peach blushes without thinking, for good and all, and cannot in the least help it.

The lowest form of life must have some will, be it, as in the least animated Zoophyte ever observed, but to expand for food or rest.

"That which was tendency in the plant, has become will in the animal, and that is development."—That which was the cause of tendency in the plant, has received the aid of a new collateral cause, which has produced will, and that is creation; and both these causes are acts of one and the same First Cause.

It is doubtless hard in many cases to distinguish, where in the chain of beings life begins; but where there is life, there must be feeling, appetite, choice, will. But if there be will in the lower, so also must there be in the higher forms of life, and, if so, *a fortiori* in the Highest, the giver and distributor of all that life. That which has not will cannot bestow, that is, cannot create will. All that is created must be in the Creator once and for ever.

But if that Highest has will, He must have Personality, and must be God. He can have no controller, for if He had, that controller would himself be God. There is therefore demonstrably none other than He himself alone, and His will must be absolute. Our own is under His unperceived but immediate control, and has a certain permitted freedom

only ; a true freedom, but in mercy a limited one. In our worst moods there is always something inviting and working to draw us back, and that something is not a mere remnant of good which once overcome can have no power of recovery in itself, but an interference from without ; in the most confirmed state of unbelief, the most dangerous state of man, there is always a lingering regret that abides to the end, except where displaced for something worse. But His will is His law, because what He wills must be perfect, and therefore unchangeable.

Force is the exercise of creative power by this Divine Personality, without whom is neither matter nor spirit other than His Own. These exist only in Him. But if they exist only in Him, they are hidden in Him, for He is incomprehensible. Our reasonings on these matters are but as the breakers and surf that line our shores, which because at hand, importunate and restless, impress us in our moods more than the quiet Ocean itself, sleeping in the far distance, of which, however they are the mere edge and selvage.

The forms of all things must have been co-existent in the Divine Mind at the creation ; and they might, if such had been the Divine Will, have been wholly different from what they are, or nothing might ever have been but the Creator Himself ; but by His grace, they are what they are. Some of us may remember what St. Paul, now better known in Philosophy as Paul of Tarsus, "a clever and ingenious writer, but fanciful and prejudiced, and greatly overrated, a cotemporary of Apollos," has told us of the change from an earthly to a spiritual body, that awaits us after death ; but both of these bodies must come out of the same storehouse of the Divine Mind, and life, even the separate and individual life and consciousness of each of us, is thus as much an idea in that mind as the material universe.

It may seem strange to speak of life which receives ideas, as itself an idea. But is it not so ? The word "idea" is necessarily a metaphor, and comprehends more than can possibly be expressed in language. The entire scheme of creation must have been one eternal idea in the mind of that Creator, for whom there is no other name than the one given by Himself,

Jehovah, I am. The design and act of creation were one in Him ; but in relation to the thing created they were progressive ; and the life that was to animate the body not yet formed, may thus be said to be an idea in the Divine Mind.

Thus far the question concerns animal life only, and thus far the Theory of Development is harmless enough, and more especially as it does not absolutely exclude the idea of a Personal Creator, though the rhetoric of some of its advocates in speaking of the First Cause, is not always to be commended.

But who, and what is the Theorist himself ? What was that, which when the heavens and the earth were finished and all the host of them, and the earth was filled with life, and all were pronounced to be "good," was formed, out of the dust of the earth indeed, but in the image of One, who, being a Spirit, had no outward image, parts, or members, and into which was breathed by that One, the breath of life by which it became a living soul, at the time when all was declared to be "very good?"

From this point the question becomes one of belief or no belief, and the Theory if carried further, an undisguised rebellious extravagance.

By our natural lights alone, we cannot but discern the excellency of man until deformed by sin, but for which he might fairly aspire to perfection, of goodness, that is ; for as he cannot by taking thought add a cubit to his stature, neither can he by perplexing it, gain a new faculty to his mind.

Reverence for the saintly character lingers long in those who fall away, though it may turn at last to bitterness and hate. Byron felt this, when in his doubting mood, treating of the question of a future state, he wrote these lines in *Childe Harold*—

"And if, as holiest men have deemed, there be
A land of souls beyond that sable shore,
To shame the doctrine of the Sadducee,
And sophists madly vain of dubious lore."

But holiness is the attribute on earth of the earnest worshipper of the true God only ; and if there be no true God,

there can be no real holiness ; and if the former, the object of the worship, be doubted, the worshipper must be suspected ; and Byron was in no better case than Lord Herbert of Cherbury, who, after writing against miracles, prayed for a sign from Heaven, to confirm him in his unbelief.

It would be needless here to deny to brutes, whom we find constantly effecting the like ends and by the like means as ourselves, the possession of some degree of reason, of something that assists the instinct. Perhaps some degree of understanding is a necessary accompaniment of consciousness. *Sentio ergo sum*, the grand and laboured conclusion of so many philosophies of the pale, is the logical conclusion of all brutes ; if they but know it. The blind, deaf and dumb, stay-at-home sea anemone, is content to catch its aliment as it passes ; the beast of the field and fowl of the air must do much more ; they must search, find, and take, and this requires skill, which implies reason, and skill assists, but is not itself instinct.

Our Philosophy made easy books are full of anecdotes of the great intelligence of brutes, and so are the *Gesta Romanorum* of miracles, and each in its turn is said to be perfectly authenticated.

But after making every allowance for the exaggeration of impulsive writers and talkers, one can hardly doubt that animals possess some reasoning power, showing itself in a sagacity adapted and apportioned, not to things in general, but to their natural requirements. The line between instinct and understanding may not be very easy to draw, unless we accept the one as a blind will, the other as the guide. Instinct impels the bird that never as yet saw an egg in its life, to build a nest, and suggests its form, but reason goes to the building ; and more especially must we so conclude, when we observe the varied ingenuity with which it will surmount accidental or artificial and non-natural obstructions in the progress of its work. The same instinct urges the bee to construct a cell of given form and dimensions ; it probably could not construct it of any other, but it is the skilful application of its natural means and powers that enables it to do so. Many things too are imputed to instinct which are not properly so imputable. The hunted hare runs up hill and doubles, not

from instinct, but from a consciousness of its natural advantages for so doing ; and for the same reason, the stag takes to water before it stands at bay.

It is said indeed, that as instinct never errs and reason does, there can be no such thing as animal reason or sagacity. Well ; “ never ” is rather a strong word ; and we have a little proverb of “ one swallow not making a summer ; ” and every fish that takes the hook, and especially if it deliberate about it, is an argument of something being at fault, which, if the fish has nothing else, must of course be the instinct. Besides, if we have on the one hand the migrations of salmon and Parliament in vacation as cases of pure instinct, we have in the other that of Androcles and the lion, and that of one dog taking another to his own medical man to have his broken leg set, and many others, none of which could well have been results of unaided natural instinct.

But that the two are in fact distinguishable, may be collected from what takes place in some animals, tamed and trained by us for our own uses. In doing this and for our own purposes, we suppress or pervert their natural instincts. Thus, the pointer stands, when he should spring. The high bred greyhound is trained to run straight at the hare, without cutting corners to catch him at his doublings. In the wild state, beasts and birds of prey never throw away a chance. The Shepherd’s dog was by nature a butcher of sheep on his own account. We have made him their guardian on our own. There are few things more curious and interesting than the very common sight of one of these dogs watching and guiding his flock. Always intent on his charge, and evidently pleased with it ; now permitting them to range ; then, at the proper moment, recalling stragglers, and punishing them for, and it would really seem, in proportion to their offences, and even making allowances for the lame and weakly, and ewes in the family way, and when required, pouncing upon, and bringing out any particular woolly pate that may be wanted. Now, here the natural instinct seems completely stamped out and gone ; but the sagacity that would have aided that instinct remains, though it has been diverted and improved for other purposes ; and this can hardly be anything but intellect ; for

instinct given by nature for one purpose, if diverted to another wholly foreign, is no longer pure instinct, but must be associate with some other quality.

But granted all this cleverness, what moral sense have brutes? Extravagance must be met by extravagance. See what they do openly and without thought of reproach. Dogs would be first rate public speakers if they could but speak; they are proverbially gifted with one of the chief requisites for it. When was a dog ever commonly decent? Who ever saw a rich dog give away a bone in charity to a poor one, if he wanted it himself? Why do they always grin, whatever happens? Why do animals of the gregarious kinds torment and poke to death their sick and wounded? What proper sensibility can those Does have, who stand by and do not declare their preference, until one of Landseer's Stags has killed the other? There is an account in one of the late Basil Hall's works, of a ship's monkey, kept for the diversion of the crew during the voyage, killing his wife. They had had some quarrel about a piece of biscuit. He enticed her out towards the end of the bowsprit, and then suddenly pushed her off into the mouth of a shark that lay convenient. This was an intellectual proceeding, and a very rational one, if he thought he could get on better without her; only the more reason, the less moral sense. The reclaimed cat that plays with a mouse (wild animals are too hungry to do such things) is cruel from mere surfeit and wantonness. The beast of a bitch that destroys her superfluous pups, is a good political economist, but she need not eat them. The carnivorous animals rage with hunger, and there is lawful warrant for what they do, but they might do it, like Izaak Walton baiting his hook, or as we skin eels, or buckle up the bearing reins of our carriage horses, with a little more humanity.

What moral motives have brutes beyond fear and attachment? Remove these, and all is gone. The dog is attached to his master, be he good or bad, and will follow him as Tobit's dog would have followed Satan himself, had Satan asked him, and is anxious to please him, by doing his bidding, and to escape the lash, which being a coming event, throws its shadow before it, but the right

or wrong of the thing done, is wholly the master's. The dog of St. Bernard saves life; the bloodhound destroys it; but with the dog it is only a matter of training; the merit and demerit rest, with the good monk in the one case, and the devil, that is the slave driver, in the other. The decoy duck, the two anguimanous Dalilahs that surround and coax the wild male elephant and carry his trunk for him into the inclosure, and the worthless unmarketable old sheep, that some butchers make use of, to draw the others into the slaughter house, are all blameless in their way.

It is only a question of enforced habits, time and opportunity. The well bred cat that purrs on the rug, is loud, lewd, and ferocious, the very counterpart of a street walker, on the tiles. The fox kills the lamb; the dog kills the fox; but he would rather kill the lamb, which is better eating, only he dares not. The same dog kills the harmless and beautiful water-fowl, which he does not want, and brings it to his master, who does not want it either. The man is not to be praised, but the dog is commendable, for his eye is to his master. But the act is the same in each.

If there is no difference between man and beast, beyond what may be accounted for on a principle of development, there is in us neither good nor evil; for they must both have sprung from that which was indifferent, and at some point must have been indifferent in us, and we are only good or evil as the Player who struts his hour on the stage, sometimes a hero, and sometimes a villain, is good or evil, according to his part, but before and after his entrance and exit is neither. And this is the freedom that, Philosophy, offers as a substitute, for what she has been heard to call, the pains and penalties of belief; as to which however it is not the felon whom we hang, but the philosopher to whom we unveil statues, that complains the most.

The teaching of the Mosaic Record, to which one gladly returns, is, first, that man was made out of the dust of the field. This we can see with our own eyes. But there is something far more, in the matter. It had been stated just before, that, "God said, Let us make man;" that is

the language of deliberation. But God does not deliberate; and these words therefore can only be taken as a declaration of the purpose for which man was to be created; that is, to subdue and replenish the earth, and to have dominion over all things living and moving upon it. But this is a declaration pregnant, for man could not have had this high prerogative conferred upon him, except for some purpose that could not have been effected by the lower orders of creation, and unless he was to be in some essentials different from, and more excellent than they; and that he was so created, appears abundantly from the immediate and ensuing context.

He was created "in the image of God;" that could not mean, in the bodily likeness, for God is a spirit; nor in the senses, for not only do the brutes possess these senses, but God in His own Personality does not, though He created them in us; nor can it be in the intellect, for in what can our puny blundering step by step intellect be the image of or likened to that of Him who knows and wills all things at once and eternally? It must then be in the moral sentiment, in its highest and most comprehensive meaning; that has no taste of time, for it is a disposition that guides, and although informed by ideas is not one itself, and is ever asserting a divine origin. And in what except in degree, which is not a quality, was not the conscience of man when first created sinless, the likeness of that of God? What was there in it that was not also in God? What was it but the will of God imparted to man? Such a being must have possessed goodness and holiness so perfect, that because of that very perfection, his yielding to the great Tempter from without, must have entirely broken up this likeness, and sent him forth to take the spiritual image, and do the will of that howling Tempter, and but for a special grace then accorded, thenceforth and for ever. Then must not this, the only perfect quality in man, have been that which constituted him the true image of God, into which was breathed the breath of life by which, as an immediate effecting cause, man became a living soul?

But if this spirit, disposition, and goodness be in God, it must be so eternally ; and if the same were also in the first man at his creation, it must have been, not created, for it always existed, but, as the text itself implies, imparted ; and being eternal in its essence, and proceeding from an eternal Being, the soul, of which with the breath of life it was the cause, can never die. It may change, as changed it has, by disobedience and sin, but once possessed of an eternal living principle, could not have been designed to perish and never can.

This was not the talent that was to be "occupied" which being a gift, might be replaced, but the disposition and wisdom to occupy it aright, and which being imparted and eternal, must have been the very essence of the man's being, and once sullied must have been so eternally, but for the vicarious merits and mediation of One himself eternal.

It may be permitted here to recapitulate. The despised Creator, dwelling alone in eternity, willed that the insentient heaven and earth should be ; and the insentient heaven and earth were ; that is, He created them by force of His will ; but if they were thus created, they exist with all their qualities and conditions only in His will, and so far as His will is that they should be, and beyond that not at all ; otherwise there must be something existing beyond the knowledge, power, and reach of God.

It has been said before, that if it were His will that the visible senseless creation should no longer exist, it would pass in an instant, not into a fabulous Chaos, but into nothing ; it may be added, that should such be His will, all thought and consciousness within and without our universe but His own would perish. All arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul apart from His will and power, fall short of aught beyond a faint probability. It is a fact that they do so fail, because the question is debateable to the end, and where the strife is continued there can be no assured victory ; and unless He whom we seek, be though invisible, actually and sensibly present, there is none to answer, none to help ; we are quite alone and can but offer a feeble, barren and undevotional assent.

Rave as we may, a doubting suggestion is a temptation. Deliverance from evil comprises deliverance from temptation; and where there is no longer temptation, there alone is perfect liberty, and we rest from labour, because our labour has become rest.

Nothing can exist without Force, that is, creative Force, itself existing somewhere; and that Force, whatever its attributes may be, is God. If God be, and matter be nevertheless something objective to Him, there must be a Force other than God, and something which He did not create; and then it must be shown, whence this increate matter came and what it is. But further, this increate matter necessarily lessens the power of the Creator, for it is manifestly one thing to create by an act of absolute will, and quite another, to mould that over which he has a qualified but no absolute creating or abrogating power. But if His power be limited, David was wrong, and the fool right.

The insentient world thus existing in the Divine mind, the next step is life, which we know to exist in some forms of what we call matter. Then, if this life be a modification or property of matter, if that matter itself exist in the Divine Mind, so also must all its properties and incidents, and individual life may thus properly be treated, as an idea in that Mind.

But mere animal life had no assignable end or purpose, but just to browse, propagate its kind and die, until another advent; and then came man, to have dominion over these inferior lives, and make known their use and purposes; a being who is bound to a service, who acknowledges that service, and confesses, and however unworthily, worships and obeys his Creator in accordance with a law, written, not so much on the external face of nature as in his own heart. This law is of such surpassing excellence, that it seems tame to call the will to obey it, the moral sense, being rather an aspiration towards perfection, bending all the faculties of mind and soul to that end.

But if the brutes want this sense, it is not a property

of life, but something added to it; and if, in its perfect condition, it has such attributes as goodness and holiness, and others which we know to exist in the Creator, and none others, for weakness lies in degree and is not quality, and if these attributes are eternal, so also, without such a mediation as before mentioned, must be the consequences of sin; and this mediation must have been pre-ordained before sin in man was; otherwise there must have been a time, when man was eternally lost; and the scheme for his redemption must have been an after-thought, in One in whom can be no change or shadow of turning..

This is the only true and Catholic system, that alone leads to, renders possible, and exacts in return, a perfect self-rewarding morality, both in the highest and most comprehensive acceptation of the term. Its name is Bigotry; but there is none other that does not, sooner or later, proclaim in mockery "Depart from me. I did but jest."

Certainly there is another way of putting the question, of smoking out the Prejudice Hive, as they call it; and it makes all clear to some minds, and here it is.

"That which is, is; and that which is not, does not exist; and Force exists, and matter exists; therefore both exist; and nothing is beside matter; and nothing is beside Force; therefore both exist together; therefore Matter is Force, and Force is Matter; and Matter is infinitely divisible into atoms; and atoms have certain properties, such as, motion, attraction, repulsion, sensation, noise, philosophy and divers others; and these atoms are therefore protoplasms; and a protoplasm is that which exercises protoplasmic functions; and time is made up of æons; and an æon is an infinite space of time; and before the infinite æon in which we are now living, was another infinite æon, and another before that, and so on; and after the infinite æon in which we are now living, will be other infinite æons; so that we have plenty of time, both before and behind us, to create all we want: and there are none other than positive facts in the world; and the proto-

plasma or atoms above spoken of, are those positive facts ; and an atom is infinitely small ; and is therefore without magnitude and without parts ; and that which is without magnitude and without parts, is an idea ; and therefore an idea is matter ; and these atoms by reason of their protoplasmic properties are always in motion, and so meet and combine, and effervesce, and form precipitates, which are partly intellectual, and partly non-intellectual, but are all the same in the end ; and these precipitates are now the world at large,"—and then they quote Lucretius, and say that his poem would be a grand subject for an Oratorio, if Offenbach would but turn his thoughts that way ; and then they run off into the question of development, of which a few words presently.

The truth is, that the principle of this school being, " hoc age," a very good one if the " hoc " be of a good vintage and well chosen, and having rejected the Mosaic scheme, they feel bound to propose one of their own. They must have a policy, and they have adopted that of the unjust steward, writing off all religious debts, and defacing the securities.

Yet is there some peril in the case, which some at least of their followers may as well be advised of ; for though time be long, the life of each man is short.

If there really be an Eternal Creator and Ruler, He cannot be mocked ; and if He has revealed Himself to man, that revelation must be complete for the purpose intended, and sufficiently evidenced to answer all requirements and claims of reason, justice, and mercy ; for what He does, must be reasonable, just, and merciful. He demands service and devotion sincere and entire, He could require no less, and man in the end will be accepted or rejected as he regards this demand or not. This Creator and Governor is not afar off, but ever close at hand, watchful, ready, and sure, though unseen. He has given his word, that " he who truly seeks Him, shall ever truly find Him." Then the opposite must also hold, that he who does not truly seek Him, shall not find Him ; and the question then arises,—and a more momentous one

cannot be,—whether all this dry, hard, captious, undevo-
tional controversy, with which we are stunned, and some
of us bewildered, from day to day, can be a true seeking
within the conditions of His pledged word. Is the philo-
sophic mind even indifferent in the question? Has not
the Philosopher been heard to say, “I will have none of
this Revelation of yours, because it is a prejudice in some
of you, and therefore a prejudice in all; and I abhor all
prejudice, and therefore I will even yet find new arguments
against it. I will not worship your God. I do not like
Him. I prefer Lucretius to your Bible, because Lucretius
was a great poet, and the Greek of the New Testament
sets my teeth on edge. I do not at all approve of the
nature of things. I could devise a better. I have
motes in the eye, and I cannot see with one part of it, and
if I shut it, I cannot see at all; and I have no end of
thorns in the flesh, and the tiles and chimney pots fall on
my head when I walk the streets; and the lightning fires my
stacks, and the thunder sours my beer; and sometimes
I think acutely and wisely, like Socrates in his basket
amid the clouds, and am perfectly satisfied with myself
and everything I say, and then I get a fit of the spleen,
and do not know what to think; and I do not like it, and
the author of all these things could not have known what
he was about, and therefore I turn from him to worship
Humanity, not indeed the dull circumstantials about me,
who answer my bell and bring me butter and eggs and
such things, nor the fools who do not understand what
I say, nor the fools who disagree with me, nor any other
fools in particular, but Humanity in the abstract, which
does not hide itself away, nor threaten or seek to make
an abject of me; and if I must die and go into utter
oblivion, and be separated from all who are dear to me,
it will be a satisfaction to me, first, that I am right; next,
that I cannot help it; and lastly, that others I know and
care nothing about will come after me, who may be better,
that is more fully developed, in some things, possibly
than myself; and that is a more ennobling thought than
the selfish unrealizable one of my own individual immor-

talities hereafter, the very thought of which wearies me, because I am sick enough of life as it is ; and as to what you say of a future state being an advanced state of perfection, I can perfect myself well enough without it, and what more would you have ?”

This is the creed of the creedless, and it cannot be thoroughly refuted by the light of nature only, or without aid of Revelation. But if we accept the reasonings of philosophy, and follow them up scholastically to their legitimate conclusions, only to find ourselves at the end, in this state of hopelessness, dismay, and perturbation, must we not perforce look elsewhere ? and if so, may we not look into a Book that is offered to us ? and if we find in that Book a clearing up of all difficulties, peace and happiness, truth and justice, may we not accept them, even though dashed with a little religion and piety ? Is Plato alone to speak *ex cathedra* ? If Plato by reasoning from things seen, demonstrated that there was an unseen, may not another be heard to declare that unseen ? and if that other speaks as one with authority, may not that authority approve itself by doctrine and facts united, both being consistent ? We accept the mariner’s compass which we see ; must we reject the magnetic influence as the cause, because we do not see it ?

If one appeared in an evil and wasted world, himself “ unspotted from it,” teaching with an authority avowed by himself to be divine, and, passing over all miracles as unadmitted in the argument, attesting that avowal by an entirely unselfish life, the only one on record, spent willingly and of choice in hardship and privation, to be ended by a foreseen, cruel and ignominious death ; and, above all, if that teaching be, so far as we can test it, or by any means discern, without flaw, without one weak link ; if it come home to the understanding and feelings with far more than the weight of a dry conclusion on a matter indifferent, with all the force and conviction of a long forgotten truth revived, we must accept it as delivered, not in parts but entire, the hidden as well as the open, the Divine equally with the human Personality, and all their incidents and consequences. It cannot be disjointed

like a child's puzzle map, nor a part accepted, as the manner often is, with insipid politic encomiums, the gift freed from the conditions, the teaching without the cross. Unless accepted entire it is in fact wholly rejected. We are indeed directed always to search further, not however to dispute but to learn more, and gain new privileges under an unfailing guidance.

This way lies the only door, and this alone is true conversion, working, not only on the cold and ever vacillating intellect, but upon the collected soul. It is indeed open to the objection, that it cannot be reached by the reason alone, for the first premises must be taken on trust. By no exercise of our faculties, by no observation of aught in nature, could we ever have discovered the original state of the first man, his fall and its consequences, or the terms of his and our own redemption. There is none other, and we reject it, not because contrary to reason, but because, as we wrongly in our pride consider the matter, it enchains the will. But in the end it looses all bonds for those who truly desire it.

This is the true *Quicumque vult*, which we must accept and at once, or it will be too late. It will not do to say with jesting Pilate, "What is truth?" nor, with time serving Gallio, "This is some question of your law;" nor, with stock-jobbing Felix, "Hereafter I will hear more; what will you give me for promoting?" nor, "I have not yet proved that yoke of oxen of mine in the parable; I pray you have me excused;" nor, worse than all, "It is too late," (when it is not too late. It must be done at once, and entirely, or all is lost,

Next comes Deucalion's Deluge as set forth by Ovid, the Founder of the Anthropological Society, who was the first to shew us in his *Metamorphoses*, the new Fauna of the present order of things scrambling out of the mud, followed in due time by the pleasing Discovery of the Origin of Species by Selection; and it is hard to deal unpeaceably with agreeable companions whose chief mischief lies in a merit, the charm of their illustrations. Nicer reading is nowhere to be found, from Carlyle to the Weekly Pulpit. Their writings contain abun-

dantly every element calculated to interest and gratify minds at all above current literature, and current literature is always bad, and never can be otherwise so long as there are current readers. Variety throughout, novelties, surprises, instances, disillusionations, catachreses, instruction looking like fancies, and fancies like instruction, all running on together in a light easy flow of narrative, interspersed here and there with a little reasoning of the mild, beseeching, *eau sucrée* kind, make up materials for beguiling many a weary hour in a Railway carriage. Many tolerably intellectual intellects never take holiday without them; Botanising that is, and Sporting of the rare Moth and Butterfly kind, as it used to be in the days of Mrs. Barbauld and "Evenings at Home."

But then comes the grand crash, the wretched end to all this pleantry, the unbearable disintegration of the First Grand Cause into fragments, neither quite living nor quite dead, that by virtue of certain motions and affinities go on, because having once begun without cause, there is no cause why they should stop.

True it is, that these Theorists say, they do not desire to interfere with a First Cause; neither do housemaids desire to break China; but they do it all the same.

This however they do say, as Lord Monboddo said before them, that because some of us have pointed ears, and all of us retired tails or cuckoo bones, we were once no better or other than that two-footed, two-handed, one or two at a birth vertebrate mammal, that synonym of mimicry, mischief, deformity, and folly, the filthy, gibbering, perpetual ape. This is Esau's mess of pottage with a vengeance.

All waverers should again be warned, that at this point they must take their final stand for one side or the other, for life or death. From this point can be no compromise. If the argument for our primitive bestiality prevail, if man was not always man, if he was not at the first created "good," he could not have been a work acceptable to a Creator, Himself good, who could never have created a being displeasing to Himself, or declared it very good, or have looked for service from one unfitted to serve. If man was not at the first created "good," either the Creator must have abhorred His own work

fresh from His own hands or He was not a Personality, or not omnipotent, or not benevolent, or, if benevolent, thwarted in His designs by an unsubdued evil power objective to Himself.

That the same eternal Creator can be both good and evil, that is, unequal or capricious, is hardly pressed by any one of weight ; that there can be two or more omnipotent eternal Beings, of equal independent power, and not so in accord as to be One in act, thought, and dominion, though separate in Personality, is a proposition subversive of the very idea of Deity, who, if He be at all, must be always everywhere present in and with all His inseparable power and attributes. In any other view, He might be a superior being, but would not be God.

That there is an evil Spirit, a Personality, the Tempter of man and worker of his fall, is accepted here as a doctrinal truth ; that he always was, or that he is of the nature, or with the power of God, is not accepted in any sense. He may have been in existence at the creation of our visible universe, but either he was not of it, when everything was finished and pronounced to be "good," or he had not himself then fallen ; and he was not declared to be finally accursed in his type until he had accomplished our fall. It is even possible that that very act may have been the cause of his own fall. But this is mere speculation, and no fitting subject for us to dwell upon.

But it is said, that God could not have created evil ; and it is asked, conceding that evil came to man from this spirit, whence came that evil to this spirit himself ? But what is evil ? and what its beginning ?

But for the command, the first recorded offence was a trivial act ; but it was a disobedience, and thus a departure from good, and the cause of all the evil which ensued, such evil being the just and necessary consequence of the act of that will, which up to that time was free but not sinful, but which once disobedient must under the same conditions be so for ever.

Pain was created, for the nerves of feeling were created. But physical pain is appointed for a purpose, being, as a general rule, a warning of something to be, or a conse-

quence of something that should have been avoided ; in the former case, often slight and removable, in the latter, leading up to disorder and death in its most grievous forms. Then, does not this analogy hold ? Sin is the thing to be avoided ; the pain to the moral sense at its first suggestion and consciousness, the warning ; the remorse corruption and moral death of the soul, if that warning be neglected, the consequence.

It has been suggested, that man was at first created so perfect, that he would not have yielded to less than an objective Tempter, and that Tempter one of power. This is in accord with our peculiar privilege, in assertion of which One came down and took our nature upon Himself, and was proved by the like objective temptation.

Evil, as a necessary consequence of an act of disobedience by one to whom had been given a will and power to obey with all proper safeguards consistent with reason and justice, and if with justice, then also with mercy, may thus without irreverence be looked upon as created. Nothing is gained by calling it a permitted thing, for what is justly permitted, may be justly inflicted.

The return from this point to the question in hand may seem harsh and sudden, almost irreverent, but is unavoidable.

It is almost itself a settler of the case of these darling apes, that the nearer they approach in outward form and stature to ourselves, the uglier and more repulsive, morose, and forlorn they become, while in some of the smaller quadrupedal species, there is often a grace, beauty, vivacity, and intelligence that renders them exceedingly childlike and interesting.

The "Law of the Strongest," is quite an old story, and dates long before the times of Agamemnon. Prince Murat and other naturalists have noticed the aggravated fierceness of some of the gregarious kinds, such as the stag and the bull, during the rutting season, or under the influence of sex, as a provision of nature to ensure the strength of the breed, by destroying or driving off the weaker males, treating it, however, rather as an assertion

by the stronger of marital rights than as a mode of courtship. But they have not noticed, to this end at least, the assiduity and gallantry of certain fine birds in seeking to recommend themselves to the æsthetic sensibilities of the hens of their kind; a provision, it would seem, for keeping in their proper places the ill feathered plebeian male birds, and the origin of privileged classes generally. But it is wonderful that those who have so very deservedly made such a strong point of this, should have passed over the Bird of Wisdom, the dignified, contemplative, unfrivolous owl. Of all that be, is none so delicate and persistent in his attentions as this sagacious bird, who being ungregarious and of recluse habits, gives to perfection the ideal of a Monk courting a Nun, when no one is looking and without a competitor. The manner of it is thus described by Broderip in his *Zoological Recreations*.

"Such a serious affair is only to be observed by the out-door Naturalist who will bury himself for hours in the depths of some quiet wood, near some favourite owl-tree. If he is so fortunate as to see the courtship in some warm gloomy spring, whose stillness is only broken by the pattering of the shower or the minute drops that fall from the moss-grown trees, he will be well repaid for his watching by the solemnization. The Hudibrastic air with which the lover approaches, making lowly congès as if to

'Honour the shadow of the shoe-tie'

"of the prim Quaker-like figure that receives all these humiliations with the demure starched demeanour of one of Richardson's heroines, only now and then turning her head towards the worshipper when she thinks she is not observed, but instantly turning it back when she thinks she is; and the occasional prudish snap of her bill, when she is apprehensive he is going to be rude, make a scene truly edifying."

A selection springing from the will of an individual, and by the continued working of a certain tendency, effecting at last, unconsciously an unforeseen change in that individual or its more or less remote descendants, is

intelligible, and a fair enough ground for a yes or no controversy, that, such as men are, may never come to an end; but any collateral result to an unallied species marks a separate design in relation to that species, but is too remote from this selecting will to be counted among its effects, without much stronger evidence than has ever yet been brought forward, both as to the result and the means. The full result, that is the development of a new species must first be shewn as a fact, and then, that it could not have been effected by other means. As the matter stands, it would be just as reasonable to assign the growth of plants to the alternating sunshine and shower as selecting and not as appointed causes, or, apter still, to attribute selecting influences to the natural vehicles, such as the flood, the winds, the crops of birds and others, that carry the seeds of trees and plants, some to perish, some to barren, some to good land, to dwindle or flourish as the case may be. Certainly all the diligence of all our Naturalists has hardly yet relieved the argument of an exceedingly *à priori* character.

The bee,—this is one of the latest of these intensitives, and yet a very old story,—that in penetrating a flower to get at the sweet stuff at the bottom of the cup, brushes off the pollen, and flies off, like one of the mysterious witches of Parnassus, *κατα κρατος πεπαλαγμενη ἀλφίτα λευκα*, *Hom. Hymn to Hermes*, 547, to distribute it unconsciously from flower to flower during a whole summer working day, has no thought of selection on its own or any other account in so doing; for it does not want the pollen, and does not care whether it is good or bad. It needs but to watch a flower bed that has fed a family of bees from generation to generation, and mark the doings of a single bee. The bee hovers from blossom to blossom, not for pleasure, for who ever saw a bee taking pleasure? but on earnest cares of the hive intent, that is, to collect honey. On some, he alights not at all; on others, he will barely alight, or perhaps crawl a little way in, or, better still, a little this way, and then a little that way, deliberately thinking of nothing, so as to collect the dust, and then take wing again. There has been, as you may perhaps have observed, some thief

there before him, or there is, as you do not know, some canker within. At last he fixes on some blossom, enters, repeats his performances, and then suddenly and desperately buries himself in the flower and is lost to sight, until he returns with his spoil, and flies heavily off.

But even a good horse is sometimes none the worse for kicking straps. The bee does assist the flower, but it is stretching the point much too far, to call this, the supposed origin of one species by the independent action of another, selection. The bee sows (the pollen), but the flower reaps. The bee may select the best flower, but only as we prefer any point in a clear stream to every point in a foul one. The bee has no special fancy for any particular flower, but is in and out among them, with lots of earwigs and other unpleasantnesses all engaged in the same work of pollen spreading, all the day long ; and the flower does not care either about the best bee or the best earwig, but is free as air, open to all comers, and visited alike by strong and weak, pleasant and unpleasant.

The argument must come to this ; that the best bee laden with pollen or the finest quality taken from one first-rate flower, carries it into another first-rate flower, there to be mingled with other pollen of like quality. But the tendency of this would be to improve and develope, that is to change the species of the flower, and not to maintain it ; the one, a thing of time, and certainly problematical, for we have no warrant for supposing that the "Lilies of the Field" are more beautiful now than they were in the days of Solomon, or of a greater than Solomon ; the other, a thing of present requirement, and best forwarded by the bee mingling the pollen of a stronger with that of a weaker flower. But, it is said, what should bring Jove into a thatched cottage, or a milkmaid with her pail into a field of oxen, or a strong, sagacious, selecting bee into a weak or starveling flower, for that or any other purpose ? The bee is at it all day long, and if the early bee will not, the late one will. This milkmaid, by the bye, and her cow, are irresistible on this point, and in the question generally ; for the milkmaid by her perpetual squeezing and pumping, develope the cow into a monster, a

kind of clean, gigantic, unwieldy, straddling sow with horns, a mere living udder ; but if the cow manages to escape into its pristine wild condition before it is too late, it returns to its natural shape, udder and all, and is content to feed its own calf with its own milk, and kick down pails no longer. Then what is this selection with such perishing effects ?

But returning to the bee and flower, there is in their case an observable contrivance to fit one species to the natural seasonable exigencies of another, but certainly not selection by one that needs and suffers no change, to originate a new species in another, which may in some instances require extraneous assistance to keep its place in the garden of the world, but often defies improvement ; for under Providence a Lily is a Lily still.

So far then development is at least equivocal, and falls far short of certainty to a common intent.

It is to be observed too, that development can be no more than a change effected by blind natural causes always in action, and that it might be mischievous and for the worse, but for a directing Providence, whose ways we can trace in some things but not in all. But providence is the attribute of an Agent, and if, arguing from His works, we would but assign Grace, Wisdom, and Power to that Agent, all would yet go well.

Yet one word more of this bee and flower ; if these two, small as they are, do not show an original design that fitted the one for the other, and with this, the stability of order, there can be no such thing as design. The sun and earth in their wild or nebulous states, must have selected each other for companions, and by force of such selection worked out between them, the exact balance of the centripetal and centrifugal forces, which enables them to keep up such companionship, and roll on in their courses, which must thus have been, not appointed but selected courses.

Development as the extension and improvement of something already existing, is largely and admiringly admitted ; but it is insisted that the addition of what was not before, is creation and not development.

But see first how much creation goes to every puny development, to the forming of a single feather.

"In its embryo the feather of a Peacock is little more than a bladder containing a fluid, while every one knows, the general structure of those long ones which form the train. The star is painted on a great number of small feathers, associated on a regular plane as these have found their way from the root, through this long space of three feet, without error of arrangement or pattern in more millions of feathers than imagination can conceive. If this is sufficiently wonderful, the examination of each fibre of this canvass (to adopt this phrase) will much increase the wonder. Taking one half of the star, the places and proportions of the several colours differ in each of those, as do their lengths and obligations: yet a single picture is produced including ten outlines, which form also many irregular yet unvarying curves. And further the opposed half corresponds in everything; while this complicated picture is not painted after the texture is formed, but each fibre takes its place ready painted yet never failing to produce the pattern. while every annual renewal is equally accurate, as it has been in every such animal since the creation." *Macculloch on the Attributes of God. Vol. I, p. 81.*

Yet even this is hardly enough; for this embryo must have been contained in generations upon generations of like embryos all obeying the same law.

This indeed is not conclusive, because if development be a reality, it is as easily traced back to the embryo of thousands of generations past, as to the egg that was cackled over only yesterday; but it certainly adds a new marvel to the selection Theory, by bringing into the light, the amazingly complicated structure to be acted upon and wholly changed at the will and by the caprice of a few silly birds for the breeding time being.

But here it may be conceived, that the feather was always latent from the first embryo downwards, but how is it with the supposed development of sight after generations upon generations of blind ancestors? In this case, it must be assumed, it cannot be proved, that the organs of sight were always latent in a living but shapeless jelly-like mass, themselves separately being, "little more than bladders containing fluids," without forms and without locality, for we do not yet know where the eyes

are to come ; and we are to suppose, myriads of similar or somewhat similar masses lying about, for no one has yet been found to suggest, that all life was derived originally from a single hermaphrodite jelly.

We are next to suppose, all these creatures acted upon for millions of years together by light ; which, bating perhaps some few of the millions of years, they undoubtedly were ; light gave them colour, and kept them in life and spirits ; without light, they probably could never have been at all. Light has been looked upon by some, with a kind of idolatry, as almost the First Cause. But all this action of light must have been without any will or motive upon the part of the primitive man or jelly, who could have had no idea of light, or what it was about, or what himself wanted, or what if any thing to ask for.

But light had a great deal to do besides this, to produce vision. It had to reach and act upon the interior of the parent jelly in aid of its ordinary and natural functions and properties. It had to help to float these lesser jellies, these subordinate "bladders containing fluids" into their proper places, and then to partially dry them, and draw them out into lines and filaments, and nerves and muscles, some hard, some soft, each with its own proper warm and sensible motions and properties, and each at its own proper time in its own exact order and place, until at last in the fulness of days, the microcosm completely formed looked out upon the world, a perfect living eye ; either the dull filmy goggle of the gurnet, or the piercing brilliant of the Chamæleon, or the multitudinous look-all-round-or-you-will-be-caught spy-glass of the fly or spider. Light having done all this, having fairly completed this eye making process, takes service in a metaphor as the light of the mind, and in that character just begins to tell us that light is sight because there is no sight without light, and because *omne majus continet in se minus*, and because it is a property of acoustics to see, and because——and then stops all at once, and tells us no more.

It has been gravely suggested by some, that because this primitive jelly was more or less transparent, it might perhaps have *seen all over*, through the pores of its skin or integuments ;

and certainly when nothing at all is known, no suggestion ought to be disregarded, because out of many one may come right at last where least expected, like the rose which Hotspur proposed to pluck out of the nettle, or the honey that came out of the mouth of the lion killed by Samson, which destroyed so many Philistines. Well, the jelly must certainly have perceived or suffered light, but that would not have been sight, because sight requires a special arrangement of organs ; and something too that makes them visual organs ; and there is more in this than a half-burlesque answer to a weak suggestion, that of itself is hardly entitled to any at all.

Without cleanliness is to us no health ; rather without health is no cleanliness ; for, with the exception perhaps of the cornea of the eye, the enamel of the nails, and the somewhat unlovely papillæ of the hands of our washerwomen, we are never for an instant perfectly clean. The smoothest and brightest skin, puckered up, as it is, into minute wrinkles innumerable, is always transpiring, always giving passage to acids of the most disagreeable kind, to dry and lurk in these wrinkles, until carried off by the free air, with but little artificial aid of our own. Dress, as every change of linen shows, is a dirty thing, and we should be cleaner without it. Better, as Walker the Original has taught us, and he once went a whole week without washing to try the question, is five minutes of a dry Turkish towel in health, than a whole day's sponging and warm watering in sickness.

But this skin, one of the most complicated and sensitive parts of the body, is also the most yielding to outward influences, and especially those of season and climate. In surprisingly short time it will change from fair to dark, from rough to smooth, from delicate to callous, and sometimes in a few short hours well spent at the toilet, from ugliness extreme to perfect beauty.

But if the skin so change, so also in due proportion must the internal organs of the body, for none are idle, but all, as Menenius once explained to a Roman Excursion Party, co-operate in a work which must be done or life will perish. If the skin foregoes its proper office, the lungs are immediately clogged, and cannot do their work properly, and then the other

organs must in some way ease them, and so become clogged in turn, and thus all within must either change or become rapidly disordered; and with them necessarily the outward characteristics of the man.

But what if this Scheme of Development be in reality one of checks to prevent confusion, by replenishing the earth with existing rather than with new species?

It should be borne in mind, that the principle of this scheme must be as wide as Creation itself, and necessarily in action at the birth of every thing that lives, and that one species is always bound to some other or others. A new Fauna would require a new Flora for its subsistence, and both must go on selecting themselves into something better *pari passu*, or both must be damaged together. What would become of our Hop Gardens if the Lady Bird were to select itself into a Diamond Beetle and leave off eating smut? Should a small insect like that be more powerful on a Liquor Law question than Sir Wilfrid Lawson?

But seriously, with all this selection and development going on always every where at once, would it be possible, with every individual a potential founder of a new species, to realise or set a limit to the confusion that must ensue? Could we under such conditions either reasonably infer or unreasonably augur, any thing like a fixed design, or, worse than that, find anything to argue about in Creation?

The problem to be worked is this; an earth of many climates to be filled with life; a Fauna of divers species each susceptible of change to fit it to the varied conditions of these climates; such the grand design, and such the simple means; of anything beyond this, there is neither evidence nor probability, nothing to be gained, no perceptible motive or working cause. Even as it is, wherever there has been change there is always an observed tendency to recur to the original type, and this tendency and this recurrence under favouring circumstances is a full equivalent to any alleged change by selection, and shows further that such change can be neither stable nor real.

In all cases of this supposed development in the ordinary course of nature, passing over the fancy pigeons, toy terriers,

acrobats, Manx cats, prize cattle, *patès de fois gras* and other cruel absurdities of our own forcing, we find none without an object, and that object, generally agreed to be both a beneficial and terminable one, when once attained, is the limit of the change, and a check as firm as prison walls. It may well be that the object in view is only an improved breed, as in the fine bird case, or increased utility to man, the lord of all, but that cannot alter the question except as it more strongly marks the wisdom of the original design.

The English greyhound when transported to Mexico, cannot course, by reason of the rarity of the atmosphere extending over the high table land of that country affecting its breathing ; but the brood of that dog can run perfectly well ; but no further change has been observed in that brood, none being called for.

We have thus, object, means, effect and limit, all given. The effect is strenuously asserted, the limit persistently overlooked. Beyond this limit is neither object nor cause apparent ; without it we should have creation running to waste confusion or mischief, in a way hard to conceive, even by the most strong-minded Philosophy.

Every inquiry respecting the resemblance and identity of species, is necessarily an isolated one. The naturalist may be right, or he may be wrong in assigning the subject before him to one species or another, or to none at all, but so succeeding or so failing, he knows not which, he does but dispose of the single specimen, without any general or further result.

But what of man ? What of Pre-historic man ? certainly a happy expression, for man without reason is without advance, and can have no history ; and if there ever were such a thing as Pre-historic man, he must have been a brute, and become rational all at once by a new act of creation, or, if that expression give umbrage, by development *per saltum*.

All known remains of the Eoplastic or earliest works of man, are, for aught that has ever yet been authentically shown, safely within historic limits, and all denote the possession by him of combined power and intelligence ; and until still earlier

vestiges of him are discovered, the Mosaic account is not discredited, and at this point our natural lights fail us.

Beyond these remains, are none but a few geological sweepings flaunting it in our Museums and Lecture Rooms, such as the skeleton in limetone from Guadaloupe in one of the rooms of the British Museum, but they are of unknown or equivocal antiquity, and until more is known or that equivoque is authoritatively determined, can have no weight. Their very rarity is an argument against them ; for, if in the vast accumulation of organic remains of pre-historic life, found lying and imbedded in nearly every part of the earth, authentic vestiges of man are wanting, it is a just and necessary inference, that he was not co-existent with that life. Stratum upon stratum, each in succession the habitation of races long wholly or in part extinct, turns up and is examined, and during the different and countless ages which they represent, was no man. Then where was he ? Many of these strata are evidences of past and not of continuing states of things, and if man be not found among them, he must have come afterwards in his own proper time and order, and why he should not have been perfect man from the first has never yet been shown, and again the Mosaic account is not discredited.

An additional organ or two to the brain of a brute, or possibly a mere change in the proportions of those it already possesses, might make a deformed man of him. There is however not the slightest ground for concluding that there has been any change in the constitution of the intellect of man, any addition to, or remoulding of its faculties, since mind began. The process of reasoning and all the modes of thought, in quality and action, are the same as they have been from the beginning. We can no more conceive a new mental faculty than we can an additional sense. Philosophy indeed herself abhors a metaphysical vacuum, and is always found heroically standing up for Reason as it is.

Neither is there anything to show, that the standard of its natural powers, has ever been raised. The first readers of that scare of the intellectual sluggard, the Book of Job, one

of the grandest and the oldest now extant, could have been no mean men. They must have been high minded, thoughtful, earnest men, close reasoners and possessed of at least an equal sense of all that is grand and beautiful, with ourselves, even though strangely given to look for "Wisdom and the place of Understanding," where it is but little the custom to do so in these days.

It may be added, that this Book of Job is not very doctrinal ; but it is a noble and fitting introduction to the Scriptures which, unconsciously to its author, were to follow in their due order, and is thus happily placed in the position which it now holds in our Bibles, immediately after the historical Books.

But it is said, and by some too who profess belief, that the differences in the personal characteristics of the various families or races of mankind, are so great as to preclude the possibility of a common parentage.

That is rather a strong thing to say, when new physical characteristics have been observed to be developing in some of our own colonists of our own blood in our own times and before our very eyes. If we were now to be shown a Cretin or Albino for the first time, the legitimate conclusion would be, that he belonged to no race at all.

It would not be difficult to show, did space permit, that these differences however great are indispensable parts of the scheme of Providence in relation to man, which being one, partly of retribution for offences, partly of education for a more perfect state, could not have been effected in the way or by the means adopted, without them. It may well be, that they may hereafter become greatly modified, or possibly blend into one common type, but down to the present time, they have been active and important agents in the furtherance of that scheme, and furnish the strongest intrinsic evidences of design. Always however it should be born in mind, that there is a religious progress as well as a secular one, and that the latter is the subordinate.

All inferior natures, being without a moral sense, are under an invariable law. Man alone having that sense and a will, is under an additional one, attempered to that will, and therefore not absolutely unchangeable. It must declare, as it did to

the Jews, "Obey, and it shall be well with you : disobey and you shall be punished." It is a law therefore providing at the beginning for a double contingency. What would have happened had the Jews been obedient, is as fully known to the Creator, as fairly written in the Divine Mind, as all that has actually taken place.

Man having this will, has alone a history ; and this history turns wholly upon that of one small and personally insignificant people.

The Old Testament narrative is taken here to be a sufficient authority for all the leading facts there recorded and here referred to, and to be familiar to all.

It was clearly designed, that the whole habitable earth should be peopled ; and the first steps towards this end are well known. The Confusion of Tongues and consequent Dispersion, occurring so very shortly after the Deluge, mark a Moral Government, directing, perhaps aggravating, natural causes to a moral end.

Next following on the general corruption of all mankind, is the selection and setting apart of one personally inconsiderable people to preserve the true religion, and ultimately for the redemption of all mankind. The history, rise, sufferings and fall of this people are well known, and the causes, immediate and accessory, too broadly written, to be easily misinterpreted. But there was one and the same Ruler of all, and He who so chastised His own peculiar people, would not pass over the others, but visit all alike in justice. Of His temporal dispensations many speak for themselves. One thing is certain, and indeed declared by Himself, that the offences of the fathers will be visited in this life on the children. In the line of the coarse-minded Ham and of Canaan this is most strongly and unmistakably observable. They were to be "servants of servants," a familiar Hebrew intensive, through generations untold. But this could not be, without setting its mark upon them in perceptible deterioration of mind and body. The slave eye and bearing, hereditary among slaves so long as they are slaves, are books that all can read. There are casts in the South Kensington Museum of two statues by Michael Angelo. These figures, larger than life,

and perfect in their anatomy of the prime of life, give the idea of strength and power ; but the crouching attitude, the arms, not folded but crossed, the drooping head, and, above all, the almost insufferable side glance of defiance half stamped out, of dying hope, and shame and misery, tell their tale of broken manhood and the beginning change, far too well to need labels. These are slaves.

In too many lands even now, the slave and his master breathe the same air and dwell always together, but the acquired hatred between them, and not least, that of the stronger towards the weaker, has never lessened, even with better and more awakened sense of justice, and this hatred compounded of aversion and contempt is visibly augmented in the former by the mutual repulsion of races.

But then the Bosjeman or the Native Australian is set side by side with the refined white man, or the Venus de Medici with the once famous Hottentot one, and then it is said, "Surely these cannot be brothers and sisters!" But why not? Dr. Syntax on his Tour in search of the Picturesque, after looking at a picture by some great master, of Nymphs bathing, was moved to pronounce, that "if these young ladies were beautiful, Mrs. Syntax must be most astonishingly ugly."—Who shall say, bearing in mind that a distinction, not to say repulsion of races, would materially assist the design of the Dispersion, and the establishment of nationalities and governments all now in different degrees progressing towards improvement, that the three sons of Noah, the ancestors of all mankind, miraculously preserved and therefore miraculous personages, one of them marked out for special degradation were not so constituted as to admit or lead more rapidly than by causes now in action, to these physical differences in their descendants?

All the races of man are capable of cross breeding. Hair is only straight wool, and our young ladies often frizzle theirs to great effect, nor is there any reason in nature, why Margaret in Faust should always have blonde hair, or Medea black, or why Minerva should have blue eyes, and so many of our strong-minded women, topaz, jet, or neutral tinted. The white man has his pigment as well as the black, and Albinos

are common to both. It is possible to live upon onions or onion-like roots, and we know the disagreeable effect which an overdose of onions has, extending even to the skin; and what may be the consequences of perpetual overdoses, and nothing but overdoses of them, who shall pronounce? Here then are the chief differences fully accounted for.

It is all very well to say "seriously now," and all that sort of thing, but, do what we may, it is not every serious argument however well intended and well looking that can be seriously treated, nor are there so many that would be so, were not we who are on the right and safe side of the question so often kind and complimentary to a fault towards our opponents. Certainly there are some, such as the Protoplasmic one, arising not so much out of the subject itself as from the ambition of the propounders, which it is lawful and best to take by the forelock, or as we should a protesting, clattering crab, by the carapace, and drop into its native element at the boiling point, a shorter and less cruel way than stripping them feather by feather, as Diogenes served the cock, to prove to Plato, (could anybody ever prove anything to Plato?) that a man was not a cock.

But this is not all. The earth was to be replenished by man, but all the earth was not at first ready to receive civilized man, though capable of supporting the savage, the pioneer in so many cases of the former. Go back a few thousand years, and cast a few families of men such as they then were, in and about the islands of the Pacific or the continent of Australia, with a Fauna of kangaroos and duck-billed rats, and Flora of roots and rank grass, and what could they do but what they have done, that is, nothing? They might barely exist. They could not improve their condition by work, for there would be none to their hands. Their children would not even believe in such a thing as work. There would be no motive, and therefore no advance. They could not even continue civilized, for if they did, they would be simply miserable. They could do nothing but abide the ancestral doom; they must become debased, play *chamæleon* to the climate, change colour, and dwarf or strengthen physically under skyey influences and the hidden virtues or vices of roots, rats, or other

available diet, until they reached at last the several and respective states in which they were found by our circumnavigators,—the Cooks, Ansons, Challengers, Yachtsmen, and Captain Webbs of the last and present centuries.

The like consequences would necessarily follow in the case of the weaker races thrust out by the stronger into the African deserts or the frozen-up countries of the north.

“Mind, the eternal cause of all.” So said Anaxagoras surnamed for it *Aθεος*, according to his lights in derogation of the Gods of his day, but there he stopped, and went dancing back to his brother philosophers, to chatter nonsense about plenum and vacuum; and the full idea has never been expressed by any teacher of any school. One Creative Mind, one Will, one Power, one home and resting place for all, by Whom all things were made, in Whom all things exist, the senseless worlds and separate life and consciousness of every creature in them, from the worm to the Archangel. To Him, the life and death of His creatures are equal cares; but to one of them He has given thoughts and aspirations, and with them faculties and powers which are plainly of a life beyond the grave; and that He, who also has life beyond the grave, will regard His own gifts, and not cast away His own works, we might well feel assured, even if He had not Himself expressly declared it.

IN THE BEGINNING
REMARKS ON CERTAIN MODERN VIEWS
OF THE CREATION

PART III.

BY

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Dissentientis
. exemplo trahenti
Perniciem veniens in ævum.



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IN THE BEGINNING.

PART III.

When tempests beat thy garden, Lord,
Make strong the frontier tree,
That shelters from the rage abroad
The primrose, strong in Thee.

The pasture which in secret grows
To feed thy simple sheep—
O save it from the dreary snows
Our Magi on it heap ;

Far from their wisdom who of old
In Bethlehem bent the knee,
Along with guardians of the fold,
At thy nativity !—JOHN STAFFORD SPENCER.

WE have been assured lately by a fearless and brilliant writer, with something perhaps of the peremptoriness of an unplaced apostle, that, like the Athenians of old, we are at all times too superstitious or overcurious in our worships ; that there is “an eternal, not ourselves, tending to righteousness ;” that this is all that we know, or need know, of God in the concrete ; that Literature is the only true Revelation, and its professors the priesthood of the world ; and that all beyond is *aberglaube*, extrabelief, metaphysics and nonsense ;

and that the Bible therefore, is the only safe guide to conduct that the world has ever seen. By Literature is to be understood the knowledge of the best that can be known on every subject; by metaphysics and nonsense, every thing that is not Literature.

The assurance of this "eternal" is based on the irresistible consciousness and experience of every thinking man. This we, on our part, gladly accept so far as regards the "eternal," but are a little uneasy at the prescribed limitations; and in the meantime cannot but think it somewhat strange that one, who so happily opens to us the true path, should in himself evince such an irrepressible alacrity in standing still, and cheering on his followers to stand still with him. Has he really no *vis inertiae* of his own? or is it his set purpose to send us all flying over his head into places of grief and trouble unknown, himself meanwhile steadfast and *undique tutus*?

It is agreed that that there is an "eternal not ourselves tending to righteousness;" but then we are told that it works by "a secret and a method," and that all beyond this is to us very properly a blank; we on our part say, that we do not very well understand what is meant by a secret and a method, because we have long had a method communicated to us, which has never been a secret, except as a thing which can at any time be learnt if we but will it, may be considered one, and which has always worked well and left no blank when fairly tried; and we contend that this "eternal" being thus objective, and so working on our wills, must itself have a will, and if a will, then a personality of its own; and for for this we appeal in our turn, not to reason only, but to that very same consciousness and experience of mankind. If such an eternal be, we say that this Personality, will and power, is that eternal; and to this the question must come at last.

This "eternal" and assurance are also to us the source and evidence of all even the most advanced dogmas of the Church, and there is none besides. There is no such thing as an unresolved or half convert to any article of faith. If you find such a one in seeming, strip him, and you will find a wavering logician, a philosopher in disguise, and also in a fix.

The conditions of this "eternal" are given us by our unplaced apostle with great clearness, negatively that is, and by innuendo. It is not a personality, because it cannot be verified as such, without letting in some at least of the teaching of the Church, which would be a *reductio ad absurdum*. Neither is it a spirit; because a spirit, as now better understood, is a person without a body, "or what children call a ghost," and when Jesus said, "God is a spirit, and to be worshipped in spirit and truth," all he meant was, that He was το θειον του πρεποντος, the divinely decent in the abstract, an influence to be obeyed and followed as religiously as circumstances and the claims of Literature will admit of, by a self appreciative enjoyment of the results, and that when we have done this we shall be free of the subject, perfectly happy, with nothing more to hope for, fear or worship, during the rest of our lives. It is further added that Jesus declared all this in such plain and unmistakable terms, as a warning for all time against the "unprofitable jargon of two of our Anglican bishops, in speaking of the God of the Universe as a person."

It is, moreover, hinted that, language being as all know a bad conductor of meaning, inasmuch as Jesus spoke in Aramaic or Syro-Chaldaic,* the most concrete and unmetaphysical of all languages, and is "reported" in Greek, the most metaphysical one, there is an additional and very appreciable risk of error through the ignorance or misapprehension of the translators.

This is a very reasonable argument, especially coming from one who, as we may see, accepts that as translation, which is not translation, and does not recognise that which is; and we may well turn it to our own advantage by avoiding over reliance on stray texts and grammatical niceties of construction in discussing vital or important truths. The Æthiopian Eunuch, spelling out his Septuagint in his chariot, was in all probability a much more learned man and better grammarian than the simple minded earnest Philip, who met him by the

* See an article "*On the Language of Christ and His Apostles*" in the *Church of England Magazine* for December 1872, p. 419.

road side, taught him his "Aberglaube" and sent him on his way rejoicing.

On the 15th of April, 1525, Zwingle, the great Swiss Reformer, arguing before the Grand Council of Zurich on the nature of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, contended that in the expression, "this is my body," the word *ἐστι* ought to be taken to mean "signifies," and quoted various instances in favour of that view, but with seemingly little success, and retired from the Council dispirited. The same night he dreamt that some one appeared to him and said, "Why do you not quote Exodus, ch. 12, v. vii, You shall eat the lamb in haste; it is the Lord's Passover?" He awoke with a start, and turned at once to the passage referred to in the Septuagint, and found there the word *ἐστι*, where by common consent it can only mean "signifies;" and thus the word being used in this sense at the very institution of the Passover, the parallelism seemed complete. Zwingle took this verse for his text the following morning, and urged it with such immoderate effect that, as he could not describe the person he had seen in his dream, his opponents, in their amaze, one and all declared that it must have been Satan himself who had thus visited him. *D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation, Book 11, ch. 6.* But neither were the words, "This is my body," spoken, nor those, "It is the Lord's Passover," written in Greek, but the former in Aramaic or Syro-Chaldaic,* and the latter in Hebrew without any auxiliary verb expressed; and the Septuagint, however great its value, is not an inspired book, and is not only unequal nearly throughout, but contains many patent and some even laughable errors, and what is even more to the point here, errors arising from a fanatical addiction to grammar and spelling. Thus, in *Psalms* 88, v. 11, "shall the dead praise Thee?" is in the Septuagint rendered "Shall the physi-

* It may be observed here that St. Luke, not having been present at the Last Supper, derived his account of it from some or one of the twelve, and must have been strongly interested to have rendered the very words used; and the expression which he attributes to our Lord, as used by Him on the occasion, is *ἐπιθυμῶν ἐπεθύμησα*—"With desire I have desired"—a well-known idiom of the Hebrew and the cognate tongues.

cians *ιατροι*, praise Thee?" Now, the word in the Hebrew, is according to the vowel points used, either "Rephaim," dead, or "Ropheim," *ιατροι*, the causers of death, and the Septuagint translators, having by ill chance fallen on some copy of the Psalm in which the word was pointed "Ropheim," *ιατροι*, too hastily adopted that reading; and, as the authorised one preserved in the Temple and those used in the synagogues, were without points, there was nothing from which the error could have been authoritatively corrected afterwards, and so it passed into a tradition.

Upon the grand truth so handled by Zwingle, and not, so far at least as above appears, very effectively, the authority of St. Paul will hardly be placed out of view by any not being themselves greater apostles than he, of whom indeed there are now not a few; but these are not our immediate concern. St. Paul speaks of an unworthy communicant as one *μη διακρινων το σωμα του κυριου*. This is untranslatable into our language for want of a perfect equivalent for the compound verb *διακρινω* with all its various meanings, and is thus diversely rendered by us, "not discerning," and (in the Communion Service) "not considering," the Lord's body, expressions by no means necessarily synonyms.

But neither have these two English words very perfect equivalents in the Greek, each expressing different meanings according to the context; and this any one that chooses may try for himself. There is thus a secular scholastic difficulty on this point, and surely to apply to such an expression of a vital spiritual truth, merely the rules by which we should construe a Greek Chorus, would be to cut the diamond to the setting, and not the setting to the diamond; and would be the less reasonable, as the Greek of the New Testament is in the common dialect into which that of Athens in her glory, and those of all other states and colonies of Greece, had by the working and usage of the common mind at that date, not without a Providence, become blended; and which is not after all the language in which the truths delivered by our Lord himself were spoken.

We do not commonly enter or dwell very long on minute criticisms on a text until some subtle heresy has been proposed

to us, and perhaps already prepossessed our thoughts, and such criticisms are doubly perilous, both as drawing us away from the true means of assurance, without which the questions must remain open for ever, and as leaving us at the mercy of the subtlest, not always or necessarily the most enlightened, disputant.

But it may be asked, if we have a written law or message thus miraculously delivered, must we not prove that message by itself?

A well trained child may best answer that question. The message comes to us from a living Spirit, "who is to be worshipped in spirit and in truth." But words cannot express, nor can the reason grasp, the full transcendent method and working of the Spirit; and in every rite of the Church, and even in private prayer, there is an outward visible sign and inward spiritual reality, and our consciousness of and longing for this last is our faith, which more or less abounds in each, according to his spiritual advance. Then, the outward act which all may observe, if done with any degree or portion of saving faith, is so far efficacious, and not lost; though whether it be so done or not, is a thing known only to the worshipped and the worshipper. But, further, the answer and reward for the rite now in view, the Communion, if worthily partaken of, is also inward and spiritual according to the measure of the faith that brings the worshipper to the table, and abides with him there, and in the same kind; and if any one be unduly vexed with doubts as to changes in the elements, or any other question of a like nature, it is there, if ever, that he may look with fullest assurance to have the truth disclosed or confirmed to him, and to come to the discernment of the true import and sense of the working of the rite. If, as is too likely, any one has gone on communicating all his life, with uniform regularity and placidity, and untroubled by any scruples, he may well school himself to doubt whether he has ever on any occasion received worthily. There are degrees in privileges. The prophets whom Obadiah hid by fifties in caves were, we need not doubt, good, and some of them holy men, though possibly far below the measure of Elijah. It may indeed be, that of those who have departed this life in

sure and certain hope, the last death-bed communion has of many been the only one taken quite worthily, and with full perception of all its privileges.

The assurances of all dogmas, the earlier and more advanced alike, are the same in kind. If the existence of the "eternal" be assured to us, not by the reason, but by an irresistible consciousness and experience, so also are all the more advanced articles of our faith. If, as we are so often imperiously told, our assurance of these articles be merely a superstitious prejudice, such also must be that of the "eternal." If this undefined "eternal" be not a personality, nor derived from a Personality, it must necessarily be the working of a universal law or principle underlying all spiritual or moral existences, including ourselves, and therefore an original law, quality or form of ourselves—that is, "ourselves;" or else a form or quality wandering in an ideal space and time in search of a concrete, which it finds at last in us, when, as in the former alternative, it becomes equally ourselves. But we still claim our right to challenge the possibility of an objective moral power working on us that shall not also have personality.

But then, it is said, that we only get at this personality, as we think, metaphysically; and that as Literature is "the knowledge of the best that can be known on every subject," metaphysics is only the knowledge of the best that cannot be known on any subject, and therefore this personality cannot be got at at all. Well, be metaphysics what it may, we can find even in its outskirts, an illustration pretty nearly equal to the occasion. No painter can present us with the very lineaments of Milton's Death as personified by him in his *Paradise Lost*; no mind of any cultivation but conceives some image of it, probably no two the same. Is not that Death—so variously conceived by us—as much a person in Milton's poem as Eve herself, whom, by the bye, some nationalities conceive to have been a blonde, others a brunette, and sculptors of no complexion at all?

The argument here comes to this. We can describe a head, because heads are recognised in Literature, and we cannot do without one; therefore there is such a thing as a head.

We cannot describe a headache, because a headache is either only a relation, or a simple idea, an element only of a very unpleasant compound one, and we can do without it, therefore there is no such thing as a headache.

All this is apart from the difficulty of conceiving an influence without source or director, or how that which is eternal first came to attach itself to that which, being material, must have begun to be what it is, once upon a time; and this last all true philosophers know is a difficulty that can never be met.

This "eternal not ourselves," whether personal or impersonal, must pervade all existences, so far as concerns man, the only being that we know of, or have here to do with, that possesses a moral sense upon which it can work. The supposed exceptional cases of the total absence of this sense in races or individuals, are more probably cases of obliteration, or if not, are triumphantly disposed of by the Darwinian discoveries of developments and rudiments, and migrations of organs from the stomach to the brain, and of places where the eyes have been, and places where they are to come, and of pointed ears to receive all rumours, and risible muscles to cause laughter, and others to produce all the different emotions suitable to rising beings, from all which we may safely conclude to our own satisfaction that, if the moral sense be not already come, it is on the road, and will arrive all in good time; and in the meanwhile we may, despite appearances, and for the purpose of the argument, reasonably assume it to exist among us generally.

The position taken by our new teacher seems to be this:— "The word God does not stand for a perfectly definite and ascertained idea from which clear inferences may be drawn, but is a term of poetry and eloquence (like Milton's Death) 'thrown out' at a not fully-grasped object of the speaker's consciousness, a literary term in short, and men mean different things by it as their consciousness differs (just Milton's Death again), and as a matter of fact and of history, it is commonly used to mean, as expressed by Luther, "the best that man knows or can know." But then come the theologians, who affix a scientific meaning to the word, and deduce from

the metaphysical ideas of substance, identity, causation, design and so on, which they say are taught, or at least implied, in the Bible as we now have it, the conclusion that God is a person, the first cause, the moral and intelligent governor of the universe, and the other doctrines of the Church. Other people, however, failing to perceive the force of such a deduction, and being told that it is in the Bible, and that they must receive it if they receive the Bible, conclude to reject both."

It is then contended that none of these things really are in the Bible properly viewed.

This Literature, by the bye, is described in nearly the same terms which Luther, as we have seen, applies to God, "the best that is known or can be known." This, whether designed or not, is really very curious, a sort of philosophical palindrome; Literature-Dogma-Dogma-Literature; "read backwards and forwards and always the same."

The argument then proceeds—"The Israelites alone of all mankind, were free from the distractions arising from the breaking up of all grand truth; for they clearly discovered by an irresistible consciousness and experience that there was within them 'an eternal not themselves tending to righteousness,' and not being metaphysicians went no further. Being thus assured of the eternal, they invented or found for it a name, and the name they gave it is 'Jehovah,' which is a Hebrew word, which means and ought to be translated by us 'eternal' and nothing more."

But certainly if this were the case the name was not a very happily chosen one. The complete idea of the eternal is eternal in righteousness, and it is the righteous and not the eternal element that is the proper object of our worship and adoration. Most assuredly the dominant idea of the Israelites when they framed the word, if they did frame it, and at all times, was holiness or righteousness. It will be remembered that the words "Holiness to Jehovah" were engraved on the gold plate in the front of the mitre which Aaron, if there ever were such a person, and all succeeding high priests wore, when on stated occasions they entered the "Holy of Holies;" and here assuredly we find the idea of

holiness the dominant one. But the High Priest at these times was the type of a mediator making atonement for the people, and the words thus conspicuously displayed must have meant, not that he ascribed—for why should he have done so then more than at any other time?—but that he brought typically by virtue of the sacrifice just offered, holiness to Him who was holy; and if “Jehovah” meant eternal only, and neither directly nor by association something more, the words “Holiness to Jehovah” would have been tame and unsacramental—that is, wholly inexpressive of the thing signified.

He who was thus Jehovah to the Israelites was already known as El Shaddai,* God Almighty, (and therefore as eternal, for He who is Almighty must be Eternal) to all mankind; and the former name must therefore have been in some way or sense suggestive of the peculiar relations thenceforth established between Him and His chosen people, rather than of aught in common to them and the rest of the world.

If the name were really one devised by the Israelites for their own use, it seems rather hard to understand why they should have invented one which they never dared to use; for of course it is well known that they deemed it unlawful to pronounce it, partly from fear lest they should commit a breach of the commandment, by doing so unworthily, and partly lest it should thereby become known and profaned among the gentiles; and that they carried this so far that, when they had occasion to write it, they were accustomed to use the vowel points proper to the words Elohim or Adonai instead of its own, and that by such means the true pronunciation is considered to be now irrecoverably lost, and all that is now known of it is that “Jehovah” is not the right word.

It has been said to be a mood and tense of the verb *hayah*, in the Hiphil form, to cause to be; but, if so, it is impossible that the true pronunciation of it could have ever been lost, for no Hebrew scholar has the slightest difficulty in pointing correctly any verb that may be set before him through all its conjugations; nor is it easy to understand

* *Exodus c. 6, v. 3*, El Shaddai Θεός, Jehovah κυριος.

how the striking out from common use of so familiar and indispensable a word could have been compensated for. It is true that, being apparently a derivative of the root "hayah," to be it may suggest the idea of eternal; and it is accordingly rendered in the Septuagint, *Εγω ειμι ο Ων*, and sometimes more simply, *Εγω ειμι* or *ο Ων*, as *Εγω ειμι* or *ο Ων ερρησαστην*, but that is no more than the approximation of the translators, who devoutly accepting the "Aberglaube" of the Old Testament, and fully sharing all the mystical notions attaching to the name, did not dare to write it correctly, even under the veil of Greek characters; and indeed if they had written it, as well as they could in those characters, "Jehovah," the attributes of Elohim and Adonai, Lord and God, covertly suggested by the Hebrew mode of pointing the name, would have entirely disappeared and been lost to those for whom the Septuagint was written, and the word have been altogether meaningless. But all this will not make it properly translatable by "eternal." It is not Hebrew for eternal, and either it means something more, or it is a barbarism.

It has become a fashion of late in some quarters to write the name "Jahveh," either because it looks thus something more like a common Hebrew word, or because it is—covertly suggestive of the heathen Zao, or Jove, who may thus have yet one more chance; and one distinguished philologist, now deceased, is said to have usually commenced his morning prayer, "O Jahveh, whom that fool —— will persist in calling Jehovah."

It is very conceivable that the idea of an absolute and perfectly righteous Almighty Ruler and Governor, whether expressed or implied and understood in the name of Jehovah, whether communicated or even devised by man, might strike the minds of the Israelites, deeply conscious of their short comings, with awe and dread extreme, when brought suddenly and full into their thoughts; and it is indeed a law of the conscience that it should do so; and we may not unprofitably call to mind here the conduct of Peter at his call on the occasion of the Miraculous Draught, unable to bear the sudden and unlooked for manifestation of the immediate presence of

a Divine Majesty, and his cry of terror—"Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord."

But it is by no means so easy to understand how the Israelites, having once fully realised the grand overpowering truth of an "influence within them not themselves tending to righteousness," and being, it is said, without any assurance of a future life for themselves, should choose for that influence so barren and inconsequential a name as the "eternal," a word expressing an attribute proper to the First Cause whether possessing righteousness or not, and not rather the "holy" or "all holy," or other such expression, having some relation to its office and working within them.

A Liturgy for the worship of such an undefined "eternal," if there could be such a worship, would be one continued solecism. Suppose the third collect in our Evening Service to run thus—"O Eternal not ourselves tending to righteousness, by thy great mercy save and defend us from all the perils and dangers of this night"—who could endure the crude antithesis between such an "eternal" and "this night," between a mysterious abstraction and immediate personal protection? An observed and doubtless studied beauty of our Liturgy lies in the propriety of the addresses of the different prayers and their accommodation to their objects, as, "O God, the Creator and Preserver of all mankind," in the prayer for all sorts and conditions of men; "Almighty God, Father of all mercies," in the general thanksgiving, and so throughout. For all these we must have some answering Personality, without which all our worship is a mere forced absurdity, and for this we appeal in our turn to the consciousness and experience of every man that lives.

The "Shining" (perhaps the Phæthon *Φαέθων* of Ovid who, however, was only the Son of the Sun, and not the Sun himself) which the irrepressible—whom we have been so long watching as we should the opening calyx of some unknown exotic never seen in our parts before—tells us is the true meaning of the word God, is worth noticing. But only for this, that signs are not wanting of some undeclared purpose underlying the excessive laudation of Sanscrit and the extreme East now becoming so common.

Of mystical interpretations of the name Jehovah there is no end ; but they are mere imaginations ;* and the argument has come round pretty nearly to this : the name means something of which the Israelites have lost the knowledge, which knowledge we have never had.

But then all this story of El Shaddai and so on is mere "aberglaube, belief of supererogation, and unprofitable episcopal jargon," and we may as well come at once to reliable facts. On the one hand it is urged, that the Israelites, who alone, or certainly pre-eminently above all others, possessed and cultivated the ideas of righteousness and holiness, and whose language and ritual alone preserved expressions for those ideas unprofaned by coarse and vulgar misapplications, and being assured by an irresistible consciousness of an influence not themselves working to righteousness, the thought of which was never for an entire day, perhaps scarcely for a waking hour, out of their minds, for that is the law of the dominant idea in all of us, devised a name for it, the use of which they immediately proscribed, such name meaning or seeming to mean, especially if it is written "Jahveh," not holiness or power or anything implying creative or ruling attributes, but simply "eternal," and nothing more, an attribute, according to some, equally belonging to Satan. We, on the other hand, accepting the definition of conduct as stated in "Literature and Dogma," viz., "that it is the earnest pursuit of the righteousness of the eternal, and the purification of the inner self," and relying on the same irresistible consciousness and experience, say, that that which gives life must have life,

* Annotarunt quidam, Judæos antiquos ante adventum Christi ita fuisse imbutos in hoc puncto, ut mysterium Trinitatis in nomine Jehovah יהוה observarint. Nam illud nomen constat e quatuor literis, unde et vocatur τετραγράμματον, quadriliterum ; tres tamen peculiare literæ tantum sunt in eo : ' yod, "quod notat Patrem et principium rerum ;" ' , vau, "est conjunctio copulativa notatque Personam tertiam, quod exit a Patre et Filio ;" ' , he, "notat Filium."—*Godwin's Moses and Aaron, L. 4. ch. 4, s. 4.* Jehovah expresses the Divine Essence, which has no quality ; for kind and difference do not exist in the first cause, and hence the name, which is almost spiritual, and was known to angels even before language was created.—*Article on the Book Cosri, Church of England Magazine, April, 1873, p. 237.*

that holiness is the true moral life, and that we not having this life are aided in our endeavour to obtain it by the grace and fellowship of One who has, and that without full assurance of that grace and fellowship, we can have neither hope nor belief in the matter.

The first thing that amazes us in this question is, that the Israelites of all people in the world, should be said not to worship a personal God, when nearly every page of their writings, every rite and act of their worship; their exclusive claims as a peculiar people to favours and privileges never to be communicated to the rest of the world, so plainly avouch the contrary.

But we do not wait long for an answer. "The Israelites having become assured of this 'eternal not themselves,' gave it the safe name of Jehovah or Jahveh, meaning or understood by them to mean eternal, and then all was well; but afterwards, through their importunate yearning after righteousness, and being poets rather than metaphysicians, got to indulge in certain lyrical imageries and personifications, and anthropomorphic notions of a magnified and non-natural man, which by degrees found their way into the text of their Scriptures to such an extent, that what are now accepted as the Canonical Books, contain so many things which are neither true themselves nor will let others be so, that the Bible has become throughout wholly untrustworthy both as to facts and doctrine, and is only the best guide to conduct the world has ever known."

Suppose we try an argument under these conditions, just for the literature of the thing, selecting one or two representative points.

M or N (as the case may be) The opening words of the Old Testament are "Bereschit bara Elohim," translated by us "In the beginning God created," and these necessarily imply an act done by a Personality, or, if you will, Personalities, as Elohim, God, is a noun plural; but we cannot conceive a plurality of "eternals" within us not ourselves working to righteousness or anything else.

L and D (as the case is) That passage is not authentic; and the story is all abergläube, Episcopal jargon, metaphysics,

nonsense. The Book Genesis was not written by Moses, but long after his time—perhaps by Samuel, who thought himself a prophet, and afterwards added to by Ezra, and next by some of the Maccabees, and later still by Caiaphas, and then by Longinus, who gives the words, *φως γενεσθῆ και εγενετω, γη γενεσθῶ και εγενετο*, because, being a Professor of Literature, he knew that light must have existed before the earth, and lastly by myself, who have made it a little less intelligible in various material particulars; and besides, there never was any such person as Moses, and if there were, he has been misreported all through the first half of his Decalogue, a very weak production, to say the best of it.

M or N. It is at least certain that the Israelites passed through the Red Sea by the aid of a miracle.

L and D. Not authentic, nonsense, jargon, stuff. Something of the kind happened to Alexander the Great in the Sea of Pamphylia during his campaign against Darius, and the Jews had the account of this from Antiochus Epiphanes, who was descended from Seleucus, one of the companions and successors of Alexander, and put their version of it into the book Exodus not to be outdone by their persecutor; but no miracle, no miracle, confound it all, *meo Marte*, no miracle—

De par le moi : Defense a Dieu,
De faire miracle dans ce lieu.

There never was such a thing as a miracle. There never was a miracle here; there never was a miracle there; therefore there never was a miracle anywhere.

M or N. The Israelites looked for a Redeemer who came at the very time assigned by prophecy.

L and D. Not authentic, metaphysics, episcopal jargon, nonsense. They looked for a redeemer who never came at all. Jesus came, just as another Jesus might come to-morrow, not to redeem, but to teach the secret and the method.

M or N. To teach by discourse and example of life is not to save by deeds. There never was a person called Jesus, which is a word without meaning, and neither a translation nor a proper name. The right name is Jeshua, which in Hebrew means or implies "Saviour," and Jesus was so

called at His birth, because He was to save the world, which He has done and is doing every hour that flies. The final "a," the Hebraic "ain," in this name Jeshua is a radical sonant letter, which cannot be dropped without absolutely destroying the force and meaning and very life of the word; the "u" or "vau," on the other hand, is only a servile, denoting the mood, and it were a better deed to have translated this word right, which you have not done, than to have translated "Jehovah" wrong, which you have done. To say nothing of the Messianic prophecies of Isaiah and others,——

L and D. Not authentic, not authentic. Must I go on smiting you for ever? The story of the name is some fancy of the Reporters, and as to your prophecies, there were two Isaiahs, and only one of them, the one edited by Handel, was much of a Messianic prophet, and he flourished some time unknown, but long after the other, and was therefore both logically and arithmetically more likely, and may be confidently pronounced to have written after the events prophesied; and besides, his Messianic idea does not agree with that of the writer "passing among the Israelites under the name of Daniel;"* but if they were both prophets, both must be true; but they do not agree; therefore both cannot be true; and you cannot say which of them is true, and which not; therefore neither of them is true, any more than yes is no, or no yes; and if Handel's Isaiah be not true, *à fortiori* none of the lesser prophets can be so. Besides, nothing is so easy as to prophesy. Mark Antony prophesied dreadful objects over the wounds of Cæsar, and his prophecy came true quite Hebraically, that is, both in its primary and secondary applications; first in the times of the taxing when Cyrenius was governor of Syria, and afterwards in those of the demoralization begun by Gregory the Great and Augustine of Canterbury, and culminating in the present horrors of denomina-

* Mirum, quod not meminerit Αποστολιδιον, hic, nostrum, that Daniel was considered by the stricter Rabbi as something less than a prophet under the Law, because his revelations were made to him when beyond the borders of the Holy Land, and chiefly in dreams, and related very much to heathens and their affairs, to the lessening, as it was thought, of the Hebrew privileges and dignity.

tional teaching ; and Heliodorus in the Apocrypha prophesied to his master, that if he sent another governor to Jerusalem to rob the Temple, that governor would get well flogged, as doubtless he would, as soundly as Heliodorus himself had been, if he had gone. Besides, when you get a prophecy come as you think true, you do not read it right. Would it not surprise you to learn, that your famous prophecy, "The Lord said unto my Lord," ought to run, 'The "eternal" said unto my Lord the king,' and that David the king, the son of Jesse, and ancestor of so many kings and others as per genealogies, was himself in his own proper person "a priest for ever after the order of Melchizedec, without father, without mother, without descent, having neither beginning of days nor end of life," and that this grand prophecy is no more than a proleptic paraphrase of our English psalm, God save the Queen, a vague promise of victory to a prince of the peculiar people if he behaved well. And again, in that other prediction of yours, the parting of the garments and casting lots for the vesture, you entirely overlook the parallelism of Hebrew poetry, a rule of religiously strict observance, by which, on the principle of one side of a man's face exactly resembling the other, the second part of a verse is, like the tap of a drum or the echo of a closing door, simply a repetition of the idea contained in the first, and absolutely nothing more ; just as our Professors of Poetry, the best, it may be observed, in the world, allow and encourage to the utmost the free use of epithets and other fill-ups, not to add to the sense or crowd the imagery, but only to make the verse scan properly. Thus, in the Fleugel Psalm, the one set in front of the others at the Morning Service daily throughout the year, "O come, let us sing unto the Lord ; let us heartily rejoice in the strength of our salvation," the second part of the verse simply expresses "Yes, to be sure, so we will," and nothing more ; the idea of heartily rejoicing, strength and salvation, the effect and the cause, being manifestly included in that of singing to the Lord ; especially if for the Lord, you read, as you ought to do, the "eternal." And again in the metrical version of another of

these psalms, still to be found in some of your silly hymn-books—

The Lord descended from above,
And bowed the heavens most high ;
And underneath His feet he cast
The darkness of the sky ;

On cherub and on cherubim,
Right royally He rode ;
And on the wings of mighty winds,
Came flying all abroad ;

the thought is carried on, and the imagery repeated, with a studied monotony almost overpowering to all but poetic minds of the pale. Can it be maintained, that the bowing the heavens most high, the trampling down of darkness, the ministering cherubim, the royalty, swiftness, and power really add anything to the simple idea of the Lord descending from above? especially if for "the Lord" you read as you ought to do, "the eternal?" And so in the case of the garments and vesture, "the words are taken by you to mean contrast, when they do in fact mean identity, and according to the rules of Hebrew Poetry, 'for my vesture they did cast lots,' is merely a repetition in different words of 'they parted my garments among them,' and not an antithesis to it;" and these with the context, "they pierced my hands and feet," only point to the single act of a crucifixion; and besides, crucifixion was a Roman and not a Jewish mode of punishment, and David could never have heard or dreamed of any such thing, and therefore the psalm is not authentic, and must have been written not by him, but long afterwards, and was most probably drawn up by a committee of converts under the direction of Paul of Tarsus after his change of party.

Jenny Geddes became for a time a sort of Presbyterian saint for throwing her stool, still preserved and shewn as a relic at Edinburgh, at a bishop's head; and well she deserved it in the estimation of those who thought with her; but if she had repeated her performance twenty-seven times within the little hour that it takes to score a few notes of admiration

in an easy-going essay towards the better apprehension of things, the sameness might have lessened the grace of the original act, and one almost shudders to think of the disillusionation that might have ensued, if Jenny had been carried off at last, still flitting and screaming, "Ah, that kist o' whistles! that 'rastian bishop!"

Two eminent prelates, one of whom yet survives and still holds his bishopric, by a slight catachresis in speaking of a high subject, offended the scholar mind. Perhaps some notice of it was called for from one brilliantly placed and writing enthusiastically, but was it quite worthy of one flushed with victory over the very pronounced but, it is said, non-constructive mind, Teuton mind

Cum de Teutonico vellet descendere curru,

to make literary capital out of so mere a slip? through chapter after chapter, page after page, down to the very last sentence of all, which ends by consigning the mitred delinquents to self-delusion and mockery until they die?

Perhaps, however, he should not be judged too strictly in this little matter. Nicholas, the aged bishop of Myra, boxed the ears of Arius at the Council of Nice, and this, may be, is only the return blow.

Yet might we, after all, if he would but put a little more (shall we say?) melancholy into his style of writing on these subjects, conclude with declaring of him, who in his later work has struck so good a blow "for the honour of God and the Bible" in demonstrating, on the truest and surest grounds, so many of the most vital texts in the Fourth Gospel to be beyond all question authentic and true. "Talis cum sis, utinam noster esses," were it not that it might be somewhat too suggestive of the Roman senator of old, who having in the heat of debate spoken of his opponent as a rival of Cicero in eloquence, and thinking on reflection that he had been a little too sarcastic, rose presently afterwards to apologise by explaining that he meant no such thing.

But to resume. The question of the possibility of a miracle, though a dependent one, is always coming to the front, there to be vexed with surface arguments without end. The antecedent

incredibility one is a mere logical *jeu d'esprit*, that never yet made a sincere convert, never harmed a living soul, except where it may have helped to press home a foregone conclusion on certain hasty and impatient spirits, who think to take wisdom by storm ; nor will it ever do more than this, unless it shall happen that there shall be only one sort of mind left in the world, and that the mind of its propounders.

It is willingly conceded that, if the First Cause be not a personality, a miracle being a departure from or breach of the law of such cause, that cause being itself only a law, is impossible. But, if it be a Personality with will and power, then, inasmuch as the finite cannot measure, and is not even a unit in the scale of the infinite, and we have indeed but the experience of a few centuries to set against it, a miracle is possible and not improbable ; and one that we have not ourselves witnessed may be proved like any other fact. The entire contention here is, that the First Cause is such a Personality, and that the proofs of it are not to be sought for in the external world, but are wholly spiritual, His own voice speaking within us to the sense—that is to say, the moral one—which He has given us ; and then, outside this position and subordinate to it, that all outward phenomena of nature, though they do not prove it, agree with this conclusion.

It is conceded that this Personality must be proved beyond all possibility of doubt, for upon this all that is of the least value in the question wholly depends.

The miracles recorded in the New Testament (those of the Old are by no means doubted, but are less material in this place) are believed in by us, because they are attested by credible witnesses, and are in harmony with the teaching and character of Him who is said to have worked them, and were necessary to His design, which was one grand and efficacious beyond all example. A key to this necessity may be found in this ; that He had declared that He had power to forgive sins, and had in some cases forgiven them ; and to win faith for this inner truth, it was requisite to show that He had supernatural power over things external. Signs of this power were multiplied beyond this strict necessity in merciful con-

cession to the natural infirmity and slowness of belief and deadness of purpose of His hearers, "Unless ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe," and sometimes they were withheld expressly on account of the excess of their hardness and rebellion against truth.

But now it is contended, and, it is said, that the proofs are on the road and will soon be here, that our advances of late in the arts and sciences show conclusively that many of these supposed signs and wonders may have been, and therefore certainly were, only the effects of what are now discovered to have been natural causes, and that as our knowledge enlarges all the others will be found to be of a like character; and that the Evangelists or "reporters," being unlearned men with a strong bias towards believing everything, set down what they thought they saw, according to their own erroneous impressions; that, for instance, and this has been seriously stated, the feeding of so many thousands with a few morsels of bread and small fishes, never really took place, but the multitudes merely sat down on the grass and forgot their hunger in the excitement of the occasion—that is to say, worked their own miracle.

But unfortunately the miracles were professed miracles, and declared by Him who worked them to have been effected by a supernatural power, and unless they were so, our witnesses were not mistaken only, but purposely deceived by Him, and the whole truth of the character of Jesus "his secret and his method" are gone for ever, and the very cause he sought to establish weakened by his advent; for the necessity of righteousness within was taught long before.

That He could Himself have been deceived in the matter is quite incomprehensible, from the character and multitude of the miracles wrought, his readiness and infallibility at all times. It will be remembered that, in at least one instance, that of the nobleman of Capernaum, it was a child that was healed, and that child far away at the time.

If the First Cause were not a Personality, it must have been an original force by which all things necessarily began and continue in a certain course, or what we understand as the the nature of things; and any real break in that order must

come from a new original necessity, springing suddenly and obtrusively into life and activity, not from or out of, but in place of the old one ; and in such a case the original first cause could not have been a first cause at all, but only first in the list, and a miracle would thus be only the starting point of a new first cause, a position which will hardly be favoured by any who are averse to falling into a trap.

But it has been said that the cause of this break or miracle may have always lain hidden in the true first cause, until called unexpectedly to us into action by the working of some unperceived element, like a change in some supposed infinite series, and for this some have quoted Babbage's calculating machine, and others have referred to the Law of Averages, and the perturbations occurring in the Rotation of Changes and Developments in things vertebrate generally, which they argue very wisely, must be the effect of circumstances, which they contend are always circumstances, however uncircumstantial and however unknown. But in this we are neutrals, and have no concern.

If there were but one will throughout all creation, and that the will of a perfect eternal Personality, a miracle or break in the established order of things would be inconceivable, because that order must have been designed by Him entire from the beginning, and there could be no break in it at any time, without a change of will or some defect in the original design, both of which are incompatible with the idea of an eternal perfection.

That this must be so with an inanimate universe will hardly be disputed ; but it must be equally so with the irrational animal creations, who are actuated only by the senses and instincts, and are under no law which they can transgress. But the instant we arrive at beings with wills either to obey or disobey a given law, we find a motive or reason for change dependent, not on this perfect will of a perfect and absolute Being, but on a will delegated to an imperfect and unstable one, and for this last we must, as stated in a former essay, have a law with a double aspect, a provision with opposite contingencies ; because a world of enjoyment and happiness prepared for

and adapted to the obedient, cannot be claimed as the right of the disobedient and rebellious.

It is not forgotten that it is alleged by some, that man possesses neither will nor conscience good or bad, but that what we take for the former is only something entirely governed by circumstances, and the latter merely the result of civilization, and taking colour from that alone. But this theory, though old in years, is as yet avowedly only in its infancy; and, if we accept it as it is, we can but look on and admire any thing that turns up paradoxically truculent and disorderly; admire—that is, in the sense in which the hedge sparrow admires, on finding the decencies of its nest broken up, and all its little ones crushed out and starved by the greedy overgrown changeling cuckoo poult, on whom it has so long been lavishing its equal cares and attentions, and training up to decent sparrow life.

It is then willingly enough conceded that instances of design in a physical and brute creation, however multiplied and however striking, are no absolute proofs of a creator possessed of will, intelligence or consciousness. Given a point and a line and we have the whole science of geometry at a glance. Given matter and motion, and in materialism nothing else is given or demanded, and we have all the laws of nature from the first scarcely perceptible movements of primitive atoms to organization, life, instinct, intellect. There must be a first cause, at least so it is said, but this first cause may itself be no more than a law, or set of laws, residing in these things from the beginning, and as much a phenomenon as themselves. We find, in short, around us a system such as we consider might have been produced by an intelligent power, and say at once that it was produced by such a power. But we cannot prove it; we can do no more than say with those who dispute it, that it is plausible. Universal creation may thus far have been the effect of certain inevitable laws which could never have been other than such as they are; but if these laws and their results be inevitable, what need of a mind to direct them? Why must we con-

clude that it is a mind which directs them ? Why should we go in search of a mind only to create what it could not help creating *modo et forma* ? and what form of will, consciousness, thought or intelligence, can we assign to a mind which only looks on, and gives no sign that it even does that ?

The entire field of geometry has been fairly enough worked out by us, and we know all about the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle, and many other fine things besides, and we cannot apprehend that they could ever have been other than such as we find them ; and this looks so much like necessity that we may reasonably enough give it rank as such.

The physical laws of nature admit the same handling ; bringing to the same conclusion matter, motion, attraction, gravitation, and their fixed laws, such as that of the rates of the velocities of falling or attracted bodies, the rotation of the earth and planets round the sun, the perturbations in their courses, at first not understood, and afterwards fully accounted for by the suggestion, search after and ultimate discovery of other planets, never to this day beheld by the naked eye of man ; light, heat, the plants of the field, and other countless phenomena. In all these, wonderful as they are alike in their complexity and harmony, is yet nothing that we can certainly affirm not to have originated in the motions and affinities of certain primitive elements, and the more reasonably may we so conclude, from the principle of constancy observable in all their modes and actions.

A difficulty arises when we first find sensation among some of these forms of matter. But we look round us, and discover up to this point no visible worker moving among all these things, and thus by our logical *vis inertia* reasonably enough conclude that there is none, and that sensation is only tendency quickened into a dim consciousness, and from this the further steps are easy enough ; thus, sense, five senses, pleasure, pain, appetency, contrivance, reason, and so on ; but in all this is nothing to convince an unwilling mind, that matter with its properties

is not or may not be "El Shaddai" the true God Almighty.

With personality in the abstract, or with the nature of that of the Creator, we need not now nor at any time greatly concern ourselves. If we will be overcurious, the inquiry must end almost before it begins, for it is manifest that the only attributes which we can assign to such a Personality, however magnified, must be such as we possess ourselves, being the only ones of which we can form any idea. Such inquiry would be especially out of place in an argument the sole aim of which is to show that there is a moral Ruler of a moral world who himself makes himself known to us, being as we are subjects of that world, and who being the Ruler of that world, must necessarily be the Creator and Disposer of all things having any relation to it—that is, of all things in heaven and earth.

We know that we ourselves possess consciousness, because we are sometimes conscious; but this consciousness has no form of its own by which we can apprehend it; for, except as it is affected by the rhetoric of the senses, unless through and when acted upon by ideas or impressions from without, it has to us no being; the restless brain gives no sign. Then, if it has no such form, what is it? It must be something, and it cannot be the accidents which affect it, the impressions it receives. If it be spirit we have all our own way; if a form, mode, or property of matter, it must be in that part of us which is material—that is, in the body, and with that body wholly dependent on the laws of matter, and subservient to them; and so long as the organs of sensation and thought exist in the body, so long ought we to feel, think, and be conscious. If it be in or of the body it must be bodily all over. But we find no full correspondence between them. We find ourselves subject to long periods of unconsciousness for which we cannot account, and which have their own separate laws apart from the body.

We sleep, say, about one-third of our lives through, and during that time we are unconscious, though the brain is still performing some at least of its functions.

But then, it is said, that during sleep ideas are present and consciousness present, but that from some natural cause the memory has stopped, and we wholly forget on waking what we have been dreaming about. But without some memory there can be no sense of identity, no continuous consciousness from one instant of time to another, no links in the succession of our ideas, no reasoning process, no combination of ideas, for in sleep it is the memory that supplies them; and, in fine, neither intellect nor sentiment. Suppose we were to sleep all our lives through, what could be made of a consciousness which no one can predicate that he has ever possessed? What does an octopus think about when he is asleep, who, when he is awake, only thinks that he is hungry, and when he is asleep can think so no longer? What shadow of evidence or probability is there anywhere to be found of this sudden defection of the memory?

But, then, they refer to dreams in support of their position. It is, however, now generally agreed that these only occur during the state of imperfect sleep, and generally or more frequently in the act of awakening. From sound and healthy sleep we commonly awake with a certain sense of a sudden return of consciousness, and with little or none of the interval of time elapsed between our thus waking and our first dropping asleep. In proportion as our sleep has been more or less sound, we awake with the impression that we have been dreaming slightly or all night long. But these are phenomena of the awakening state. We have been dreaming, as we think, all night long, because we have been half awakening all night long.

Dreams are mostly but silent echoes of our waking ideas and impressions, and are probably far more instantaneous than is commonly thought. We often dream of a long succession of events and actions, carrying us seemingly through a long space of time, and bringing us to the mood, whether it be one of excitement or depression, gladness or sorrow, which the imagined facts of our dream would have produced in us if they had really occurred;

but in these cases it is more commonly the mood in which we happen to be that excites and colours the dream, and not the dream that causes the mood ; and that this is so appears sufficiently clear, if we call to mind those familiar instances in which we have dreamed of long scenes of confusion and uproar, and have found on awaking, that our dream, with all its turns and changes, has been in fact suggested by some passing noise, such as perhaps the rattling and clamour of a fire engine under our windows.

But these are awakening sensations only. During perfect repose even pain sleeps. Some people sleep with their eyes only partially closed, and must therefore receive impressions of light and objects of sight ; but neither optic nerve nor brain give any warning, though a dagger be held to the throat.

In dreaming we neither reason nor invent, for we can do neither of these without an effort, and that implies will ; but we can neither will nor command the course of a dream, but, as in the state called reverie, a very dream-like thing, are carried listlessly onward we know not how or where. We no doubt some times dream that we are arguing, or, to speak more correctly, that we have been arguing, and can even recall the chain of reasoning with which we have held or been held by our imaginary opponent, and I can even remember having on some such occasions felt greatly mortified at the idea of having being confuted by my adversary before sufficiently wide awake to perceive that his arguments must have been supplied by myself.* Instances too are not wanting where men have solved in a dream the problem which has baffled them when awake. But, in the former of these cases, it will be found, if looked into at all closely, that this supposed argumentative feat

* This, *experto crede*, is a shadow of what occurs in modern Spiritualism. The answer of the spirit is demonstrably the thought of some living person present at the *seance* consciously or unconsciously communicated and manipulated.

has been nothing more than the recollection, or possibly the involuntary re-adjustment without effort of the threads of some bygone discussion long forgotten or supposed to have been so by us ; in the latter may be found an instruction constantly disregarded in these impetuous days, the old story of over-working the brain and forcing the intellect. There is a problem to be solved, and a problem that must and shall be solved before we leave off. But the more we will, the more we cannot. The problem is not solved, and still we go on. We get more and more impatient—more and more perplexed, excessively fatigued, stupid, downright silly ; we no longer invent, no longer perceive things, forms, or relations as they truly are ; search afar for what is lying at our feet, but has been overlooked in our haste, until at last in a state of utter confusion, rage, and helplessness, we drop off, muttering formulas, into a kind of sleep, when, our thoughts unwinding as the mind takes its rest, we fall back without effort on the very thing we have missed through our preposterous over diligence.

There is a well-known physical law in relation to sleep and the dreaming state not to be overlooked in this question. We are told that consciousness is due to the activity of the brain, and that as this activity lessens in sleep, consciousness wanes with it, and at a certain point ceases altogether. But those who tell us thus much, tell us also that this physical activity of the brain so diminishes by slow degrees, and is at its *minimum* some certain few hours after sleep has begun ; and that this is a matter of direct observation, and an ascertained fact. But, in health at least, and as a general rule, we fall asleep all at once ; and thus the gradually resting brain and instantly resting consciousness cannot go hand in hand in the process. The brain is perceptibly fevered with the heat and work of the day, and the consciousness too has a sense of fatigue and weariness ; the former calms and repairs itself by degrees, but in the meantime the latter has suddenly and wholly disappeared, and for any thing we can find no longer exists for the time anywhere.

Somnambulism may perhaps be cited as an instance of a continuous dream, the action of the sleeper being sensibly prolonged in time. This, however, is a comparatively rare and abnormal affection in individuals. The acts done by the somnambulist in this state have not always, perhaps seldom, any traceable correspondence or connexion with any dream, and the state itself presents appearances different and distinguishable from those of ordinary dreams.

Every set of nerves in our system has its own proper functions and affections, and none others. Those of sensation convey to us impressions of pleasure and pain and nothing more, and are simply passive ; those of volition, by which through their actions on the muscles we are enabled to use our limbs, may languish even to paralysis, but without yielding pain or feeling of any kind. A blow on the eye strong enough to reach and offend the optic nerve, produces in us through that nerve, the effect of a flash of light, and nothing more ; and all these nerves thus distinct meet in one common sensorium, the brain. It may then possibly be, that in the state of somnambulism, being as it is a morbid one, the nerves of volition are primarily and chiefly affected, the voluntary thus becoming involuntary, and producing in us a disposition, of which we are unconscious, to exert the muscles and set the limbs in action, and that this tendency is then communicated to the other nerves and to the brain, the seat both of sensation and of the imagination and intellect generally, so as to irritate them, as it were, into a kind of secondary activity, and furnishing the intending sleep-walker out of their respective stores with the requisite powers to direct his steps ; and all this possibly without any will or consciousness on his part, or the presence of any dream. It is well known how hard it is, without waking him, to lead a somnambulist from his apparent purpose, and his fixed stare is not altogether pleasant to the easily frightened ; but his state is evidently that of imperfect sleep, and it is often not without interest to watch him back to his bed, and mark the return of calm to the countenance, and the relaxing of

the limbs as he falls at last into the state of complete and untroubled repose.

Conversely in ordinary dreams, the nerves of volition are often more or less slightly affected, a passing frown, a smile, a momentary clenching of the fists, a kick, or a moan, a grunt, or "*ut de poitrine*," lower than the sleeper's ordinary compass of voice, or something of the sort, just to show that there is something wrong in the dream, but not worth waking about.

The nightmare is hardly within the category of dreams, being rather a modified *delirium tremens* or "the horrors," coupled with a slight temporary paralysis. It is easily got up. You have only to sup valiantly on some pleasant indigestible, and go to sleep lying on your back, with one of your arms across your midriff. This obstructs some necessary circulation; the brain is offended, and down comes her hideous messenger with his rabble rout of indescribables; you half awake, just enough to know that it is all a sham, and that if you can but lift your arm the least in the world, it will be all over, but you are paralysed for the time and cannot. You succeed at last with a desperate effort, and all is over, except that you feel, or ought to feel, mightily ashamed of yourself, and now, *Βασκ' ὅθ' ὄυλε ονειρε*—and so much for dreams.

But besides all this sleep, is the state in which we are during swoons, and in certain mental conditions, and in very dull society, in which our consciousness is plainly absent—that is, no longer exists as consciousness.

Archbishop Whately, indeed, a humourist among logicians, but a logician everywhere, is reported to have said on some occasion after he had become *scholastice emeritus*, or a primate in Ireland, that we think by jerks, and to have recommended to the pupils he left behind him to learn and practice knitting or sewing, or other ladies' work of the kind, as they sit thinking hard things, to fill up the chinks and ease the jerks. But if so, then,—speaking here as staunch materialists and with all the zeal of recent converts,—as, according to the atomic

theory, no two atoms can ever be so perfectly united as not to leave an atomic interval between them ; so according to this Whatelyan one, there must always be a blank of unconsciousness between one complete idea or metaphysical atom and another, and as one atom or atomic interval must always be exactly equal to every other, what we take to be consciousness must during half our waking lives be unconsciousness.

But the archbishop was a very warlike man, and always ready for an intellectual "pattern" fight, and it could not always be very clearly made out whether he had not some covert design in his propoundings, and whether in the present instance his advice arose naturally out of a theory seriously entertained, or whether he did not give it, in order to provide knitting and sewing as desirable substitutes for the philosophies of the present day which he saw coming, and wished to counterpoise with something better, or possibly to enable his younger clergy to provide their own vestments.

This flickering, jerking, in and out consciousness of ours is never all alive at the same instant, and generally refuses to carry a double burden of ideas ; those derived from the senses and those from the intellect, not generally asserting themselves at the same time. During the greater part of our lives we seem nearly unconscious of the former beyond the play of the animal spirits ; in deep thought, wholly so. In extreme pain or pleasures of the senses, and on divers other occasions, the intellect seems often to take flight altogether.

But this alternation is under the direction of the will, and not of the body or senses. The bodily appetites may no doubt affect the will so far as they incline or disincline it to do one thing or another, but when once the will is formed, it takes full command, and *bon grè, mal grè*, the body obeys, and the consequences above referred to follow ; and certainly the freaks and vagaries of the will are often of a very incorporeal character, and present not the slightest analogy between itself and anything to be found in the slow, pulsating, eating and drinking body.

Somehow I do seem to have some will of my own in my

own concerns. I wake from habit every morning at eight o'clock ; that is natural, perhaps wholly physical : but I have to go one morning by an early train, and I determine overnight to wake at five ; and I do so wake accordingly ; that is my will dominant over the body. Again, I am idle and go forth to feast with Lucullus in Apollo, and I do feast well and wisely accordingly ; and that too is natural ; but another time I am intensely occupied, am hungry, thirsty, too hot, too cold, even in some bodily pain or suffering ; but my will is dominant. I will do what I will do. I determine to feel none of these things until I have done doing what I am doing, and I do feel none of them accordingly, and my will and consciousness are once more out of the body.

Now there is an admitted fallacy in all this if applied to the main question, because of course, if sense and thought are once given as modes and operations of matter and motion, an intermittent motion is as conceivable as a constant one, and the premiss which has brought us thus far, will carry us onward even to the end, wherever we may think fit to place that end.

But it was not our intention so to apply it, nor do we very greatly care anything about it, our proof of our own position lying, as may be seen presently, wholly in the moral world, where alone we are encouraged and permitted to find, and do truly find it.

But we had some idea of what could be done with matter and motion assumed as realities, and could follow you a long way in your reasonings, and fully appreciate some of your pleasantries ; we could even for the sake of the argument assume your original fine homogeneous vapour stiffening itself by degrees into various concretes ; and how certain of those concretes might, by the force of certain motions and tendencies, reflex and otherwise, become quickened into life, and acquire the power of receiving and arranging, and, in fact, become ideas ; but what we desired to know was, assuming that nothing exists throughout the whole universe but matter, how one of these concretes, sitting at a desk with a pen in its hand, should be able to detach parts of its own concrete—that is to say its thoughts, and send them flying beyond reach of time and space, there to range, jerking, it may be, and flickering, and at

their own will, pleasure and time to return to the hungering and thirsting main concrete they left behind them ; and then, how the same main concrete after a slight refreshment, standing before a table in another place should be able to induce other concretes, more or less successfully, to do the same ; and also why on such occasions, whatever is said, the still small voice of an eternal echo is always repeating, "the sea is His, and He made it ; and His hands prepared the dry land."

We really thought that we were smoothing the way for you. But either there is no way, or you will not start. You have never made any advance from the very beginning, and are as much baffled and bewildered at this present time as you were at the first. You are now in search of a moveable homogeneous vapour, and you show us something invisible on the point of a very fine needle, and say, "We have reason to think that this is a part of the First Cause." Why will you not rather say, as others once said before you, "Master, we have toiled all night and taken nothing ; nevertheless at Thy bidding ——?"

But where all this time is this flickering, unstable consciousness of ours of which we are not always conscious? It is not in the soul, for the case is that there is neither soul nor spirit ; and it is not in the body, for there lies the body warm and breathing, and performing all its vital functions with as much regularity as if nothing had happened, but asleep and unconscious. True it is that you may prick it into a very lively state of consciousness with a pin ; but where is consciousness in the meantime and until you do ? Plants sleep and are nevertheless plants. So you say ; but they do not sleep, because they are never awake. There is a change of their natural functions after sundown, owing to certain tolerably well-ascertained natural causes acting upon them from without, and that is all, and your analogy is forced and inadmissible. But what and where is this consciousness?

Hereafter, and before long, this question of life and consciousness will be answered by all, with one accord, unhesitatingly, confidently, temperately, rejoicingly. Men will learn at last that the phenomena around them are not their fore-

fathers, but servient means ordained and prepared from the beginning by an eternal Personality for a high and worthy end, to which all creation is even now working, and that of this there is an assured witness within them who will not always keep silence.

But they will never learn this from cold and colourless science, or heated and many-coloured philosophy ; and one proof of this is that they have never yet done so, or by their aid in this question ever raised themselves from the category of rocking-horses, turned after one and the same model, always on the gallop without progressing a step, and adapted chiefly for the use of persons of not very advanced age, and the entertainment of passers by.

There is a specious fallacy that disturbs and may mislead some who have no *à priori* right to be misled. These are taught to argue, that if there be a Supreme Personality, the Creator and Ruler of all things, He must be eternal and perfect in all His attributes, and that His will especially must be from, through, and in eternity, without beginning, succession, or ending in time, absolute and without change or possibility of change for ever ; and then they are further taught to object that this is not will, which implies freedom of choice, but Fate, the Homeric *Μοιρα*, or "must be," and that there is therefore nothing from which we can assign personality to this unchanging fate, or order of things ; and that in attempting to do so, we only step out of our way to create a new difficulty ; that is to say, granted an order of nature which we perceive but for which we cannot account, we assume a personality which we do not perceive and which is equally unaccountable ; that a fixed self-existing law, and a will which can never vary, are in fact the same thing, and that it is creating will and personality by words out of nothing, to hold otherwise ; for what is that sovereign will, that can do nothing but what it cannot help doing ?

Well, this fate, if there could have been such a thing, must have been co-eval with the first act of what we call here creation for want of other words to express it, before which could have been nothing ; and then, so far from having been the cause, it could have been no more than an associate phenomenon of

this co-eval creation, and an effect of one and the same cause ; and remains therefore to be accounted for. But the first cause must have existed before or at the beginning of its effect, viz., the world it created, and must have created it not from any necessity or cause acting upon it, not from any eternal not itself, tending to creation, for then that eternal would have been the creator, but from that which would have been will in us, and which we cannot conceive to be any other quality in anything else. We may call this Fate from the prejudice of custom, but the instant we attempt to assign to it Form, it becomes Will, the cause of all secondary forms, without which all creation must have remained in eternal repose, without even an atom to show for itself.

There is little if any analogy between our will and that of the Creator. Ours is "placed between design and its opposite, and we may do either of several things" *Cosri ubi supra* and is partly but not wholly swayed by surrounding circumstances ; but that of the Creator has no opposite, being as it is original, increate, sovereign, the cause and not the servant of circumstances, and taking from them neither colour nor bias, but not the less the faculty or quality we call "will."

With regard to the question whether we ourselves possess "will" or not, we may be content to say to all, that we are sure that we have it from our daily habits and experience of life, stronger than all argument, and that we all tacitly admit it in every action of our lives, and that "the design and its opposite" between which we are sensibly placed being objective necessarily the one to the other, it must be will that directs us between them.

But among ourselves, we may add yet further that we are even yet more assured that we have this will, because we find in the Revealed Word, command, precept, direction, admonition, persuasion and promise addressed to all alike to win back our perverse and wavering wills ; and because Christ in His humanity of His own will wept over the coming afflictions of Jerusalem, because there were in it those who might yet be saved ; but had they been at that time all irretrievably lost, He could not have done so without losing something of His oneness with His Father, by whom that final condemna-

tion had been ordained. He wept, because he knew that the future lot of every one there, depended on the yet undetermined will of each respectively, and that with many that will would be turned to evil and lead to destruction at the end, after which end He would weep for them no more. There was no more sorrowing in His mind for the Iscariot after He had pronounced him the Son of Perdition, none for the Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, who He knew would resist Him to the end and were then already lost, but grace and earnest endeavour for all the world beside.

To the arrogant charge of cruelty in the Creator's dispensations to us, we may repeat that it is conceivable as a scheme perfectly consistent with a Divine justice and mercy, that none should be admitted into Christ's kingdom, that is, to share in the Creator's glory, for that is the promise, without first undergoing some trial of obedience and faith; and in this trial some must fail, or it could not be a real one. But must there on that account be no such kingdom? May not the Almighty on such conditions, if He cannot wisely do so on others, create happiness in angels and men, or must creation remain a blank for ever? Would it not be fairer to look upon the question from a truer standpoint? The Creator being minded to establish and accomplish this kingdom, made man to undergo this trial; and for this end gave him will, without which no such trial could be. But He who gave this will, and appointed this trial, appoints and provides also the laws and circumstances which are to rule and attend it. He is present always with every man, in and through every trial; He is in the will of the man, to persuade, teach, and encourage as well as in the circumstances to mould and temper them to the strength of that will, so that none shall be tempted beyond what he can reasonably bear. But man fell, and by that brought death and corruption into the world, and his posterity for ever, and the same trial could no longer be accorded. But with this death came also greater mercy, for with it came means of redemption, open to all men that live to the very last moment of their lives; and if the trial, owing to our greater corruption, be harder, so is the aid more efficacious and more direct.

In what did the greatness of Christopher Columbus consist? Not in his courage and daring, for in these the Buccaneers who came after him were his equals, and perhaps the first man who ascended with a fire-balloon, or dropt in a parachute, had as much ; nor in his science, for the good Franciscan, Juan Peres Manchena, who received him in his convent and gauged and approved his plan, had possibly more ; nor in his philosophy, for he was a churchman, and actually quoted the Bible ; nor in the acuteness of his intellect, for in that Kant, and other Kant-like men, were far beyond him ; nor in his wisdom, for Bacon was much wiser ; nor in his sagacity, for Development lay immediately before him, and he never perceived it ; nor, lastly, in his ingenuity in the application of material resources, for he was a beggar and had none. His greatness lay in none of these, but in his choice of a grand and most useful aim, which he knew to be within the limits of his powers, earnestly, bravely, and singly followed up. He knew, and could demonstrate that there must be lands yet undiscovered in the far west, and the incalculable benefit that would ensue on their discovery ; and thus at last, after suffering repulses and undergoing difficulties incredible, on the 3rd of August, 1492, about the time of the revival of Platonic Philosophy in Florence and Rome, set sail from the bar of Saltes, near Palos, in Spain, with three small vessels and 120 men, ill chosen and partly pressed into the service, to add a new world to civilization and ultimately to Christianity.

Is there no lesson for you other siders in this ? You have made many voyages, and always been driven back. Are your aims more assured, your means and appliances better proved than they were before ? You will of course say "yes," as you always do. But your means, however much improved of late, are the same in kind that they always have been, and they have been found unsuited to the work in hand, and are therefore not appliances at all. That they are thus unsuited, appears from this, which seems to be your only argument just now : you show us from day to day a number of fine things which you have discovered, some in metaphysics but more of them in physics, and we are most unfeignedly grateful to you, and duly admire them ; but then you take upon yourself to say,

that besides being realities, these are also the shadow of a great coming event, that is, of your First Cause ; we on the other hand say, they are no such things, but like all things else in the world are only works, the work of our First Cause ; and thereupon the old, old issue is joined ; and the world is no wit the wiser, for you have made no advance, and we on our part neither make nor need any.

Suppose you discover your First Cause, and He proves to be our First Cause ; will He not say to you, " Why did ye seek me ? Wist ye not indeed that I am ? why have ye not obeyed my word ? " Should he prove another, he may indeed address you, " Here I am, do with me and yourselves, even what you list," and you may answer, " We thank thee, O First Cause ; we mean to do so," and this or something very like it, is the true alternative. But how will you answer our First Cause when He comes ? This may be harsh, but great battles are not to be won by sprinklings of rose water, and you yourselves are not always over civil.

Are you not in this, like bees that would desert their sunny hives, redolent of thyme and all sweet flowers, to live and crawl in a damp and noisome ant-hill ? Are you, while you thus persist in wasting all your faculties and energies in search of the unattainable, with all your superior science, philosophy, acuteness, wisdom and sagacity, worth one Columbus ? Why will you not rather expend your genial showers on fruitful plains that pine for them, rather than on the thankless sea which is wet enough without them ?

Tempests of winds——

Have hurried to the thankless ocean, clouds
And showers that needed not at all the courtesy,
When the poor plains have languished for the want,
And almost burnt asunder——

Suckling, Brennovult A. 3, sc. 1.

This image was utilized by Sprat in his History of the Royal Society, p. 25, in noticing the misapplication even in his days of Philosophy to subjects of Religion, and its eminent unsuccess.

But tempests are always failures if the obstacles they meet are too strong for them.

The storm that breaks in thunder on the shore,
 But smooths the pebble that was smooth before ;
 The light soft air glides silently along,
 Meets the tuned chord, and glances off in song.

But we are now to take our own secure position. We may not quote the bible, but we may take custom of all pagan writers at pleasure. First then Catullus, a little before the Christian era, writes to Lesbia,

*Soles occidere et redire possunt.
 Nobis cum semel occidit brevis lux,
 Nox est perpetua una dormienda.*

Next, Martial, a little after it, to his friend and relative Julius Martialis,

*Nunc neuter sibi vivit, heu ! bonosque
 Soles occidere ac redire sentit,
 Qui nobis pereunt et imputantur.*

and with one of these, reckless despair, or hope springing out of sharp regrets we must perforce cast our lots.

The position intended to be here taken is, that there is an eternal Personality, who for one high and most worthy end, for which ourselves and other beings to us unknown are designed, and to which all nature is subservient, created, rules and disposes the worlds visible and invisible, and that His Will alone is to be followed in all things ; but that the absolute truth of all this, is only to be fully discerned by the gift and means of the moral sense or conscience, which through good report and ill report we are assured that we possess, and by which alone we become cognizant of that Personality and Will.

By this moral sense however is not to be understood that dim illuminous spark, that rag picker of unsifted odds and ends, that weak, debateable, compromising, to and fro prompting within us, that just avails, we know not how or why, to keep us sometimes tolerably honest and decent in the dull traffic and chances of our ordinary lives ; but that far higher spirit, by which we are lifted up to a conception of perfect goodness and holiness in thought and will, which is apart from and precedes and prepares us for conduct, but is not itself conduct, as we generally understand the word.

They do well according to their lights who cashiering the Personal Creator, deny also that there are or can be such things as goodness and holiness except as relations ; for unless they exist perfect and eternally in some perfect Personality holding communion with us His creatures, we are under no law, and they are but experiments, and we ourselves now and for ever no better than lay figures upon which they are tried.

This spirit within us tells us the true law of our beings, and is our only motive and guide to right conduct, in thought and deed. Perfect goodness, being the inseparable attribute of the Creator before and in and through all worlds, must exist in Him in forms and amid relations to us unknown, and can only be manifested to us by the things which are seen ; but having been so manifested to us it is far beyond the schoolings of all the schools, school they never so furiously. We may be thankful that the Creator is good ; but His will is our law, and the consequences of our acts done according to that Will, concern us not at all. We may indeed fairly reason on doubtful points of conduct, that if the consequences of an act are good the act itself must be good, because it is agreeable to our idea of the Creator that good should follow only from good ; but that will not make the goodness of the consequences the cause of the goodness of the act, because the cause, that is to say, the disposition to do it, existed before the act. This disposition is apart from and far above the act, which is a mere passing accident of our present condition and state of being, but the prompting mood will, if we but permit it, abide with us now and hereafter for ever, whether under the same or new conditions of life through all eternity.

Strike away the idea of a Divine Creator, the Ruler, Governor and Disposer of all things, and we have absolutely nothing left from which to reason on questions of conduct, but this counting house debtor and creditor tare and tret calculation of expediency and consequences, and those temporal ; and thus it is, that when differences arise, and they are always arising, men having no authority to guide them, fly off to their scattered oracles, and these tell them double tales. With us who use them sparingly, they are disarmed of all hurtful

influence, by the assurance that He who directs the act will temper the consequences to all whom they may reach.

The distinction between ourselves and the showy maintainers of all other systems of morality whatever is, that they want the idea of duty springing from the consciousness of an eternal spiritual Ruler and Governor, having all the strength and action of an eternal implanted principle. They have indeed, some of them, an indistinct idea of no very decided character, of something rather famous than forcible, which they call *το θειον*, and of which they count themselves the drippings, and into which they look at some time, by reason and in right of their intellect to be re-absorbed ; that is to say, from consciousness they came and to consciousness they will return, but that consciousness is not their own consciousness ; a doctrine, it is believed, held among some tribes of Gypsies, Pacific Islanders and other schools.

The true principles of conduct are privileges rather than restraints, and are not felt as the latter, until they have been disdained as the former. If we accept them as implanted, we have but to seek the will of Him who implanted them, and if we do so with singleness of purpose, either we shall surely find it, or there is no such thing as reason. But if we discard this will, and look only to ourselves, another will rushes up from the depths of our consciousness to possess and distract our thoughts, to lower the tone and whole character of the inquiry, and let in all the countless natural causes of error from all sluices, assuming at the same time an authority and self dispensing licence perilous to think of. Unless founded on the basis which we have proposed, Casuistry has no just premiss, and is and must always be vain and mischievous.

But though it be conceded that instances however multiplied of design or even if you will of the perfect unity of design in a senseless animate or even intellectual world, will not of themselves prove a personal designer, though undeniably consistent with one, yet if we also find in and through that design, one governing and most worthy moral purpose, we rise in the argument to the height of this purpose, and may disregard all else except as the mere materials and instruments

upon which it is to work, and by which it is to be made manifest; and so confidently may we do this, that although, should we in the course of the inquiry find any thing in the phenomena of the insensible and animate world in seeming conflict with our views, we should be bound to meet and dispose of the difficulty; what we find in harmony with it, we may even let alone, as trivial and insignificant, being well assured on other and firmer grounds, that this moral purpose, one and entire, without break or short coming, "spreading undivided and operating unspent," throughout the whole moral universe, could never have proceeded from blind, scattered insensible forces.

This we have to show to two classes of inquirers; the one, having accepted, from the light of nature as they think, but far more probably from something very different, the idea of an absolute Creator and Ruler of all things, necessarily attribute to Him every imaginable perfection; and as He is unseen, easily conclude that He is not "a magnified man" but a spirit, and from that, but with possibly somewhat less assurance, infer their own immortality; for spirit is recognised only by spirit, and that which is spiritual can never rest in a material grave. These yearn for their Creator, and often feel Him within them though they know Him not. It was to such as these, the more earnest among the *δεισιδαίμονες* of the Athenians, that St. Paul undertook to declare the "Unknown God," who had as yet to them given no sign. These, sincere from the beginning, assured that there is a truth yet to be disclosed, and longing for its unfolding, gladly accept a teaching that recommends itself irresistibly to their minds by the grandeur and completeness of the truth it declares, and the perfect satisfaction which it brings. These are willing and steadfast, and perhaps the only true and firm converts; for remembering the force of their first full and glowing convictions, they will accept nothing that does not come with a like and equal sanction, and are thus safe from the vain inventions of unfit and unprofitable teachers.

To the other class the inquiry is merely the continuation of their secular studies, with like means and appliances, and equal want of seriousness. They cannot prove that there is no God

—they cannot by reason prove that there is—but they can prove other things which they think may do as well, and they do prove new things continually, and are now, as they tell us in their light indifferent way, looking shortly to prove that all things were once a homogeneous vapour filling all space, which happening to harden more on one side than another, was the cause of motion, which was the cause of development, which is the cause and end of all things. There is little in all this leading to a true appreciation of the real exigencies of the question that is, the improvement of the moral being. Some of them feel this to a degree of unrest which cannot always be borne, and thus at last with captive minds, and the depressing sense of utter defeat, yield themselves up as excessive converts to the first guide that offers, be he never so blind or unfit for his work.

We have then to show this purpose, nor have we far to seek, nor is it hard to find.

There has been among us one man worthy of all creation, were it even more glorious than it is, and He is now the central light and life of all the worlds, known and unknown. He came amongst us to make us like himself, and to that end, and to draw all towards Him, He is now and always working, and of this He has left His witnesses everywhere.

We are then to consider first what He was ; next what His design in coming among us ; and, lastly, how all things in heaven and earth, visible and invisible work towards that design, and so work, that they must have been created and moulded as they are for that purpose and for that purpose only ; a vast inquiry, losing itself in eternity, but taking illustration from everything around us, from the stars in their courses to the mote in the sunbeam, and even from the thoughts and imaginings of our own hearts.

It would probably be found on a little examination that the popular view of the person of Christ among professed believers is, that He was not man at all, but God in the likeness of man, just as the apocryphal angel who accompanied Tobias, was always the angel Gabriel, though for the time in externals a man. That, however, would be a most dangerous error, for if Christ were with us only in the likeness of a

man, He must on His ascension have wholly put off that likeness, and He is not now truly man, mediating for us, and drawing us to Him, that we may hereafter "awake in His likeness, and therewith be content."

We, who are at peace with all philosophies, and gladly receive them all indifferently, as the monks of St. Bernard do travellers lost in the snow, may be content perhaps, for the sake of peace and quietness, not to take the account of the Temptation as given in the New Testament literally ; but we may and must, if we accept any at all, assume that Christ was at one time led by the spirit unto the wilderness, and that he was there tempted by an objective evil power or influence, and we may perhaps infer from the expression, "then the devil left Him and angels came and ministered to Him," that He was not again tempted, and that the angels who so came and ministered, remained with Him always as unseen special ministrants, to the end—that is, to use His own words, until He was perfected.

He was one who never spake but words of wisdom and truth, because He was wise in His humanity alone beyond the measure of man. But He had accepted our nature with all its conditions. He had become by His own grace and will perfect man, with all the senses and faculties of man, and no more ; for the authority and power that were given to Him were distinct from His humanity. Not only did He hunger and thirst and suffer pain and weariness of body and mind, but He must have received ideas, thought and reasoned by means of, and with the same intellectual organs and faculties, and by the same steps and process as ourselves ; but, indeed, it is conclusive on this point, that He had been a child, had sported, grieved and been restrained as a child, and had "increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man"—that is, He had progressed towards perfection.

He knew that He was the son of God ; He said so when He was only twelve years old ; and at that time none else could assert this of themselves, for the adoption through Him had not then been declared.

But for all this He was perfect man, and felt and thought as

an unsullied man in all things ; but by virtue of His sonship—and we should bear in mind what that word implies when the tie is unbroken and has never been strained,—His will and that of His Father were always one, and by force of that oneness, when miraculous power and inspiration were needed, that power and that inspiration came, we may almost say naturally, but not before. It may, for instance, be a question whether in His interview with Nicodemus, He spoke from extraordinary inspiration or with the natural wisdom of one absolutely free from all the causes of human error, and who alone thoroughly understood the Scriptures ; and certainly His words of mild reproof, “ Art thou a master in Israel and knowest not these things ? ” would seem to favour the latter view. In the case of the woman of Samaria, a sign was needed for the sake of and to win the Samaritans, and He was directly inspired to tell her the events of her past life, which without such inspiration He could not have done.

He knew His mission, and His approaching sufferings always, for they were declared to Him by the Scriptures, and He knew in His agony all the mystery of the Cross, and all other things necessary to His mission, not as God, to whom the past, present, and future are all as one thought, knows things, but as man does, in and through ideas and impressions in succession from time to time. It is, for instance, hard to conceive that He could have known that Judas Iscariot would in the end betray Him as he did, when He selected him for an Apostle and gave him his charge among the others, or until His last journey to Jerusalem when He is expressly and pertinently said to have known it. We are told indeed, that His disciples often said to Him, “ Lord, thou knowest all things,” and that He never reproved them for saying it—that is, He accepted and allowed it to be a truth. But what He knew superhumanly, He knew from the spirit that was in Him. What that Spirit told Him, that He knew, and that Spirit would at all fitting times tell Him all things. But in the flesh He was subject to time and patient in all things, and His will being always one with that of His Father, He could never prove that Spirit, except when it was agreeable to that

common will that He should do so. We ourselves know what we have learnt, and can call to mind at will, though it may well happen that we never have occasion to do so.

It should be observed, too, that although the unworthy Judas, transgressed and must bear his own sin, he was, equally with the faithful Eleven, an instrument in the hands of the Almighty for effecting in His own way, His gracious purpose towards mankind.

Again, in the case of Peter, our Lord knew that Peter from his hasty and unruly zeal needed His especial care, and He gave it abundantly ; but He may not have foreknown until Peter's over-confident and boastful protestations called for the warning reproof that he would deny Him at the very time he did.

In His discourse on the mount He spoke "as one with authority." He had that authority at all times, and in His ministry could never speak without it, and by this authority. He did at and in the proper appointed time and place, amid Galileans and others accounted the reproach of Israel, deliver a discourse of divine wisdom and power, but conceived and expressed by Him in human thoughts and language, the ideas that passed into minds of those who heard the discourse worthily, being in the same forms but far more worthily present in the mind of Him who spoke it.

We read of His frequent retirements for meditation and prayer. It was only as man by the exercise of faculties and modes of thought proper to man, that He could meditate, for God does not meditate. He prayed for Himself and for others, and was constant and instant in prayer ; but he prayed, not as a creature who has offended to his maker and judge, but as a son who has never offended to a father, and the nature of this prayer we cannot from our rebellion and wickedness worthily conceive.

He gave us a prayer without which all Christian liturgies are spiritless forms. It was customary among the Jewish teachers to give their disciples forms of prayer to be used by them, as also, it may be remembered, did John the Baptist to his. *St. Luke c. 11, v. 2.* The Jews in their synagogues,

made use of one, called the Kadesch, Holy (it is given in *Beausobre's Translation of the Gospels and Article on the Language of Christ and his Apostles ubi sup*) which has been loosely thought by some to resemble the Lord's Prayer. But the two are widely different. The Jewish Prayer was altogether of the old Dispensation, one for continued protection, for the speedy redemption of Israel, and for the hastening of the Messiah's coming, and had thus nothing catholic about it.

But the Lord's Prayer is catholic throughout. The address to "Our Father" was a new revelation, a communication of a new name, an advance on that of "Jehovah," and could not have been lawfully uttered by man up to that very instant, for it is only by adoption through Christ in his humanity, as His First born, and then declared to man as such, that the Creator is our Father; nor could it be declared with authority that God's will was done in Heaven except by one who had himself been there.

Now this prayer has often been reviewed, and it has been generally agreed, and amongst others by many speaking, as they declare, impartially as critics, that if there really were such a being as the God to whom it purports to be addressed, it would be divinely perfect, and they do not, under mild protest, object occasionally to use it themselves, any more than they do to make an affidavit in a court of justice when reasonably required.

But if we have not a Father in Heaven, unless there be a kingdom not yet come, and a will not done; unless there be evil on earth, and temptation or trial beyond our unassisted strength to bear, and unless the kingdom, the power and the glory are His alone to whom it is addressed, the prayer is a sham, and might have been written by Shelley, whose character of Prometheus, designed by him as the type of suffering humanity fettered by religion is, it may be observed, in many points formed directly on that of Christ. But it is in truth a revelation and prayer in one. We are commanded to use it; but those who do not accept it entire, have no part in it, and cannot use it without profanation, and are in worse case than the poor savage who prays to his sun or clouds; for the one

is the error of the wholly uninstructed and ignorant ; the other, the rebellion of the intelligent and gifted.

Not wholly irrelevant is it here to note the marked change in the character of Christ after His Resurrection, during the interval between that and His Ascension, and the taking to Himself the attributes ascribed to Him in such wonderful figures in the Revelation. Before His natural death He spoke and acted in all things as one sent to do the will of another, and referred all to the will and power of that other ; but afterwards, that will having been accomplished, and having thenceforth all power and authority in Heaven and earth committed to Him, and made absolutely His own, He spoke only as from Himself, as may be specially observed in the manner of His giving His apostles authority to remit or retain sins by the overt personal act of breathing on them.

But although all things thus mark Him out as perfect man, there was one part of His character in which He was divinely and absolutely perfect, and that is His holiness, the inseparable attribute, the very law and necessity of God Himself. He was not more holy when He descended to take our nature upon himself, nor is He so now in His glorified state, than He was in and throughout His humiliation. He brought holiness into the world with Him, and never parted with it. In Him it has always been perfect, without effort, surprise, diminution or increase from the beginning, before the worlds were. What it is, neither we nor angels can worthily express, for it is not of this world, nor of creation, but the eternal fulness of glory of the Highest Himself.

We have, then, in Christ viewed as man, and "made for the time a little lower than the angels," an object worthy of the most glorious creation. But He was also God, and the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain Him ; or, if that expression be thought too Scriptural, He was one single person, the only faultless being that ever lived upon earth, and we must therefore look further for other worthy objects, and these we trust to find presently.

But then it is objected, that if these things be true, the

Bible must be true also and authentic, neither of which positions can possibly be accepted, for that, unless as a guide to conduct, it has neither literature, utility, nor sanction ; that the guiding principle indeed, where there is any, is always easily discernible by everybody according to the measure of his literature, and his capacity of drawing distinctions between himself and other people ; that, for example, in the acted proverb or parable of the barren fig-tree, its moral as a denunciation of the drones or non-workers of righteousness is plain enough to all, but the fig-tree itself is mere *aberglaube*, metaphysics, poetry, fable ; that as to a future state, to those who really desire one, Plato and the others might, if they had been left alone, have worked out a very satisfactory one, for the philosophical and more estimable portion of mankind, in a certain yet undisclosed Utopia, with a dim view of a not very concrete or efficient *θεος ἄγνωστος*, or Unknown God, enthroned somewhere about, but not interfering very much, and rather disposed to admire the sententious dignity of his new subjects than otherwise, which would have answered all reasonable purposes ; but that the Bible is really too exacting, too supernatural, too regardless of all scientific results, and must be given up. Men must have some option as to what they will believe or not.

The way in which these objectors seem at present disposed to carry the point runs something like this—"All depends upon the four Gospels, which made their appearances at divers times, no one knows how or when ; but there is a factitious interest about them all derived from the superhuman beauty and grandeur of the central figure Christ, that disables the judgment and disposes us to accord to them an authority which they would not otherwise have had, very much as might have been the case in the controversy respecting the genuineness of Ossian's Poems, if only those poems had been readable productions ; besides, if the Gospels were what they purport to be, they would be complete manuals of doctrine, and there could be no such things as schisms in the Church, and

Luther might well have conformed with Pope, Patriarch and Presbyter at will and at once. The Gospels, therefore, are not to be wholly trusted, and if so, cannot be authentic ; and besides, external evidences are against them ; for instance, “——” and then they proceed, “ If a man mentions a fact relevant to a matter in hand, and does not mention another fact not relevant to the matter in hand, it follows that that man does not know that other fact not relevant to the matter in hand, and therefore that fact never happened ; that is to say, if Irenæus, having occasion to quote St. Luke, does quote him, and not having to quote St. John, does not quote him, it necessarily follows that Irenæus did not know that St. John ever wrote anything to quote from, and consequently that St. John never did write anything to quote from ; and therefore the Fourth Gospel was not written by him ; and in the same way it may be shown exhaustively from the writings of other bishops and saintly men like Irenæus, that neither of the other supposed Evangelists ever wrote anything to quote from, and that consequently, as things which are equal to the same are equal to one another, none of the alleged Gospels are either true or authentic.”

One need not be careful here in reference to a controversy now in better hands ; but as to these schisms, what says St. Paul, who, according to the Petrine party, was the first schismatic ? It may be observed here, as parenthetically as possible, that although there certainly was at one time strife between the two great Apostles, and although St. Peter did say, that there were in the Epistles of “ his dear brother Paul,” *δυσνοητα τινα*, “ some things hard to be understood,” the strife scarcely seems to have ever risen to the “ unmitigated hatred point,” assigned to it by some, or if it did, hatred must be a very harmless thing, and has been very greatly maligned.

But what says St. Paul about these schisms ? First he admonishes all indifferently “ that no one should desire to know more than he ought, but think soberly according as God has dealt to every man the measure of faith,” and then, after saying something not altogether in commenda-

tion of certain ecstasies, who were rather over fond of being noticed, as being "of Paul," or "of Apollos," or "of Cephas," fairly ends all with thanking God that he had baptized none of them.

Again, Clement of Rome, no mean authority, a fellow-worker with St. Paul, and highly commended by him, desiring to repress certain schisms which had at that time arisen among the Corinthians, in his First Epistle to them, c. 47, referring to 1 *Cor.* c. i. vv. 9 and 10, and speaking of the very divisions above noticed, says, ἡ προκλισις ἐκείνη ἡττονα ἀμαρτιῶν ὑμῖν ὑπηνέγκε, προσεκληθῆτε γὰρ ἀποστόλοις μεμαρτυρημένοις, καὶ ἀνδρὶ δεδοκιμασμένῳ παρ' αὐτοῖς." But what can be said of some of our modern divisions and schisms when all that can be said of one arisen under such authorities, is that it was *μειων ἀμαρτία*, a less sin.

There is a Fifth Gospel of three words: "*Cogito ; ergo sum*," with a Talmud of its own; and that Talmud tells me, that "I stand out as a speck of consciousness against illimitable surroundings about me;" which seems well enough, and is just what the cricket ball says to the bat, but then I desire to know, "*Cur cogito*" and "*Cur sum*," and the Fifth Gospel makes no sign, and I return to the Four; and from or through them I learn, that I think and am, equally with all these surroundings, only in and by the mind and will of One who created them and myself at and to do His will; and that He has declared to us that will by His Son, of whom they tell us, and that the rest is known to Himself alone.

Again, this new Talmud tells me, that there is such a thing as what it calls, and the term is accepted here, a "best self," a right reason having paramount authority, ascertainable, available for direction and guidance, always at hand and of most easy access; and the Fifth Gospel again makes no sign, but the Four tell me that this "best self" is the God we worship.

There is also mention made in this Talmud of "a collective consciousness of races," which is alleged to be necessarily better than that of its component minims, which no doubt it might be, were it not sometimes clearly

in the wrong ; and if it be a collective consciousness swaying the individual one, it must itself be liable to be swayed by other collective consciousnesses stronger and better than itself, and they in their turn by others stronger and better than themselves, until we arrive at last at an infinite consciousness swaying all other consciousnesses, and that brings us once more very close home indeed in our argument.

Notwithstanding a few questions of dates, not ranging over a very extensive period of time, the early acceptance of the Four Gospels as paramount and inspired authorities is not in general much disputed, but it has been reserved chiefly to these later days by the aid of improved intellectual machinery to deny altogether that they were written by the persons to whom the authorship of them has been assigned.

But could they have been written by any other than true and faithful eye-witnesses of the facts related, and hearers of the words spoken ? The alternative is, that if not so written, they must have been compiled in the first and first half of the second centuries, from scattered sources, by hearsay of unknown persons in different countries, and with this mixed and undefined sanction accepted as both true and authentic, by the entire Church wherever situate, although even then beginning to be torn asunder by rivalries and schisms, under which conditions neither truth could be admitted, nor error excluded, without a sanction admitted by all to be divine, which sanction under these conditions it would be impossible to find.

We may or will assume that we are passed the times and have heard the last of Volney and others, who pronounced Christ to be a myth, an allegorical personage, signifying the Sun or any thing else lying handy, and take it as an accepted fact, that there really was such a person as Christ, who lived at the time, in the country, amid the characters and in the manner stated and mentioned by the writers of the four Gospels, and that he was a perfect model of an absolutely faultless life.

But He is not so much said to have been faultless,—that is

easily said of any one, as it was by Tennyson of his blameless monochord King Arthur,—as shown to have been so by the acts and discourses attributed to Him by these writers. Then by whom but eye witnesses and hearers, could these have been presented to us? How could men of later times, say of the second century, so zealous and fearless in the assertion of a cause manifestly deemed by them to have been that of sincerity and truth, martyrs themselves or associates of martyrs, have looked to support that cause by forged credentials? and by whom could such credentials have been prepared? by whom accepted? From what if they had not themselves seen and heard Him, could the writers of the Four Gospels have derived their idea of Christ and his office; the perfect blending of the now and hereafter for ever? Not assuredly from the heathen world, whose ways they utterly and persistently denounced, not from any elderly sententious *Selecti e Profanis*, arrogantly in their moments of ease and at their feasts talking down such things as pleasure and pain to mere relations; who had no will but their own; to whom conduct was only something deemed by them advisable, and therefore logically optional; among whom the voluntarily humble in spirit were no more than a few elegant extracts from the naturally poor in spirit; whose own meekness was stubborn endurance, courting fame by forced jests, to whom, in brief, the Baptism of John, the sacrament unto *μετανοια*, a term implying with deep sorrow for the past, an entire change of heart and mind, in advance to that state of spiritual freedom, in which is neither evil nor temptation to evil was wholly unknown. There was no such thing known in the heathen world as repentance for its own sake, as self abhorrence for a vicious practice, or earnest enduring sorrow for an act not leading to immediate sensible consequences to the individual self, except among Faquirs and other like fanatics, who made foolish laws for themselves, and were sometimes vexed with themselves for having broken them.

But neither could they have derived the idea from the Jews; for although the character of Christ both in His humiliation and His triumph, may be traced under a light veil through nearly all the prophetic books of the Old Testament, it was never so apprehended by the Jews. It is well known, that

such figures and expressions as "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," "he was wounded for our transgressions, and by his stripes we are healed," "he was led like a lamb to the slaughter" and others of the like kind, were applied by the Jews to themselves and their own humiliations, by which they, the chosen race, "the heart of the whole world," their own words, were to be chastened for their own sins directly, and vicariously for those of the rest of mankind, who, though doomed to inferiority for ever, were to be saved according to their degrees, through the trials and ensuing restoration of Israel.

It is certain that they might have gathered the ideas of holiness and many other leading attributes of the complete character of Christ, from their Scriptures abundantly. But they did not. They did not see, that their ordained observances and ceremonies, were for memorials of past mercies, and types and prophecies of others to come; and that the due observance of them to the best of their abilities and opportunities, was obedience certainly, but only according to the intention, and not itself worship; for there is no true worship but that of the spirit. Their failing to see this, was the starting point of their traditions, which well nigh made all of no avail. Their ceremonies were in their view ordained mysteries, the meaning of which was to be fully disclosed to them, at the expected second coming of Elias, and of the Messiah. To many of them, the Paschal Feast became thus little more than the slaughter of a lamb with certain solemnities. From such a starting point religion could take but one direction, could have but one tendency; to crush out the spiritual or thing signified, and drag down the thoughts to a conceit of acquired merits from a laboured observance of burthensome external rites.

A few instances out of many may suffice. The Caraites, who rejected these traditions, and were therefore spurned at all times by the Pharisees, the more influential sect, were most bitterly reproached by them for holding, that it was a less thing for a Nazarite, who was specially bound to the strictest temperance, to eat grapes, than to become intoxicated with wine made of honey; the reason assigned being, that the prohibition was ceremonial and not moral, and the reason of it known to God

and His elect only. But these traditions led sometimes to impossibilities, and sometimes to inconvenient possibilities; and then they tempered the command; thus, the law prohibiting the carrying any thing from a private to a public place on the Sabbath, was mitigated by fusing the distinction between public and private places. *Cosri ubi supra*. In fine, the principle once admitted that the niceties of the law could not be explained without it, tradition triumphed every where. Hardly a verse, word, or letter* of either the Law or the Prophets, but was understood to have some inner meaning, explained or to be explained hereafter in its appointed time by tradition, or by Elias at his expected return.

Yet in one thing the devout Jew shames us all. To him the religious idea was, as we shall presently see, that of an immediate personal privilege derived from a direct communion with Jehovah, and raising him towards what he counted the "Angelic degree." This in the earnest and devout was more or less a truth, but in all others merely a working of the pride that so easily besets us all. But in either case, this, weighted with the never absent sense of privilege of race as the "Peculiar People," was the ruling idea, and coloured the whole waking life of the true Israelite; and to and on this, in all the vacant intervals of his daily avocations, duties and pleasures, his thoughts willingly, gladly and naturally, flew back and rested; upon this ground the lines of his life were drawn.

Unless we do this, unless we so fill our voids, unless we gladly receive the good spirit which is always suing to be received, we have no religion, absolutely none. Unless we bear religion with us abroad, we have none at home, and less than none at Church, for there we are profane.

What can the forms of the Church do for us, though we die in the very act of an outward observance of them, if our thoughts and desires are at all times wholly secular? Is such a death bed conformance a sufficing death bed preparation? Is

* If any one will refer to the Hebrew Pentateuch, he will find in *Genesis* c. 23, v. 2, where Abraham is said to have wept for Sarah, the letter *caph*. in the word signifying "wept" printed in smaller type than the others; the reason assigned for this by the Cabalists being; "Abraham tantum paucillum deflesse Saram, quia vetula fuerit." *Godwin's Moses and Aaron*, B. 4. c. 8, p. 370.

it not even less than that broken reed on which in the far distant so many of us so courageously rely, a death bed repentance? Did not Milton's Satan know better? And are not our thoughts always secular? Do we not always rush at once from secular cares to secular pleasures? Do we ever of our free choice give a moment's interval between them to aught religious? "We do sometimes." We cannot do so sometimes. We must do so always, or we must do so never. The idea, indeed, of God, is not and cannot be always present with us, for we are to live in the world, but the disposition to turn to Him may; and where that is, the idea will always come, not without direction in its own good times and seasons. We little dream of the frightful unseen companionship we should be delivered from, and what we should receive in exchange, if we would but with steadfast purpose give our minds to this.

It may be fair and not unprofitable to look a little here at the Jewish view of some of these matters, presented by one of themselves, in a book above quoted—"The devout Jew is neither hermit nor ascetic. The law prescribes to the Jew a life devoting every faculty to God in due degree without excess, and his legal service is distributed equally between acts of divine worship and those of ordinary life, which alike require thought and devotion to God. The promise to, and hope of, the Jew being that of a present union with God, the prophetic writings do not often make direct mention of a future state, nor was there any need that they should do so. But they believed in one, and the general acceptance by them of the account of the raising of Samuel by the Witch of Endor, though an unlawful act, sufficiently shews that they did. The Jewish prayers are specially adapted to a feeling of the presence of God, communion with angels, and advance in holiness towards the prophetic degree, and these are aided in carrying this feeling into the secular portion of their lives by certain artifices, such as the use of phylacteries bound around the forehead, the seat of thought, and over the pulse of their wrist, the current of life. Thought and intention give a real efficacy to prayer, and should this be lessened by any remissness, the pious Jew studies to replace

it by benedictions uttered during the day, especially on passing any sacred place."

The ideal of the devout Jew in his prosperity under this teaching, which was but a preparation for deeper truths to follow, is thus given—"What must the religious Jew have been in his prosperity? In the Holy Land, in the midst of the chosen people, amongst the pure, bearing the impress of their ancestors Abraham and the patriarchs; his soul undefiled by sight of aught profane, his body and clothing free from all impurities, himself from all uncleanness; in the Holy City, thronged with companies of holy men, priests, Levites, Nazarites and others, the whole collected people rejoicing there together three times a year, amid Divine songs, and the Lord's work, priests and Levites ministering daily, as did Samuel from his youth upwards, and wholly devoted to it."

This was the Jewish "Excelsior." The devout Jew under this teaching and with such aspirations must have lived every hour of his waking life in a firm and increasing sense of Divine favour, purchased by himself through his own merits, in his observance of an onerous external law. When he went up to the Temple to pray, he could but say, "Lord I thank thee I am not as other men are. I fast twice in the week; I give tithes of all that I possess." How, indeed, with such memories, hopes and associations, should he not have been proud, or inclined to pride? But from pride no good thing ever came, least of all charity, an unhappy word as used by us for *αγαπη*, love, without which all else avails nothing.

Nor were there wanting texts, abounding both in the law and the prophets, to confirm the ancient Israelite in his views of his duty and privileges. The mission to dispossess the Canaanites and destroy idolaters, and to live apart from all other nations, *αλλοφυλοι*, was to our human apprehensions hard, stern and uncharitable; nor was it a slight thing to be marked out for a conquering mission. The "Psalms of David" written, the greater part at least, during the continuance and amid some of the fiercer struggles of this mission, contain very numerous passages and expressions, that on the surface, and taken in their primary acceptance, strike us as

relentless and cruel ; and they have the ring of battle, for the material strife with the Canaanites and idolators was not then over ; but with those who live under the later dispensation, that is no longer the case, for either they are seen to be prophecies since fulfilled, or they are only applicable in their secondary sense to spiritual enemies and to none else.

But by the devout Jew of those days the secondary meaning was either unobserved or misapprehended, and if on the one hand, the sense of divine favour and privilege worked to make him more frequent and earnest in prayer, and in retaining the thought of the presence of his Creator in his mind ; on the other hand the true intention and spirit with which God is to be addressed, was in general so far wanting, that his prayer seemed almost converted into a claim for a reward of merit, and he could not thus unlearn his pride and exclusiveness ; and as all around equally with himself took in only the surface meaning of their Scriptures, there could be none to reprove, admonish or guide him.

No people on earth ever so highly venerated their illustrious dead as the Jews. To them their leaders, kings and prophets were, once and always, "the lights and glory of Israel." Their memories were preserved by them with a reality and fervour absolutely unknown among all other nations, nor were their names ever spoken lightly, or without the utmost and almost emotional reverence. The word *Μακαριστος* usually rendered by us "of happy memory," conveys a Jewish idea founded on the text, "the memory of the just shall flourish."

But amongst all the great and glorious leaders, kings and prophets of ancient Israel, was not one whose character in the least degree resembled or was modelled on that of Christ. They were indeed, from the nature of their mission, and under their law, exceptionally fierce, and perhaps the nearest instance of a perfectly resigned spirit recorded in the Old Testament is to be found, not in any of the more highly privileged men, but in the frail and short-coming Eli under his chastisement, "It is the Lord ; let Him do what seemeth Him best."

But in all this was no shadow of the Cross, of a life

and spirit like those of Christ not a single trace. Nothing but His reality and actual advent could fill up the lines of the expected Messiah in His true character as He came at last.

But further—"There was at the nativity of Christ, among the Jews throughout the whole world, an assured hope of the speedy and almost immediate advent of the Messiah. There was nothing mysterious in this, or that cannot be easily accounted for. They simply reckoned from certain signs which they regarded as the accomplishment of the Messianic prophecies, that the fulness of time was come. Above all, the sceptre had departed from Israel to the Idumæan Herod, the very event assigned by prophecy to mark the coming of the Messiah." *On the Language of Christ and His Apostles ubi supra.*

But the Messiah that was thus looked for was to be a very different person from the Messiah that came, who was a bitter disappointment to the Jews. The one that was looked for was to be a king and a conqueror, something perhaps like the Archangel Michael in the Revelation, whose office would be, not to clear them from their sins, that they could do well enough for themselves by ceremonial observances, but to rescue them from and raise them to a height far above their present temporal oppressors, and place them for ever above all other nations of the earth. He was to be far greater and more glorious than either David or Solomon, but in the same kind; the idea of the Jews being that their privileges as the chosen people were both national and personal ("are not all the congregation holy?") and that in these they were to be established by their triumphant Messiah over all the world for ever; and it can hardly be doubted, that had some brilliant and conquering Maccabee then appeared on the scene, him they would have followed.

Such seems to have been the view at first even of the Apostles, and especially of Judas Iscariot, who, it has been discovered in these latter days by searchers of determined views, betrayed his Lord, not so much for the "What-will-you-give-me-thirty-pieces-of-silver," as to hasten the manifestation of the Messiah's temporal power, and the setting up

of the visible standard of his kingdom at once, as *perdidi diem* Titus, a model prince in his way, did at Jerusalem some forty years afterwards. And this has been seriously urged.

Next to the wonder of there having been such a person as Christ, would be the imagining and portraying such a character, and so portraying it, as to win therewith a world ; first, that such a thing, should have been attempted, and next that it should have succeeded, and so succeeded, that no people once accepting it, has wholly apostatised from the faith.

But although willing in this place wholly to eliminate the miraculous if required, that is, to keep our faith in it to ourselves, we cannot forego every thing we have been told. We cannot but bear in mind, that the Apostles and first disciples themselves held, at different times, conflicting views of the character of Christ, first as a temporal Messiah, Prince and Conquerer, and next, as a king of a kingdom not of this world ; and we cannot forget their utter desolation and despair, at the breaking up of their first hope by the humiliation and death on the Cross. If the words addressed to Him before His death, " Lord, wilt thou at this time redeem Israel ?" and, " Lord, wilt thou not cause fire to come down from heaven to destroy these unbelievers ?" bespeak assured belief in His person and character as the temporal or conquering Messiah, not the less do those uttered by the two disciples at Emmaus, of whom, from the particularity of the detail, and other circumstances, the Evangelist Luke is thought to have been one, " We trusted that it had been he which should have redeemed Israel (*ὁ μελλων λυτρονσθαι*, a doctrinal expression, applicable to the promised Messiah and none beside) and now is the third day since these things were done," show the entire break up and death of all their hopes.

The disciples as a rule were exceptionally incredulous of the resurrection. We have all heard of the incredulity of Thomas one of the eleven, but what of the less privileged disciples, some of whom must have been according to all reason equally slow to believe ?

If Christ truly arose according to the Scriptures, then *cadit questio* ; if not, then the Apostles and all other believers were not mistaken, but deceived, and were scattered at the eve of

the Crucifixion, fugitives, having lost all they valued, hopeless and helpless, to hide for fear of the Jews, and be at the mercy, and still worse, left once more to the teaching of the Scribes and Pharisees, for with them they were again to look "for him who should come."

But within three days all was changed to a hope and joy which have endured and spread themselves over the whole inhabited earth for more than eighteen centuries; the immediate visible aim of the first believers being the crown of martyrdom, the seal of which was death under the most cruel torments

Then comes this curious dilemma. If Christ truly rose from the dead, He arose according to the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and these Scriptures must be true; and the causes for which He arose must be accepted, not so much as matter of belief as of doctrine. If He did not rise, then the eleven and their chosen ministers and assistants, baffled, deceived and without hope for themselves or others, immediately after the death of him whom all Jerusalem had seen dead on the Cross, taking common thought, with one accord, in and through all the streets and places of that same Jerusalem and in the very Temple itself, from day to day, openly, fearlessly, impudently and falsely, on their own unsupported testimony, asserted and maintained that he had risen from the dead, and ascended into Heaven, and that, he so unlike the then ideal of the Jews, was the true Messiah, who was to save, not them only but all the world.

There is not a word here that is too strong for the occasion. What is dealt with in this place is the position that Christ did not rise from the dead, and that the eleven and first disciples either knew that he had not risen, or were by some means deceived into believing that he had. But it is not alleged that he was ever seen after his resurrection by any but a few of his favoured believers, and followers, and if there were deceit in the matter, it is among these that the deceiver is to be sought, and so we come to direct Apostolic falsehood at last.

But there is yet another view of the subject, which certainly does not lay its supporters open to the charge

of want of constructive mental power brought by some or one against the Teuton mind. It is said, and if there is any irreverence in the statement, it is not ours, that Christ did not die on the Cross ; that by some contrivance of the executioners, who were the creatures of Nicodemus, a man of great influence, or bribed by him and the wealthy Joseph of Arimathea for the purpose, the punishment was rendered less painful and deadly than it would otherwise have been ; that by these means, Christ was not dead when "not a bone of him was broken ;" that the point of the spear glanced off at a rib ; this piercing, by the bye, must have been the sudden thought and unpremeditated act of some brutal soldier or attendant, and could not have been either foreseen or guarded against ; that the burial in "a new sepulchre wherein no man had yet been laid," was pre-arranged ; that the myrrh and spices were in fact restoratives ; that the guard set to watch the grave were bribed ; and that from that point was nothing but the working out of a scheme, in pursuance of which Christ showed himself shortly afterwards to several, and then, as a matter of fact, retired for ever from the view of man, except in the single exceptional case of his appearing to Paul. In this last case, however, they seem to labour somewhat needlessly ; for not only is there no evidence that Paul was ever in Jerusalem, or indeed in Judea at all, during our Lord's ministry, or that he had ever seen him or heard the tones of his voice, except on the occasion and at the instant of his conversion on the road to Damascus ; but the contrary is fairly to be inferred from his own words in asserting his claim to the Apostleship, "Am not I an Apostle ? Have not I seen Christ ?" which can only be reasonably construed to mean seeing Him in a moment of favour and acceptance. But if Paul had never before seen Christ, and it was desired as a stroke of policy to convert so terrible a persecutor whom not even the death of the martyr Stephen had moved, the purpose might have been equally well answered by some one simulating the character, as by the more laboured and intricate machinery suggested by what we may perhaps call the Gospel of Reason.

But is this suggestion of a pretended death of Christ possible? The authorities on the question common to both sides are the Gospel Narratives; but it is said, that these Narratives admit the conclusion contended for, though neither intended nor perceived by the writers. The case necessarily assumed here is, that Christ was a man subject to all the casualties and infirmities of our own nature, and nothing more, and that there was nothing miraculous in and throughout his birth, life, or death. Whatever may have been the mode of crucifixion among the Romans,—and it seems to have been a sort of trade or craft with them, “*sunt quæ tortoribus annua præsent.*” *Juvenal 6, Satire*—it is certain that in our Lord’s case He was affixed to the cross by nails driven through His hands and feet; it will be remembered that it has been a question of controversy at divers times among the old Schools of Painting and others, whether four or three nails were used on the occasion; that the cross was of some, though perhaps of no considerable height, appears from the incident of the sponge presented to Him at the end of a reed.

Upon this cross, then, and so affixed, guarded and in the view of multitudes, our Lord remained from, it would seem, about the third to the ninth hour, when He was taken down seemingly dead. Now, if the framers of this fine story of collusion and pretended death will but consider a little what must be the nature and effect of the wound caused by driving a nail through the wedge of the foot, the displacement and injury of so many small bones, and the cutting, straining, and tearing of such a system of nerves and muscles, they will see at once how impossible it must have been that He should have shown Himself, as it is alike their assumption and our case, that He did, so soon after the event to so many persons, standing and walking, and to all appearance in His full and wonted strength and vigour.

But there is another circumstance, only to be touched upon with extreme awe, for it enters largely into the more advanced teaching of the Church. Strong minds have mastered pain before now, but not delayed death or its

approaches. The words spoken by Christ on the cross, "Woman, behold thy son"——"This day shall thou be with me in Paradise"——"Father, forgive them"——were words that could only have been spoken by a dying man. But above all, how could He, unless at the point of death, have uttered those mysterious last words of all, "Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" How could He have complained of God's deserting him if he had yet hope in man?

But there is yet something more. If Christ were only a man, unvisited by aught supernatural on the cross, He must have been subject to all the ordinary laws that govern our own lives. He would by these laws have been overcome by the long protracted physical torments endured by Him on the cross; but He would have yielded to them by degrees; His senses would have left Him gradually, and He would have swooned away His life and died imperceptibly at last.

But whence, then, that last mysterious cry just before the end of all? It is possible and probable, that to a person dying under torments, the application of one yet more exquisite and cruel, might evoke such a cry, even at the instant of death; but of that there is in this case no evidence, but rather of something much the reverse.

To us this cry, with the accompanying words quoted above, taken from and bringing to our minds the whole of the twenty-second Psalm, presenting as it does, even in some minute details, so accurate a picture of the whole scene, and assurance of the hopes to follow, is of the deepest import, and we accept it, though in its full reality far beyond our apprehension, as wrung in the moment of the supreme and true agony of the Cross, from one sinless Himself dying more than the death of the sinner, that is,—with the sins and penalties of all mankind pressing at once upon his soul.

But is this wondrous hypothesis probable? The case to be made is, that there was a device to save Christ from death, and that he was saved by human contrivances. But crucifixion was in the view and expectation of all certain

death ; and the device, if any, must have begun with some contrivance for lessening, or rendering less fatal, the pains and perils of the punishment itself ; and of this Christ must have been himself aware ; and then comes the lamentable inconsistency of his above-noticed complaint on the Cross, that God had forsaken him, when, in truth, He had forsaken God by placing his hope in man. But further, none but Himself, certainly none of his true followers knew beforehand, the hour of his betrayal ; the Eleven to the last hour disbelieved the possibility of such a thing ; to the Jews, the occasion was sudden ; they had to take hurried action ; they were unprepared ; the Sabbath was approaching, by which time all must be finished ; they feared the people, and distrusted Pilate ; they had not time even to suborn the two witnesses required by the law ; and thus with their natural dispositions aggravated to fury by the hurry and confusion which beset them, they kept our Lord from the moment of their taking Him to that of His descent from the Cross, and the preparations for His burial, apart from all private communion with His followers or well-wishers, amid the vilest rabble, and exposed to cruelties and indignities which might almost make even the cross seem as a bed of down. Then, at the last, the high priests bethink them of His prophecy that He should rise again on the third day, being indeed the very charge to which the suborned witnesses were to speak, and with the leave and authority of the indifferent Pilate, set a guard, if not of their own selection, at least approved of by themselves, who of all men would have had the strongest motive to guard against "the last error," which they judged would be worse than the first. In the face of all these adverse circumstances, amid such vigilance and cause for vigilance, is there the slightest probability, could there have been a shadow of hope that such a design, with such an aim, could have been successful or would not have been at once overthrown ?

But we need not, and are in the wrong to be over-curious on this point, for it is want of saving faith that makes us so, and indulgence to stubborn error must have a limit. Always it is forgotten, that the true assurance both of the Resurrec-

tion and Ascension is to be looked for, not in the declarations of the few favoured believers who witnessed them, but in the older Scriptures ; as shown by Christ himself at Emmaus, " O fools* and slow of heart to believe (του πιστεῖν, in faithfully believing) all that the prophets have spoken : Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory ? And, beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things relating to himself."—*Luke c. 24, vv. 25, 26, 27.*

We believe this, not only because Christ said it, for we should believe it without that, or if another than He had said it, but because we have proved it, as indeed He directed us to do, and find it to be the truth.

The question, however, at this point passes into one of a more severe and personal character ; is the charge a seemly one ?

The perfect grace and truth of the character of Christ are now established facts. We no longer throw stones at him. To assail or defend would be alike idle. It is certain that He could not sin either in thought or deed. Then what is it in us to suggest that He did both ? for of course if He did not truly die, He must have practised a wilful deceit on those to whom He appeared after His supposed death, and that in support of a cause no longer either holy or true, for nothing that is holy and true can hold fellowship with works of darkness or deceit.

This indeed is felt to be rather too strong, and an easier point is taken. It is said that Christ did die, and did not arise ; and that is all we can know about it, because the cloud of witnesses of the Resurrection, referred to by St. Paul, is insufficient for that purpose ; and that all that followed after the burial was done through personation and contrivance of the Apostles, or some of them, and other followers of Christ.

The "cloud of witnesses" was sufficient for St. Paul's purpose in writing for those to whom the Epistle in which

* The Greek *αυοητοι*, inconsiderate, has not the air of rudeness which the word "fools," as we have rendered it, has, more or less conventionally, with us.

the expression occurs was addressed to all intents and purposes ; for us, only to some. The true and perfectly reliable proof of the Resurrection and Ascension is, as above noted, that declared at Emmaus. Without this we should not have believed. The unity and connexion of the Bible would be broken up and destroyed. If there were no prophecies in the Old Testament pointing to a suffering Messiah, the death of Christ on the Cross would have been an unlooked for unaccountable and isolated event; which, looking equally with the Jews, for a temporal triumphant Messiah, we should be unable to accept. But when it is once established by these prophecies that Christ must have died and "suffered all these things to enter into his glory," then this later "cloud of witnesses" may well enough be received to show the manner, form and time. Within this short compass lies this whole question of evidence, and all besides, excepted always the teaching and word of Christ himself, is superfluous.

But who and what were the Apostles, or some of them, that they should have done this thing? Judas Iscariot,—not he of the thirty pieces of silver, but the Iscariot *decore* of the nineteenth century, the confiding, forward, practical, zealous, if a little self-seeking, Iscariot, but for his trouble,—might possibly have done such a thing, but how should these others of themselves have contrived it, when their lost brother was no longer at hand to assist them, with what, I suppose in these days, would be called, his sound practical sense and administrative ability?

They were good men. They were good men when they were called ; but being such, did they make no advance, did they acquire no new graces from their years of intimate communion with One who was the fountain of all grace? Were they no better than at the first, when their Lord in his prayer said, "Of those whom thou gavest me, I have lost none, save One, the son of perdition?" Was Peter, whom Satan so often strove to have, quite the same man at the beginning as he was when he received his last charge and promise of the cross on the shore of the sea of Tiberius?

It is idle and almost irreverent in us to praise these men :

but what said their enemies of them? They could not have been worse men than the earlier Christians who succeeded them; and what says the younger Pliny of these in his celebrated letter to the Emperor Trajan? This Pliny is represented to us in history as a man of eminent culture and ability, frugal, temperate, mild, affable, kind-hearted even to slaves, a model for letter-writers, and conscientiously intolerant of the Christians. On becoming pro-consul of Bithynia, he found the Temples of the Gods of Rome deserted, and victims for sacrifice no longer brought into the markets, through the example and influence of the Christians. This necessarily compelled him to take some proceedings against them, which he did by putting to death as many of them as he could lay hold of, who would not abjure their religion, and some who did, and then to institute inquiry into the matter. He found, to give his own words, that "it was their habit"—*stato die ante lucem convenire, carmen Christo quasi Deo dicere, seque sacramento, non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum appellati abnegarent, quibus peractis morem sibi discedendi fuisse rursusque coeundi ad captandum cibum, promiscuum tamen et innocuum*—quo magis necessarium credidi quid esset veri, in duabus ancillis quæ ministræ dicebantur (these were *διακοναι* or deaconesses of the New Testament) per tormenta quærere sed nihil aliud inveni quam superstitionem pravam et immodicam. —*Plin. Epist. L. 10 Ep.*

This was the work of the Apostles, who are now charged with fraud and falsehood, and this the state and seeming reward of their earliest followers, which they endured without murmuring and without falling away; and here we have the two kingdoms, the one of this world, the other not of this world, met in conflict. But where now are the Cæsars? and what the present state and condition of this "*superstitio prava et immodica*?"

We now again come round to this point; that we have in Christ, one who himself worthy, came upon earth in our likeness to raise it to his own; to restore us, a fallen race; to make us in the end fit sharers of a faultless and glorious crea-

tion ; and to enable us to become good and faithful subjects of a kingdom, of which He is the eternal Head and Ruler ever present and in direct communion with all, though all may not have equal privileges. We should not be deterred from this hope, by the consideration of our present vileness, for surely, He who created can, if it be His will, raise, and we have the assurance and example of Christ himself to encourage and sustain us in our hope.

But the idea of this kingdom being that of a universal one, it is objected that this earth of ours being a mere speck in creation, could never sufficiently replenish such a kingdom. No one ever supposed that it could, and the objection, if it deserve rank as one, almost destroys itself. It is conceivable of ourselves as being living souls, that we may hereafter be admitted into that kingdom ; but if so, it is equally conceivable of all other living souls, wherever placed and of whatever sphere, that they too under like or other conditions may also be so admitted. We know nothing of these other souls, not even if they be or not ; but we infer, we cannot well do otherwise, from the phenomena around us, that there must be countless such beings ; for we cannot suppose the stars to be without some inhabitants, but all that we can predicate of these inhabitants is what science teaches us, that they cannot be under the same physical conditions as ourselves. We know no more ; but it is certain that God must be the centre and Ruling Power of all creation visible and invisible, and we infer from the greatness and excellence of Christ, being God, that these beings are or may hereafter become with ourselves subjects of His promised kingdom ; and we propose it accordingly, not as a matter of faith, for that only is the proper subject of faith which is communicated, but as a sufficing answer to all objections that may be advanced on premises so vague and unknown, as to be incapable of adding to or detracting from the question on either side.

We have then to see whether our view of a grand and worthy design in creatures as above stated is or not borne out by what we find in ourselves, and the phenomena around us, and their mutual relations, and whether we shall

not in the inquiry securely trace throughout a moral element or principle governing the whole, and to which, as the worthier, all else subserve, and in which therefore the aim and object of all is to be sought for. Certain it is that in this direction only can we hope to approach the great question of partial evil in and around us, and gather hope of its final extinction.

From this point there are but two parties, and those two, the extremes ; the strict materialists to whom matter is an independent reality which never had a beginning, and which by the working of certain laws or properties, necessarily subjective in itself and also without beginning, has developed into the wonderful concrete world we now find, and ourselves.

True science, as distinguished from its counterfeit, is common ground. It is indifferent to the man of science whether his discoveries are traceable back to the working of one original law, or to a combination of many. He has done his duty in making and presenting us with his discoveries, and explaining their material results and uses, and his honours have been fairly won. But when he attempts more, he is no longer the man of science, but one of the many, a philosopher, and must, like the rest of us, be taken with all his faults. It is indifferent also to us, because in either case we are equally near to a directing mind, and it concerns us not whether that mind governs its own work by one law or many. We accept and admire.

But to the materialist we may yet hint thus much on parting, and that rather in the way of encouragement (to amend his ways, that is,) than otherwise. Good and evil must have lain hidden in your material First Cause from the beginning, and your First Cause must have been both good and evil, that is, must have been evil, for good in the abstract must be wholly good, or it is not good at all. But good and evil in action are always antagonistic, the one destructive of the other ; and in the end, good, it is generally assumed, will prevail, and evil be no more. There we agree ; but why did evil come ? or rather, why did it ever exist ? for according to your view it mus

always have existed in your First Cause. You can say no more than that it is agreeable to the nature of things that it should come or should exist ; and then your First Cause must be either evil or weak ; and if weak, there must be something somewhere stronger, and your First Cause is gone.

But though you cannot tell us, we think we can tell you. Evil came through disobedience of a moral law by subjects of a moral world, under other laws than yours, and we look (D.V.) to show this in our own case, by showing a moral purpose and a moral Governor, something in this order, omitting, perhaps, for the sake of brevity, certain extreme views.—We find ourselves placed upon an earth that denies us its fruits, and brings forth thorns and thistles abundantly, and on which we are exposed to plague, pestilence, and famine, the attacks of wild beasts who are stronger than ourselves, and all the chances, pains, and sufferings of our ordinary lives ; and are indeed in an evil case. By toil and labour, and truly in the sweat of the brow, we partly subdue all these to our use ; but even then we quickly become aged and helpless, sicken and die. So far we have no will, and are under no law which we can transgress, being set in action by the senses, and aided by a degree of intellect hardly at first rising much above instinct. But we are many, bound together in societies, and engaged in a fierce “struggle for life” among ourselves ; and this enforces a weak kind of morality, but of the earth, earthy ; we must be just and forbearing towards others, that they may be just and forbearing towards ourselves in turn. This is no true account of the progress of man in society ; for ourselves we reject it, and what follows next was, we firmly believe, known to the first man, but it has been advanced as historically true by some, who seem to consider man as his own God, and, as Luther with different views is said to have expressed it, “the best that can be known.” Then comes the idea, and with it, and without an interval between, the perfect and assured consciousness of a Personal Ruler and Governor, all powerful, wise, and good,

who, if the Ruler, must also be the Creator of all things. But with this consciousness comes another, far more terrible and hard to be borne, that, namely, of our own exceeding sinfulness, the sense that we have offended Him, that we are under a dispensation of His wrath, and for aught we can at present, or without the aid of Revelation, see, outcasts from His favour for ever. This, which sufficiently accounts for all the external ills of life, which indeed of themselves are comparative trifles and may be borne, is assured to us far more terribly by what is within us, by the anxiety, dread, remorse, "thoughts, like old vultures, preying on our heartstrings," that seldom leave us, and only to prepare for worse return.

Pure reason—that is, sheer intellect or intellect shorn of everything else—has no part in this conflict, for it can do nothing without first discarding all prejudice, and in constructing syllogisms every unacceptable premiss may always be traced back to something so hardly to be distinguished from prejudice, that you may always say if you like that it is prejudice, and thus, and in one sense, everything that comes before the judgment or conclusion, and which you cannot mould at will, must be a prejudice; thus in the present case you may and do argue in this fashion—"The idea of a God is a prejudice; therefore" (and this is a direct and unavoidable inference) "virtue and vice are prejudices; therefore there are no such things as virtue and vice, and no conscience good or bad, and we are frightened about nothing"—and this is the Holy, holy, holy, of the emancipated Cherubim of the day.

But in another view reason is out of court in this matter. The true idea of God, working its own conviction, comes to us from without, and is not subjective within us, nor dependent on any process of reasoning of ours. But if so, it must come at the will of another, and not of ourselves, and as that other is perfect and unchangeable it must come with the force and swiftness of a decree; and it does so come. There is an interval perhaps of gloom and darkness, justly proportioned, we may be sure, to the sin


and rebellion which it encounters, but it comes suddenly at last, and once come, will not again leave us. We may take thought to expel it; we may dream that we have done so; but it will return in anger at last.

It is only by Himself, through the Spirit which He has given us for that purpose, that God will be known to us. Were He not a Personality He could never be known at all. Of the nature of this Personality we know no more than He has vouchsafed to tell us. Some indeed, have pronounced Him to be an "hyperhypothesis," which is, and it is to be hoped, will always remain a Greek word, signifying in this relation, a net without meshes.

But by Reason alone, or without that aid which in its repelling icy cold fastidiousness Reason always rejects, as a Spirit, the rightful and unquestionable Lord and Ruler of our spirits, He will never be known.

But it is lawful at all times to examine the works of the Creator, and in them, and chiefly in ourselves, we shall find ample confirmation of the views here stated. In the imperfect adaptation of the physical conditions of the earth to our natural requirements, and our subjection to pain and death, yet not without a general benevolent purpose discernible as running through all, we have evidence of a Fall, but not a hopeless one. In the strength of the appetites lie the inducements to fulfil the manifest design of the Creator, to subdue and replenish the earth. The rest we find in ourselves; in the will and the intellect, not singly but in their mutual relations, so closely connected yet always distinct; in the latter, the perceptive and reasoning faculties, and among others, and by no means the least, the imagination, by which if but duly cultivated and guarded, we may raise ourselves to heights so ineffably above this earth and its surroundings, in the will, in the moral sense, and the consciousness of a visitant, an "eternal tending to righteousness not ourselves."

The main question here proposed is one grand beyond all measure and inexhaustible, but receives light continually, and is fairly open to all who are content to reason only from what they know, and it may if opportunity offer be pursued in a future Essay.



IN THE BEGINNING
REMARKS ON CERTAIN MODERN VIEWS
OF THE CREATION

PART IV.

BY

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Dissentientis
. exemplo trahenti
Perniciem veniens in ævum.



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IN THE BEGINNING.

PART IV.

IN our assertion of an original high and worthy purpose in creation, we have sought to establish that Christ, the sole perfectly worthy object known to us throughout the whole world, came of his own free will upon earth, to teach and assist men to become like Himself, and fitting subjects of His promised kingdom. If this view be accepted, it must be at least probable, that having this care of man, He, being eternal, would in wisdom and power be with him always, from the fall, if not earlier, to the present time.

That He has truly been so, we conceive to be fully shown; before his Incarnation, by occasional supernatural manifestations in the sight of all, and by a continual inward unseen communion with the spirits of all who "never bent the knee to Baal," and were willing to receive Him, and most especially in the lives and experiences of some of his chosen servants.

But these privileges of direct communion with the unknown Christ before his Advent, were bounded by the incomplete revelation at that time vouchsafed even to the best of men. They knew that the day of the Messiah was to come, and they longed to see that day, but except imperfectly and afar off, they did not. He was having care for them before the act of mediation was fully accomplished, but they discerned Him not, as Him through whom their daily prayers were answered. Under such conditions, signs and wonders might well be requisite for their support and encouragement, and signs and wonders were at all fitting times vouchsafed to them.

During His abode on earth, He spoke familiarly face to face with man as with a brother, declared His mission and achieved it.

The work of Redemption having been then accomplished, and the promised Paraclete* "the Spirit of Truth" sent, there was no longer need of further revelation or extraordinary manifestations.

From this point the Paraclete, the Spirit of Truth, whether we admit among ourselves of private judgment or not, being ever with us is all sufficient. We have nothing needful to learn but what that Spirit, on being earnestly and with due reverence sought and received, will not tell us. That which glorified the proto-martyr Stephen, will, if we give due heed, save also us. We are not called upon to pronounce that a miracle is in these days impossible, but we do say, that to require one is to shame this Spirit.

* In the account given of the rich man and Lazarus, *Luke, c. 16, v. 25*, it is said, *νῦν δὲ ὁδε παρακαλεῖται, σὺ δὲ ὀδυνᾷσαι*, rendered by us "and now he (Lazarus) is comforted, and thou art tormented." There is no idea presented to us here of advocacy; it is rather indeed excluded by the use of the contrasting word "tormented," when, if that was the idea intended to be conveyed, we might expect to find "cast" or "condemned," or some such expression. The Greek word "Paraclete" may, according to the context, mean either advocate or comforter, and its use in the latter sense is often unmistakably denoted, as in *Acts, c. 9, v. 31*, in speaking of the rest and happiness of the Churches at the time, the expression *τῇ παρακλήσει τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος*, can only refer to a working of the Holy Spirit within themselves. But if in *John, c. 14, v. 16*, where the Paraclete is promised, the word is to be taken in the former sense, it must mean "advocate" only, and nothing more, and then one does not see very clearly why He should descend to abide with us here where we so much need a comforter, and not rather remain for ever above, where, according to the belief and teaching of the Christian Churches, intercession is now and continually being made for us; nor by what special propriety it is the office of such an advocate to descend to earth to tell us all things. It is only by a figure that Christ is said to be our advocate, nor does the word at all fill up the idea of His true character and office. An advocate may plead, but cannot in his own right intercede for another. An intercessor must have a right to intercede, and Christ in His own divine person presenting his own merits, has the most perfect right to do so; but this is a claim of redemption by purchase in His own right, and not advocacy.

This principal point once established, it may be far easier than is commonly thought, to show from phenomena within and around us, that Nature is not altogether "the mighty maze" with some sort of "may-be plan," that Pope, who believed a little, in his Letter to Bolingbroke, who believed not at all, pronounced it to be, but that it is throughout in all its works, in entire accord with the one consistent design above contended for, and to that end plan-perfect in all its details.

Certainly the view which we take of the question is open in some points to the objection, that it assumes the Scriptures to be authentic and true, and lovers of wisdom at large or in concretes are thus thrown somewhat out of the game. But philosophers generally do not allow themselves to remain long disconsolate for want of strife, and as with them every opinion whatever is a call to battle, or a red rag of provocation, they are never long idle, and we shall see them again, or if not we will make some of snow.

There is a mischief now very rife, and not slightly perilous, and that is the excessive use of type and allegory in interpreting the Scriptures; and if in dealing with this, we select for a mark, a sect neither very strong, nor very obtrusive, nor very ill behaved, we do so, not only because they are themselves offenders, but because they have very numerous unavowed and perhaps unconscious followers and favourers in quarters little suspected. An allegory not fully and irresistibly authorised, necessarily multiplies causes of error. We must construct our problem aright before we can work it to any safe end.

It has been held for rather more than a hundred years past by this sect, who in the strength of their own private convictions, have taken upon themselves to re-habilitate the true and perfect Faith, with New Articles of Belief, New Liturgies, New Rites, New Orders of Ministry, New Sects, and, in fine a "New Church," that the Mosaic account of the creation, and the earlier portions of the book Genesis down to c. 11, v. 14 (this is their boundary line, not ours), the authenticity and inspiration of all of which they emphatically admit, have nothing to do with real stocks and stones, or flesh and blood

entities, except so far as they set forth certain correspondences between such things and others unseen, each separate concrete in the material natural world answering entirely to, and being indissolubly one with an inward and spiritual co-ordinate, of which it presents and is the outward visible sign or form ; and further that the true intent of these writings was not to tell us the beginning and progressive stages of the mere plebeian or physical crust of this earth of ours, nor the modes and times of the first weighing and swinging into space of the sun, moon, and stars, nor the making of great whales, or the like ; nor any of the personal history of our supposed but long deserted and forlorn father Adam and his wife, which last is there mystically said to have been "the mother of all living," but to set forth clearly and unmistakeably in type and figures, matters seemingly, but only seemingly widely different ; that is to say, the original state, faculties, propensities and conditions of certain early inhabitants of the earth, their rise and fall, and at length final destruction through means of the catastrophe which we are fond to call the Flood, but which they tell us, was not a real water one, by which all but one tribe or species of these early inhabitants, designated in a figure of speech as "Noah and his three sons, and his wife and his sons' wives," from whom we are probably descended, wholly perished.

With this valorous all-in-one-conclusion, we of all arms, and whether Crusaders or Saracens, being to them in this particular question, as thousands to one, need not very greatly concern ourselves ; but as it happens that our New Church friends have crossed our path, and do express, not inappropriately, our own views on one or two points, we think we may reasonably enough make use of them so far against our present turbulent allies, whom we have just above referred to as Saracens, and sometimes treated as such. We shall then thank them for their services, and shift for ourselves.

But they have, we repeat, on many points, among Churchmen of all denominations, not a few unavowed favourers, here and there, now and then supporters, well-in-their-way-intending, easy minded men, with rather faint all-come-right-in-the-end views in religious matters ; and these in the aggregate, are far more numerous than is generally in the least

suspected, and may not be the worse for a little cautioning, and a few gentle stripes.

These Neo-ecclesiasts, whom we purpose to speak of hereafter as our "half brethren," their sects and adherents err both negatively and positively, alike in what they reject and what they assume; in excessive use of type and figure, and in treating every thing they do not, or will not understand,—or are tired of understanding, because others understand it as well as themselves,—or having once begun not to understand, will take no pains properly to re-understand,—or do not, or will not like, as an allegory. But an allegory, unless proving itself with the force of an axiom, or presented to us by an authority we are bound to accept, is but as an over varnished picture, gay and glittering, but changing in the light at every new slant of view; you cannot make out the subject for the sheen.

So much, however, of the teaching of the Old Testament especially, is communicated to us by this method, that we cannot wholly discard it, without risk of losing instruction.

We derive it indeed from the Scriptures themselves; but we should, for that very reason, be the more careful not to make it an occasion for extravagance, however great and subtle the temptation may be: and it does carry such a temptation with it always; because it begins to act just where knowledge ends, and has nothing left to work with, but the ever restless imagination, which if not "evil continually," has always very secular tendencies, and without direction assuredly divine, whatever conclusion we may arrive at, it can never take rank as Gospel Truth.

Are we sure that we should have fully apprehended the parable of the Sower and the Seed, if our Lord had not himself vouchsafed the interpretation? Do we certainly understand that of the Unjust Steward? We know what an ill use is often made of it; for my own part, I have heard so many diverse explanations of it from accomplished and most determined preachers, that, as almost in private duty bound, I still waver from one sermon to another on the point.

The type is often some reality, divinely presented to us; but the interpretation and application of it are not seldom

entirely our own ; we should be careful therefore at all times not to force the type ; there should be no unauthorised departure from it. We will take one case in which both are alike clear.

There is no more perfect type of the thing signified, that is of the great sacrifice of the Cross, nor one with a little fairness and attention more easily read, than that of Abraham offering up Isaac. The great Patriarch, whom it eases the minds of some to represent as a sort of Arab Sheikh of the Nomad Lackland order, with all proper sheikh-like propensities, in times when no Arab was, had long before received the Promise, and dwelt upon it in his thoughts continually, and throughout had been found faithful and obedient in all things ; but he had not yet been proved to the full extent of what might be justly required of one who was to be so highly privileged. We refer here to the account given of the circumstance in GENESIS, c. 22, and the notes thereon in the Speaker's Commentary—"v. 1. And it came to pass after these things, that God did tempt Abraham, and said unto him, Abraham : and he said, Behold here I am.—2. And he said, Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah ; and offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of.—3. And Abraham arose early in the morning, and saddled his ass, and took two of his young men with him, and Isaac his son, and clave the wood for the burnt offering, and rose up, and went unto the place of which God had told him.—4. Then on the third day Abraham lifted up his eyes, and saw the place afar off.—5. And Abraham said unto his young men, Abide ye here with the ass ; and I and the lad will go yonder and worship, and come again to you.—6. And Abraham took the wood of the burnt offering, and laid it upon Isaac his son ; and he took the fire in his hand and a knife, and they went both of them together
15. And the angel of the Lord called unto Abraham the second time.—16. And said, By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, for because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son ;—17. That in blessing I will bless thee, and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed as the

stars of the heaven, and as the sand which is upon the sea shore ; and thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies.—18. And in thy seed shall all the nations be blessed ; because thou hast obeyed my voice.”

Now it is to be observed here, that, as may be collected from the rising “early in the morning” (literally the dawn) and at once preparing the wood and requisites for a sacrifice, Abraham’s obedience was perfect, unhesitating, without a murmur or thought of rebellion, and that, so far as aught earthly may be mentioned with aught heavenly, he gave his son of the Promise as freely as God afterwards gave His own. It is to be observed also, and it should be always borne in mind, for it is clearly to be inferred from the words in the text, “because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son,” and “because thou hast obeyed my voice,” that upon this one act of obedience depended the destiny of the whole race of mankind ; had Abraham failed in the trial, the inheritance of the Promise would have been broken ; there would have been in effect a second and irretrievable fall of man.

It is vain and insincere to seek to lessen the greatness of Abraham. “False religions arise and spread by degrees ; the law given to the Jew arose all at once by the word of God as did the material world.” *Cesri ubi supra*. We cannot measure this act of Abraham by anything in the whole history of man. He was tried beyond all other men, because he was to be privileged beyond all other men ; and if he had failed, we should have looked in vain for a greater than he to whom a like trial and equal privileges might be accorded, or who might be able to sustain them. We have had neither promise nor encouragement to hope for such a thing.

There is more in the case than the mere outward act of killing his son. That he could not have withstood. The command was not simply to slay his son, but to “take and offer him up for a burnt offering” ; and such an act requires a full will in him who offers it, and unless Abraham had obeyed inwardly and thoroughly with a true and perfect heart, the offering could not have been acceptable nor the rite efficacious, and he would have killed his son in vain. Had he fallen

short of these great requirements, all had been lost, for he was put to trial of the faith that was in him, whether he, the greatest and most highly privileged of men, was, with the measure of grace to that time accorded to him, a fit recipient of the crowning one of all.

So entire was Abraham's obedience, that from the instant of his receiving the command, Isaac whom he had thus determined to slay, was to him and the world virtually dead; and this being premised, we find that on the third day the two arrived at Mount Moriah, the very scene, it is commonly believed, of the Crucifixion in after time; that Abraham then laid the wood for the burnt offering on the unresisting Isaac, who thus carried the instruments of his own sacrifice, as Christ afterwards bore his own Cross; that himself bound and placed his son on the Altar, and had raised the knife to slay him, when his hand was stayed by the angel, and Isaac, thus virtually dead, was on the third day restored to life.

But the act, the most momentous one on earth down to that time since the Fall, would have been incomplete and unsacramental without an offering. It should be borne in mind, what a sacrifice offered by so faithful a servant as Abraham implied; that it was of Divine institution, that it was, and in this instance especially so, the precursor and type of that of the Cross; that there was in it both an outward sign and an inward grace, and with it always a true spiritual presence of Him to whom it was offered, and of Him who in type was offered. So righteous a man, in the Scriptural sense of the word, as Abraham, could not have prepared the altar and initiated the rite, only to turn from it, and leave it unperformed. The thought of such a thing would have been a grief and a dismay to him for ever. A sacrifice therefore was requisite, and one, namely, the ram caught in the thicket, the figure here of the mortality of the restored Isaac, was provided, as also was the natural body of Christ afterwards, by God Himself, and accepted in his stead.

We claim here from all, an admission that the outward visible circumstances of this transaction as related in Genesis, not one of them being irrelevant, show a perfect correspondence between the symbol and the thing symbolised; between the

offering up of Isaac and the sacrifice of the Cross ; and from those who feel that it may concern them, a confession that He who was sacrificed on the Cross, "truly was the Son of God."

But Abraham of whom the account is given, was as much a real personage as Marcus Aurelius, or any other antagonistic celebrity in the Pagan Temple of Honour ; nor can the relative antiquity of the record, viewed from its proper standpoint, that is, from the date of the crucifixion so many centuries afterwards, possibly be disputed ; the writer, whoever he may have been, we nothing doubt ourselves, could not have foreknown the crucifixion, or foreseen any of its circumstances. But apart from this consideration, the narrative in Genesis bears the strongest marks of plenary, even verbal, inspiration. The story of Joseph and his brethren, one of deep human interest, but comprising in itself but little either of miracle or doctrine, is told with much literary skill, several incidents being introduced merely, as it would seem, to heighten the interest ; but in this account of Abraham and Isaac, there is not a superfluous word, nor one that could have been omitted without damage to the effect intended. The words of the command, "take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou lovest," may indeed at first sight bear something of the appearance of a rhetorical artifice ; but they were requisite to the occasion, to the completeness of the type, for He who was thereafter to be sacrificed on the Cross was also "a son, an only son, and a beloved son" ; and Isaac too was to be offered up by Abraham as the chief and most costly of his possessions, not as a chastisement for any offence, which he might lawfully seek to avert by contrition and prayer, but freely as an act and pledge of his entire devotion and obedience in all things.

Again, the words of Abraham when ascending the hill with Isaac, (and so touchingly brought out by the artless inquiry of the latter), "My son, God will provide himself a sacrifice ;" not untrue in a natural sense, were also an unconscious prophecy, instinct with doctrinal meaning of the deepest import ; and further, it was requisite to show not only the obedience of Abraham, but that Isaac also was willing to

be offered, as Christ also was willing; and without this the type would have been incomplete.

The entire narrative is given with all the severe conciseness proper to the subject; as if the writer, not himself fully enlightened as to the entire import of the deed, were by force of direct inspiration, taken out of himself, and compelled to set down word for word as dictated by the Spirit. Had he been under less than such plenary inspiration, he would hardly have refrained from some natural tribute in his own language and style, to the greatness of the occasion even as he himself apprehended it. But it was needless, and he was restrained. The words of Him who said, "I am the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob," far transcend all human eulogy of these three men. Fret as we may, there are but two sure proofs of the immortality of the soul; the words just quoted, and the declarations and promises of Christ. He who rejects these, is in bonds to reason itself in bonds to the will, and gild them as he may they are still bonds.

We have then here, the type and the reality in such close and minute correspondence, and so avouched, that we cannot, or need not wander far. But then we seek to know how such a sacrifice came to be required, and we trace back the earlier pages, until we come to the third chapter of Genesis; and then there is an uproar. We seem to be deserted by all our friends, all indeed except the smiling philosopher, who hastens with the most civil air of triumph imaginable, to re-assure us of his high consideration, and to tell us, that he sees no exceptional difficulty in the matter, and that he is quite ready and willing to accept word for word what he finds there; but that he confesses to some slight hesitation about the first step, and that if we can but refer him to a single instance, however slight, of an interference with the ordinary course of nature that cannot be accounted for, he will readily concede this, and any thing else we may require of him.

But we need not any such re-assurance, and do not in the least regard such uproar.

The question is properly a domestic one, that is to say, one that concerns only those who accept the Scriptures generally. To the pure Deist we say, that his God is an uncareful, irreli-

gious, (for there are two parties, the worshipper and the worshipped, in all religions) unaccomplishing, tired out, dumb Almighty, fettered by material chains which may or not be of his own forging; ours, a free Almighty, ruling and disposing all things, both in the moral and visible world, now as in the beginning, eternally, by and to His own good will and purpose, and that He will only reveal of Himself to us that which He will reveal, and that we accept what He has so revealed as a gift, and seek to know no more until His own good time, and can but wonder at the hardness which, stumbling by accident on a God of outward Nature, resists a word so clearly spoken, not in the Scriptures only, but in the inward consciousness of every man that breathes.

The materialist we would assure in our turn that we take his argumentative smile in very good part, but are not so simple as to accept from him a false issue. We know that the question between him and ourselves is not to be disposed of by a text, the truth and authenticity of which he wholly disputes; nor does our proof lie very much in the direction of external evidences. But we look to make good to him the position with which we originally started, that there was from the first, a high and worthy purpose in creation; that this, so far as ourselves are concerned, was at first centred in one man Adam, broken through him and restored in Christ, and now again advancing through Him; and that in furtherance of that purpose, there has always been a continued manifestation and direct interference, visible and invisible, nor less so now with each one of us every moment that flies, than in the times of the signs and wonders of the Scriptures, of a Personal Ruler and Governor to and with man, tending to that purpose, which has never intermitted from the beginning to this very day; and when this has been done, and it really takes very little to do it, if he will but look up from what he calls and takes for molecules for a few minutes, we doubt not, that as by a happy turn of his prism his severed colours re-unite and blend in one single ray of clear white, he will gladly rise to our enlarged views, and turn, not to the reasoning Deist, whom he will always find somewhere round the corner picking himself up after a tumble, but to us and

our Scriptures, be they ten times as unhistorical in some parts as they are now said to be.

Of the conflicting views taken by believers of the account of the Temptation and Fall given in Genesis, there seems no end. They are mostly too familiar to be here specially referred to, but erroneous as all but one of them must necessarily be, inasmuch as they all, or such of them at least as are of any mark, agree in the one great vital truth of an objective tempter and a fall through disobedience, we need be the less careful to press its acceptance quite literally, or in the strikingly dramatic form in which we find it. We think, however, that possibly a line may be indicated between the spiritual and natural portions of the narrative.

But first it is to be borne in mind, and this is rarely done as it should be, that if the relation be to us really obscure, it was intended to be so, and yet being such, was nevertheless given to us for our instruction as to all points on which it was desired that we should be instructed; and it is therefore not to be lightly tampered with, because it speaks also of mysteries beyond our entire comprehension. It relates an incident with a moral. The incident itself may be viewed in different lights, almost harmlessly and at pleasure; but the moral, that is to say, the temptation, the fall through disobedience, and promised restoration through the seed of the woman, underlying as they do the whole scheme of the later revelations, and presenting to us the key to their mysteries, is sacred and must be religiously maintained in all its integrity. For this we require, Adam, one man, the father of all mankind; Eve, one woman, "the mother of all living"; one act of disobedience, one penalty following directly upon that act, and one restoration; and with these an objective tempter. Beyond this, we are content to leave a rather wide margin, pretty well filled indeed by this time, for essays and reviews and such like; and indeed we propose to designate hereafter such things as we may consider suitable for such a margin as "marginal subjects."

The chief difficulty, with most people, of the account in Genesis seems to rest on the word "Nahasch" the "serpent"; who, and what was he?

We do not care to rely very much on secular archæology in a matter of this kind ; but there are many sufficiently obvious references to this Mosaic account of the Fall in Pagan history ; and amongst others in the sort of regard paid to serpents by ancient idolaters, and the use made of them in their religious solemnities—"There is something very remarkable and truly horrid in what Clemens Alexandrinus mentions in his *Protrept.* p. 9, that in the Orgies of Bacchus Mænoles (or the Mad) his worshippers were crowned with serpents, and yelled out Εὐῆ, Εὐῆ, even her by whom the transgression came, ἀνεστεμμένοι τοῖς ὄφεισιν ἐπολούζοντες Ἐναν Ἐναν, δι' ἣν ἡ πλάνη παρηκολούθησε." *Parkhurst's Hebrew Lexicon*, p. 442. It may be remembered too, that Demosthenes in his Speech for the Crown, reproaches Æschines for having when a youth led the Choruses of Bacchanals through the streets brandishing snakes (in his case doubtless imitations), over his head, and shouting Εὐοε Saboe,—τοὺς καλοὺς θιάσους ἄγων διὰ τῶν ὁδῶν τοὺς ὄφεις τοὺς Παρείας θλίβων καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς αἰωρων καὶ βοῶν Ἐνδι Σαβοῖ, s. 79.

On the other hand it is but fair to observe, that the practice of snake-charming and snake-handling may well be deemed to be one of extreme antiquity, and that nothing would be more likely to attract the gaze and admiration of the vulgar, than such an exhibition ; and it is also possible that the use of the word Εὐοε may hereafter be otherwise accounted for.

It would be idle to speculate on the state and conditions of our first parents before the Fall, or of the Paradisaical life generally. It is not that far higher one to which we are now invited and to which the elect will attain. It has always appeared to us that Milton has redeemed from tameness, and added a grace and dignity to his Eden, by the songs and visits of angels. We do not follow the philosophers in supposing, that the true Adam and Eve were the creeping things they would have them to be. We believe on authority, that Adam was created at once perfect in all his faculties, that he was never a child ; but if so, his mind must have been stored from the beginning, with all that various knowledge and wisdom which we acquire, and lose, and pervert, with so much labour

and perseverance through our long and troubled lives ; and further, this knowledge and wisdom must have been in Adam free from all those errors and prejudices which now so effectually darken all our councils and draw us away from the truth.

On this point we may observe that "Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field,"—"and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof," *Gen. c. 2, v. 20, 19*. We are bound to infer from this, that he had the gift of language from God, and that his knowledge and command of it was perfect, and that the names which he thus gave were not mere arbitrary sounds, but the most appropriate that could be devised.*

But further, he was not only thus mentally gifted, but his moral sense was clear ; he was innocent, and he was alone ; at first absolutely so, and he was certainly at times in direct sensible communion with God, or he could not have received his first command ; and it is even possible that such communions may have been ordinary events, or at least not uncommon. But God is a spirit, and neither sees nor speaks with human organs, and has never been seen by man at any time ; and when, for instance, he gave his first command to Adam, whether He vouchsafed any visible or sensible manifestation of His Divine Majesty and presence or not, it was to the spirit or soul of Adam, whether directly or through his senses, or intellect, or both, or neither, that He addressed it, on his spirit that He impressed it.

The Jews during the later years of their dispensation, when open vision and miraculous manifestations were becoming

* Learning is sometimes amusing, even where it is not very instructive. In the controversy respecting the antiquity of the Hebrew points, it is made a great question, whether the word קָרָא, a partridge, assumed to be one of the names given by Adam, should be pronounced according to Sharp, who objects to the points altogether, and has a theory of his own *quera*, or according to Masclef, who also objects to the points, and also has a theory of his own, *koura* or *kaura* ; or according to the Masoretic pointing, *koree*. The question is thus left to be determined by comparison with the native note of the bird, that is to say, by what the partridge says.

more and more rare, still possessed, or deemed that they possessed, the privilege of what they called the "Bath Kol," or "daughter of a voice." This was to them a Divine intimation, something possibly akin to the Urim and Thummim, conveyed direct to the spirit of the priest or prophet, without voice or other outward sign; as was perhaps the case with Caiaphas, on the occasion of his well-known prophecy which he perverted in uttering. But whatever we may think of the Jewish pretensions in this matter, it is this so-called "Bath Kol," which is the true voice or God communicating His will to man; and all else, whether it be the three men beheld by Abraham at Mamre, or the burning bush, or the lightnings of Sinai, or the shade going back on the dial of Ahaz, are all alike but visible signs or manifestations vouchsafed on each particular occasion.

With regard to the circumstances of the Fall, we may draw something from our own unhappy experiences, and even take a lesson from the air-drawn dagger of Macbeth. We know too well each one of us, how temptation visits and masters us by degrees; how seemingly innocent its first approaches; how gentle its first allurements, and by what specious devices we are first enticed, then urged, then hurried towards the forbidden thing; how we colour it in our fancy, and how that fancy grows; then with what quick logic we defend it, until we wilfully end all debate, and the last restraining link thus broken, rush forward, and are presently afraid for ever.

But we are not innocent, and there is now nothing in us that enables us to discern whether the evil thoughts so constantly working within us, spring from ourselves, or come to us from without, and the story of the Fall tells us what we could only partially know without it, that to the truly innocent mind, there is always an objective tempter, but one who may be resisted.

Well, but the Serpent? who and what was he? The Serpent that discoursed with Eve was certainly that objective Tempter, then first revealed to us, and so far the key to the

whole question. Beyond that we may count him if we will as one of the marginal subjects before mentioned.*

None of us have ever seen Satan at any time, but all have felt him. He is, we are taught, a personality, a spirit of evil with a permitted, but however great only qualified, power over us; and he first disclosed himself to Eve in the guise of a serpent. He cannot, as he once found to his shame, enter into a sinless soul. He must be unresisted or permitted, and to permit in his case is to welcome, but being once allowed to enter, he will rule. Suppose then Eve, who in her state of innocence could fear or be daunted at nothing, with this unseen spirit ever at watch beside her, to stand regarding the forbidden fruit (something if you will of a marginal subject, but here taken literally) with innocence, with admiration, with curiosity, and in the end with longing. You cannot in this natural process mark the point at which her thoughts began to be unlawful; but they did become so at last. Is it then so very extravagant or incredible to those who are not unwilling to accept what they call a reasonable miracle

* The words of the text, *Gen. c. 3, v. 1*: "Now the serpent was more subtle than (literally 'subtle beyond') all the beasts of the field which the Lord God had made," do not seem necessarily to imply, that the serpent which appeared to Eve was actually one of those beasts; but only that it, whatever it might have been, was more subtle than any created terrestrial beast. The natural serpent is not exceptionally subtle, nor are his needs such as to require that he should be so, and he falls an easy prey to his ordained enemies, and even to the soft and delicate Ibis. The root of the word "Nahasch," serpent, implies "quick-sighted," as in the Greek *δο*, *Δρακων*, from *δερκομαι*, and *Οφis* from *οφτομαι*. Some snakes have indeed one truly Satanic power, that namely of fascination; but this is possibly not confined to them. That the being which tempted Eve was not the natural serpent, we may collect from the denunciation at the close of the narrative, which if it has some partial propriety, as applied to the snake of the field, has far greater as declared against a spiritual tempter; for if he first tempted Eve, and in her mankind, to disobedience, by inducements which, whatever they were, must have been such as would not have at once revolted a mind up to that time pure and upright, he may not unfitly be described in his present work of corrupting ourselves through all our lower and bestial senses and appetites, as grovelling amid and sustaining himself on dust and ashes. It need scarcely be added that the natural snake does not actually eat dust.

meaning perhaps something not too much of a miracle, that this evil spirit thus on the watch, should at such a time have presented himself to the wavering Eve in some objective form, whether real or in vision only, and whether as a natural serpent or in the likeness of one, and whether with a voice, or a seeming one?

In either view, whether we accept the action as presented in a vision or as a physical reality, the mysterious denunciation of the serpent is unaffected; for he affords to us the type of the tempter and his doom, as much in the one case as in the other. The natural serpent never sinned; but neither is he, though debased through the act of man to serve as a type for his instruction, harmed by the shadow of penalty laid upon him; for his condition is not worse than that of many other creatures; and venomous, and the hate (*μίσος*) of man and all living, as he is, he yet possesses all the enjoyments proper to the brute creation, and is under and provided for by an equal providence.

But who and what was the spiritual serpent? He is said to have been subtle; and the word is evidently used in a bad sense; then he must have been already an offender, and cast out from God's favour, and his previous doom or condition, whatever it may have been, was sensibly aggravated to him for his act in tempting Eve; but that further doom was one springing from the added offence; to wit, that he who beguiled the mother of all living to sin, should in the end be crushed by her seed: and of this his coming doom, we may fairly deem that he has now a foretaste in every soul that is saved from his power.

It is objected, that if the earth was cursed to man for his transgression, it was at the same time cursed to all creatures living on it; and that if by that came sin and death to disobedient man, by that also came pain and death to the obedient and unoffending brutes. The position that disturbance in the spiritual world necessitates the like in the natural one, has been handled by far better and abler men. It is indeed only a branch of the great question of the origin of evil and death in our own case; who did not create ourselves, and had no choice, but to be born; but we may perhaps be allowed here to refer

very shortly to what we have before suggested, that the Creator being minded to establish a world of intelligent, sinless, and happy beings, it is conceivable as consistent with Divine justice and mercy, that none should be admitted into that world without some previous trial of faith and obedience, such trial being in every case tempered by the Creator's ever watchful care, goodness and providence ; and it is further conceivable, that except upon such conditions, creation could not have been, and that the universe might have remained a blank. The earth was thus appointed for the place of man's trial, and, most earnestly protesting against being supposed to limit the Creator's power to have made it wholly different from what it is, had such been His will, it is certain that we ourselves, with our limited faculties, cannot feign or conceive it as aught different from what it is, or assign to it any form which it does not already possess : and here, to us, the question ends, from sheer want of ideas. There is a moral indeed, that all this disturbance is of our own causing, and one for which we must account ; and there is yet another that should come home to all, that is to say, that we should be merciful ; but merciful even to ourselves, we will not be.

Man created innocent could not become outcast by degrees ; it must have been with him, Paradise, or earth cursed for his sake. We do not well see what article of the Decalogue Adam could at first have broken, or how he could have become vicious, or sensual all at once. In effect, he was under no moral law, because he was under no temptation. He was under but one prohibition, and that apparently a slight one, and designed for his trial, and he disobeyed it, wilfully, that is, from his heart, that is, as much as he could, and was innocent no longer ; and the sin and sting of the act were in his rebellious will.

We do not find very frequent references to the particulars of the Fall as given in Genesis, in the later Scriptures ; but the fall through Adam, and the restitution through the seed of the woman, are asserted and maintained as matters of faith throughout.

We have then in this account, the man, the woman, a tempter, the fall and the promise, all plainly designated. We

then naturally look for the performance of this promise, and come presently to Abraham, the seed of the woman, but not the promised seed ; and to him chosen out of all mankind, the promise is repeated. But it is one and the same promise that was made to Adam, and the call of Abraham, the first direct step towards the performance of the promise, connects the two actions and the two men inseparably.

But at this point our "half brethren" are put forward by unstable thinkers of all denominations to maintain, upon the principle of once impossible always impossible, that the whole story is an allegory, and Adam especially, a myth, and the name itself a noun of multitude, used to indicate a people, or race of men, or of manlike, or unmanlike beings, who played their parts, and made arrow heads and the like, of flints of amorphous cleavage, and so passed off the scene in the grand prehistoric times, and some of whom have left their skeletons behind them, which are now turning up in so many directions around us.

But this position can never be held by those who truly accept the Scriptures. When the promise was made to Adam, the condition of man for all time was declared. To Abraham this promise was confirmed with greater particularity. The promise to Adam would through grace descend to his issue, that is, to all mankind ; that to Abraham, first to his issue, and then through them by express declaration to all mankind. How then, if, as is certain, Abraham was one man, could Adam be other than one man? What health can there be in a teaching that thus discards the very beginning of all mercies? If the promise were not first made of free grace to Adam, the first offender, by what merits in his afterborn issue was it won? Did grace, eternal in the Eternal, sleep? And when did Christ first decree to take the manhood into Himself? But we had forgotten ; "you, our half brethren, have taken away the Lord and we know not where you have laid Him." You know only one person in one Jehovah. You have gone a little astray ; but you have not fallen and have no Christ. You who would allegorise this plain statement in Genesis, see what you would lose, what throw away.

We have been more especially drawn to this point by the

strange confusion in many minds between type and allegory. A type, in brief, is a thing perceived bearing a definable analogy to a thing unperceived. An allegory is altogether unreal, and has no authority but what it derived from the character, or reasoning of him who propounds it. Yet in one thing our half brethren have said almost well, *pene nostra dixerunt*, only they have spoilt it a little in the telling. In their "Articles of Faith, adopted by General Conference and recognised as a Standard of Doctrine by the whole Body," Article 5 runs thus—"Man is not life, but the recipient of life," (that is, we presume, of "the breath of life by which man became a living soul,") "from the Creator, which life is communicated by influx to all in the spiritual world, whether belonging to heaven, or to hell," (before disobedience was no hell) "and to all in the natural world, but is received differently by every one, according to his quality and state of reception."

They should have said, that the entire universe of mind and matter, including the separate individual consciousness and will of every living being, exists wholly in and by the eternal mind and will of the Creator; by Him moulded and imparted respectively.

We repeat here a little of what has been said before, from a fear that we may have been obscure, and to carry it, as we think safely, a step or two further.

We know that we possess the faculty of will from experience, because we feel and exercise it every moment of our waking lives; but we soon perceive that it is partly, not wholly (we are speaking now only of what we perceive) swayed by surrounding circumstances. These as they regard broad external life, are easily read; we desire what pleases, and will to obtain it; and so far is neither sense nor thought of duty. But we soon become conscious that there is another will within us in conflict with this natural one; and we know that this other will is not our own will, because we first become aware of it by its conflicting with and reproving our own natural one, and by an irresistible consciousness within us; but if it be not our own it must be that of some higher Power, be that Power what it may, that visits and works within us for a purpose, which pur-

pose is sufficiently discernible by us from the direction and mode of action of this new objective will. Good consequences follow good actions, because, and only because, such is the will, or law of that same Power, the first cause of all life, the creating and disposing Force of all things from the beginning. In fine, morality with its consequences is to us as much a phenomenon in the spiritual world as gravitation with its incidents is in the material one, because springing from and always abiding in this one unchallengeable Force, the Author of all phenomena, whose disposition, or will is law. If that Force has a will to good, it must be a perfect will to it, rejecting all evil; if it has no such will, there is no good, and morality is neither good nor bad. But good and the disposition to good being by general consent, (we take no account here of extreme thinkers) necessary attributes of that Force, have always been, dimly it may be, but still in some degree discernible by us, even before that Force avowing its Personality openly and plainly declared it; and from this dim perception came insensibly all that is good in Pagan and Sceptical morality. But without the guidance of this creative and disposing Force, no scheme of morality has either light or life, or is in rank and value very much more than a tentative code of civil law.

We have often been referred to the light of nature for guidance; so have the brutes, and they go by it. We are now referred to that of reason: he is a poor reasoner not worth his salt who cannot on occasion prove that black is white.

In sum, it is only when we give our thoughts singly and worthily to the contemplation of this Force that we learn the eternal nature of morality, of righteousness and holiness, and thereby become fitted to receive the full and express assurance of our own immortality, until which assurance all in the spiritual world is to us still "without form and void." Without earnestness and preparation leading to a sacrifice of our own will, even the gospel must fall dead, and will but multiply transgression.

We are in a state of trial ordained for us from the beginning, but the terms and conditions of that trial are proposed and

tempered by the Creator himself, who, if ever at any single time merciful, must from the essential entirety of His nature be so at all times and in all things.

Without first undergoing some trial of faith and obedience, possibly no created being could ever become perfect. He might want the true spirit needful for perseverance in good, and remain for ever unproved. He might be innocent, but not holy ; and could look for no advance in privileges.

How we shall speed in our own trial, in the great strife between right and wrong, is known to God only. Our fall through Adam was foreknown by Him, and if foreknown, then, so far as we are by reason capable of apprehending the question, predestined ; and then, this word is converted into a railing accusation against Him.

Be it that the fall and its consequences were foreknown, and, if you will, predestined, we have been re-habilitated by means equally known and predestined, that is, by the atoning sacrifice of the Cross, by which the necessity, the moral cause and effect necessity of death for sin, has been arrested, and we have again hope of being freed from sin and its penalties, and if from sin, then also from all further temptation and trial, the true rest and "glorious liberty" promised in the Scriptures : and if any thing has been predestined, that has been predestined.

The thought must come to all. We are never alone. If there be truly a moral Governor of the world, He rules and governs, and is present with us now, at this moment, in the very spot on which each of us is standing, now and for ever, through all time and in eternity ; nor more at one instant than another ; and knowing this we have not done His will, and do not intend to do it ; relying some of us on the fulness of the Atonement, and its sufficiency to save us though we will not to be saved ; and some of us on the Divine Mercy in the abstract. But this mercy though it endure for ever, is not weakness, but has its own laws. For a space the promised Spirit is still on earth with offers of grace to all. But this will not be so

always. The Spirit will not strive with any man for ever, and he who will not accept Him now while time is, must even accept himself, and remain in bondage to his own will for ever. The philosopher indeed tells us, and he is never tired of telling us, that his intellect is, or soon will be, so bright and clear, that he will by that alone so order the course of his life, that the natural will we would make so much of shall have little or nothing to do with it. But that he can never do, unless he can make water run up hill ; for the will is always at work ; the intellect only when applied, and it is the will that applies it ; and the will has always its idols, and whether he parade them, or, like Rachel of old, hide them in the camel's furniture out of sight for a time, they are the same idols still, and unless broken up and destroyed so that their places shall know them no more, will in the end break up and destroy everything else.

When will the teacher bend to learn from the pupil that, come when it will, nothing, but by our own default, comes untimely ?

Who that has sorrowed o'er the dust
Of youth cut down in ripening bloom,
But felt a trembling in his trust
That Love directs the strokes of doom ?

Yet if pure heart and well-train'd mind
Can raise us from th' entombing sod,
To Truths the wisest of mankind
Have clutch'd in climbing up to God ;

Then this true brother, this true son,
This gifted student—tried, yet brave—
Must ever be to us as one
That has filled no untimely grave.*

JOHN STAFFORD SPENCER.

* *Charles Power Ciark*, late first Assistant Master at Archbishop Sumner's Memorial Schools, St. Philip's, Kennington : a youth of great attainments and love for his work : died September 15, 1877, at the early age of 21, after suffering an amputation at the hip-joint of the leg, diseased by a blow from a cricket-ball. Just before leaving home, to become a patient in one of the London Hospitals, he seated himself at

But the philosopher is out in the cold all this time, and has as usual something to say ; and he says it with his eyes half closed, easily, airily, graciously smiling at every full stop, or at least at every very full stop ; and it is like a pleasant twittering air, or say Gounod's Funeral March of Marionettes, played on the piano. One of their company has departed this show, and is to be returned to his native bran ; and the poor things have got up a funeral procession, and a nice little tinkling pit-a-pat march or dirge to do him honour ; but they take refreshment by the way, and get chatting, and then arguing, and then quarrelling, and then the police ; but at last they make it up again, and go on with their dirge, ending as they began ; and here it is——“ Ah ! well a day ! *αἰλινον αἰλινον εἶπε* here to-day, and there to-morrow—yes, just so—well I hardly know, that is to say—no certainly not, quite the reverse ; because by conservation of energy, that which is, always has been, and always will be, and conversely, that which is not, never has been, and never will be ; and perception is through the action of one or more molecules ; and likes go to likes, or there is no true allegory ; therefore that which perceives is also one or more molecules ; and every cause telescopes into its effect, and then the two unite and go backwards and forwards by the law of action and reaction, and round and round by that of the conservation of energies, and so become together a new cause ; therefore all causes are infinite, because they are always coming and going ; but that which is infinite, has neither beginning nor ending ; and ‘the first of all cause’ must be somewhere between extremes ; but it has been shown that there are no extremes, therefore there is no first cause ; and as aforesaid, causes produce effects, and effects produce circumstances, and circumstances produce likes and

the piano, and smilingly played to his mother one of her favourite airs. It was afterwards found that he had inserted in the leaves of the Family Bible, a list of the friends to whom, with a sad but mute foreboding, he wished his portrait to be sent. After his death, numerous First-Class Certificates and Queen's Prizes were received by his parents, attesting his success at his last examinations.—J. S. S.

dislikes, and likes and dislikes produce will ; but effects and circumstances must be as they must be, and therefore the will must be as it must be, therefore there is no potential mood, either in grammar or anywhere else, and no will, and when there shall come among us one who, far above ' the monstrous Superstition,' shall be able by mere force of reasoning on these causes and effects, to trace all things to their natural and unavoidable results, we shall be able to predict all future events, and by looking through an egg-shell, to learn what the present and all future generations of yolks, will say and do when they come to be men and women ; and so die with enlarged understandings and no small self-respect—well perhaps—that is as it were—but however—now then—Ah, well away, *αἰλινον αἰλινον εἶπε, τοδ εὐ νικατω.* Here to day, and there to-morrow, we shall never hear poor Spangles argue again."

We may next find the philosopher rather curiously at issue with our half brethren, on a point on which the latter, only small-parcel right have much the best of it.

Accepting with our half brethren to the extent above indicated, the position of their 5th article, that we are recipients of life, *p. 20, supra*, or that a life or spirit of life has been breathed into us, we have never been careful to dispute that this spirit of life in us, must have form, and if form, then a body or individual concrete of some kind, without which, except in the case of the Eternal filling the entire universe, we are unable to conceive the idea of a separate personality. But neither do we see the incongruity of speaking of a spiritual body, nor in so speaking, do we consider that we in the least detract from our belief in the resurrection of the body, within the line of teaching of our church ; for though we know that we shall rise again, that of us which will so rise is not the native dust which we have so often seen with our own eyes returned to the general earth from which it came, but that unseen imperishable germ of life, which was born with every one of us, and which, carrying with it always its own consciousness, unbroken and unimpaired, will be changed only in this, that it will part with all of it that is corruptible,

to receive in its place what under far better and more glorious conditions will endure for ever.

In our belief, this change of the corruptible into the incorruptible has been seen by mortal eyes; for He who was received into Heaven, that is into the invisible world, in the sight of men, must have been so changed in the very act of disappearing.

A future state of happiness is a gift promised to us under conditions; and our only title to it is an earnest, perfect, abiding faith, leading to the due performance of these conditions; and it is idle, because beyond our powers, and presumptuous, because forbidden, to seek to know what He who gave the promise, has not only not disclosed, but declared that He will not disclose, until its fulfilment.

To this faith philosophy has rarely sought to guide us; it has indeed, devised a sort of morality of its own, and then, finding that there is undeniably such a thing as religious feeling, has thought to accommodate matters to itself, by seeking to distinguish it as "emotional morality," by which we may suppose is meant aggravated morality. But surely of all conceits that have ever started up in favour of rashly foregone conclusions, this is at once the tamest and most whimsical. The religious feeling is moral, because its seat is in the moral sense as defined above; and it is emotional in the highest degree from its object; but it is a shallow truism distinguishing nothing to call it emotional morality. The spirit of chivalry, the point of honour, the tragic sentiment, the feeling of pity, the natural affections, are all emotional, and all moral, but differing in objects, differ both in character and degree.

To our half brethren we would say a few words presently, in deprecation of the sort of argumentative Paradise, to which perhaps unconsciously, they would take us.

Φευ. Κνισμου μεν ἐκ τουδ' ἀντιχειροιν ὥς δοκῇ
Φαυλον τι καὶ πονηρον ὠδ' εἰσερχεται.

Certain of the present day, accepting or inclining to the

view, that sense, thought and will, are the effects of the motions among themselves of certain molecules,—of which our organisms are by them thought to be composed, have brought matters, as regards themselves, to a very convenient deadlock. In their own carefully selected words, —“ the finest spiritual sensibility is a function of a living organism, is in relation to molecular facts—and the problem is to discover what these molecular facts are, and whether the relation between them and the said spiritual sensibility, is one of antecedence in the molecular fact and sequence in the spiritual fact, or *vice versa*.”

We who fail to discover and have never been shown any force in creation not directed by mind, are unaffected by this awful looking swinging door of a problem, and are content to look on and admire without surprise the well contrived failures of its inventors to solve it. But what if there be neither antecedence nor sequence in the matter? What if both facts be the continuing work of a Creator who made them one, so that in our present state neither of them can be or act without the other, and so that in the question as stated above, what may be truly said of the one, must always with equal truth be said of the other? In so entire and perfect a union as we perceive to exist, can it be otherwise?

In our view there is no dividing line by any means discernible by us, between these so-called spiritual and molecular facts, each being inseparably blended for the present, proceeding from and always resting on the same one creating mind. In our living organism it is one and the same indivisible creature that moves and breathes, and that thinks and feels, and together with the entire universe both of mind and matter, is wholly subjective in the Divine Being, now and for ever; and what are commonly accepted as second causes, are not really causes at all, but only successive phenomena, displaying the continuous working of that, which we call the First, but which is in truth the sole and ever acting cause of every created thing in Heaven and earth. That which created, alone sustains and governs; and since that cause is, as we at least infer

from His works, a Personality, perfect in wisdom and power, the result is that excellent order which we all perceive around us. This order, from its perfect and undeviating regularity, is thus the ground work of all our sciences, beginning as they all do with observation, and D.V. would be a proper heading to all our scientific writings, and would only seem absurd to prepared or idiosyncratic minds. Thus, we speak of gravitation as a law or property of matter, which is well enough and allowable in popular usage, because wherever we find matter we perceive that it is under this seeming law, or possesses this seeming property ; but it is incorrect, and unless we keep the qualification above mentioned well in mind, misleading to say so ; because matter has neither being, law, nor property, except in and by the present immediate will and sustaining act of the Creator ; but what seem to us to be such laws or properties, we pronounce to be so, because of their perfect and never-failing regularity ; and they are thus regular, because the wisdom of the Creator is perfect, and can never be at fault, or need either aid or amendment. The centrifugal and centripetal forces by which the planets are maintained in their orbits, are seated, not in the planets themselves, but in the hand that wields and the mind that directs them, now and every instant that passes, as they have done from the beginning.

This is in part a repetition of what we have said before ; but it could not be helped ; for the antagonist position we have quoted is itself only a repetition, the *refrain* in a modern dialect of a very old song, another throb of the same old philosophical ague. Except in natural science, this Nineteenth Century is by no means the inventive infant prodigy it is by some taken to be.

We can conceive no form of which we have not some experience, any more than we can a new sense, Suppose that, like our alchymist formerly quoted, a very famous person in bygone times,

We had first matter seen alone,
Before one rag of form was on ;

and had never seen anything else, we should be utterly unable to give it any form at all. If we had never witnessed motion, or unless we had the idea of it conveyed to our minds by some objective means, we should never conceive such a thing. In like manner, we are unable to conceive life or thought existing without some individual organism or concrete to support it. There may be such a thing, but we cannot conceive it ; that is, we cannot give it form ; and we confess as much in adopting the expression "spiritual body" ; in doing which we anthropomorphise, that is, materialise spirit, without altogether losing the several distinctive ideas.

In our own natural personalities, we certainly do recognise a spiritual sensibility and a living organism, which you in your high-flying ambitious phraseology, call "spiritual and molecular facts" ; we in our tamer vernacular, soul and body ; and we do also observe generally, we are not quite prepared to say universally, a strong and very intimate functional relation between them ; that is to say, when the spiritual fact (we are adopting here your own nomenclature) is in action, there is some corresponding movement in the molecular fact.

Now, we perfectly see, and cheerfully accept your consequence, that, if the molecular fact be a real and not a Berkeleian entity, and its action antecedent to that of the spiritual one, the latter must also be molecular and material ; but we do not so easily follow the process by which you arrive or would arrive at this consequence, or at the conclusion that the molecular fact has or can have this antecedence ; and indeed we rather suspect that you do not really look to arrive at that or any other conclusion, but only throw out your question as a kind of "stop short" in a maze, to enable you to philosophize more at large and with greater ease in other directions.

You do but say after all, that our natural perceptions lead to your conclusion ; that when the spirit thinks, the brain works ; when the body languishes, the spirit grieves ; and so on in many other imaginable instances. But our perceptions here are neutral, and as above noticed, give

no sign on one side of the question, which they do not immediately repeat on the other. The doubt arises entirely from the apparent perfect connection of mind and matter, and the more this is enquired into, the more perfect appears this connection, and then, strange to say, the stronger your doubt. On our part, we appeal to percepts generally, whether their perceptions on this subject can be otherwise than the same, whether the spiritual fact is to be considered as springing entirely from the molecular one, or as something wholly distinct from or imparted and for the present inseparably united to the body.

But the truth is, that you know quite well that in the question as stated by you, there is always an element unknown, and that it cannot be answered in your own set terms, your challenge cannot be met on your own picked ground, but must be dealt with elsewhere; and you only seek to triumph now by what you look upon as a full-blown doubt. But it is your doubt, not ours. You must get on. No one doubts here; the pace is too good. Even the weather-cock does not doubt; he only changes his opinion; and your doubt is only the turn of the sentinel at his post, pacing over the same ground, looking into the dark, seeing and crying, Who goes there? to nothing.

If you will not be taught by us, learn by the rule of contrary of your brother philosopher, the continuous brake of all knowledge, the brilliant dissembler, the Gnostic in his new cap, the know-all Agnostic: hear what he says, and take it in his own words—"I do not say you are wrong, I cannot say you are right. The fact is, I am very fond of these questions, and never get tired of them, and understand them better than most men; but the subjects are altogether beyond the reach of my knowledge, and I receive different accounts of them from different quarters. The South Sea Islanders, the Brahmins, and the Budhists, some of whom I am told are virtually as good Christians as yourselves, and in some things better informed, each tell me one thing, and your church-

men another ; and as to the former, whether I accept what they tell me or not, there is nobody much knows, and nobody much cares ; but as to what your churchmen say, it does seem a little material, if true ; but then that is not to the point, or rather that is my own affair ; and as I know nothing myself, and cannot accept what both sides tell me, I do not see how I can accept what either of them says ; for put the case thus—given a ballot-box with a ball in it, and A tells me that the ball is on the ‘yes’ side, and B, that it is on the ‘no’ side ; and both of them are equally credible, or what is the same thing, both equally incredible, that is to say, neither of them has ever spoken the truth in the whole course of his life, and upon the principle of ‘*quod semper, quod ubique, quod in omnibus*,’ neither of them ever can speak the truth, and both of them must be always disbelieved ; but I cannot disbelieve both in this case, because I cannot disbelieve one without believing the other ; therefore the ball is either on both sides or neither of them ; which is impossible ; therefore the ball is not there at all ; but, by the hypothesis, the ball is there, and so I am shut up every way, and thus I, who was once a Gnostic or something of the sort, and made what I did know stand for what I did not know, am now an Agnostic, and make what I do know stand for what I do know, and what I do not know stand for anything or nothing as the case may be ; and being, as all agree, subtle to a proverb, or, as my detractors, in my opinion very injudiciously, say, to a fault, I think if I had been there, I could have tempted Eve quite as well, if not better than the serpent.”

So the philosopher ; but what says the Marionette before quoted on another point ?——“What am I ? and where do I come from ? and what makes me dance to the music in the way I do ? Some tell me that it is the lights, and some that it is the music, and some that it is both of them together ; but others tell me, that there is an unseen Director behind the scenes, who prepares and manages everything ; and so between them all, as I have not the faculty of judgment, for I am but a poor puppet of bran

and frippery, though vastly superior to all my fellows, I find in the end that I know nothing but what I choose to know ; and so for the present I decide : besides, I do not mind saying in confidence, that when I am performing my motions and gyrations, I am always sensible of certain string-pullings within me, and I never could make out whether I pull the strings or the strings pull me, that is to say, whether the motions and gyrations fact is in antecedence or sequence to the string-pulling fact, or *vice versa*, and so again for the present I decide."

Both the man and the Marionette are easily enough answered ; but the latter is perhaps the least excusable, because his brain is made of fine bran, warranted, and ought to be as good now as ever it was ; but as to the man—why, you nether millstone, you outside fold of a bale of linen in a shop window ; you show us a fine scroll of foil and tinsel, but your scroll is not saleable and moreover not meant for sale, and within all is a white blank. How should you know what even the angels do not fully know ? You are not required to know : you are asked to believe. You must believe something. He does but quibble who says he believes nothing. We have the reasoning faculties which produce belief, and when these faculties are set in action belief must come, weak, uncertain, variable, childish if you will, but still belief.

At the end of things created, or things existing, if the word "created" offend, is either eternity, that is, an eternal mind, or nothing. Each of these presents to us an idea beyond our full comprehension ; we cannot realise or frame either of them in our thoughts. Yet one of them must be. Which ? You do not know. Good. But the question has been argued before you ; and now again ; which ?—"The arguments have been equally balanced, and again I say, I do not know, and I can form no belief on the matter."—But that will not do now. You have been believing sometimes one thing and sometimes another all through the argument, and you are doing so now. You are always believing something, because you do not know everything. On the very question of Divine

Personality, you have scores of times half believed when you have wished quite to believe, and as often quite believed when you have wished not to believe ; and we think we can tell you why.

You have only half believed in the first case, because you have not thought worthily of your Creator, and have not truly sought Him. You have thought of Him only as a Being of power, as the designer and framer of the outward visible world, or as some or one of you, have or has, or would or might have expressed it, as a magnified Sir Christopher Wren ; and the argument from a design so limited, is, as we think we have already at your own desire, *optantibus ipsis*, shewn you, only plausible ; and you have wished to believe, partly because it is natural so to do, and partly because you have been attracted by the divine perfection and holiness of the very revelation which you reject. But the old prejudice of the green baize and laboratory is still strong within you, and thus you only view Him as a grand "Perhaps," or as a distant far off Power, with whom you may or may not, at your pleasure, conclude a treaty hereafter, when you have solved a few more problems, and have nothing better to do.

In the other case, you have believed against your will through fear and with dislike. The first assurance of God is the conviction of our unlikeness to Him, of sin in ourselves, and that is terrible. Your belief came upon you suddenly, and you were panic-struck. He was visiting you, and renewing His promises, but you saw nothing but His terrors, and warned Him off, as you might an untimely ghost. He may visit you thus again, and yet again, but not for ever ; it may have been His last offer, and you are almost lost.

There is nothing really new in any of your philosophies but the names. One of you traces out the development of man from a jelly ; and we, that is, some of us, follow him in this, because we see the jelly, the intermediate ape and the man ; and then another adds, that consciousness is only motion, and we, that is, some of us, do not see anything else, and are again content.

But then comes another, who having a soul above apes,

tells us of a "Philosophy of the Unconscious," based on the Natural History of Nothing ; that is to say ; there was once nothing, and there is now something ; and as this something cannot come from itself, it must come from nothing ; but nothing can come from nothing ; therefore nothing is something : and then he goes on to explain, that there is a force which is always projecting itself from nothing into something, and then from unconsciousness into consciousness, or life at large, and thence into life in various concretes ; and that it is a non-moral force, and therefore leads neither to Pessimism nor to Optimism, but to things as they are, which also accounts for all things, and gets rid of all questions, about good and evil, and their supposed antagonism : and to him, after our congratulations on his arrival at the conscious state in so happy a personal concrete, we first say, that there is nothing at all new in what he tells us, for it is only the missing first chapter of Mr. Darwin's next new work, and his copyright ; and then we repeat our original question of all, and ask him to show us his beginning : and he replies, that his beginning is as good as our beginning. But it is no such thing, for his world, both conscious and unconscious, enduring in time, must have begun in time ; but our beginning sprang fresh and at once out of eternity, at the will of an ever conscious Creator dwelling in eternity ; which eternity is not made up of times and of seasons, of days and of years, for these are only necessities of created things, and end with them. Time was requisite for an occasional purpose, that is, to enable created things that are seen, to work and have their being ; when these end, time under its present conditions will also end ; but eternity abides as before in the Divine Mind. Time is thus an unreality ; bounded by the actions of the things made subject to it ; and there may hereafter be another time for us under wholly different conditions. These conditions are far beyond the reach of our conceptions, but the position must be accepted by all who look for another life in another world, or who deem such a thing probable, or who at least do not deny it to be possible.

And here of necessity we part ; you on your side, protesting that it is out of all reason to ask you to believe in order

that you may believe ; we on ours, repeating, and, as we think, having shown, that although science and the reasoning powers may increase after their kinds indefinitely, neither they nor their issue or developments can ever guide to the one great spiritual truth of all, because they stand in no fixed relation to it. The devotional feeling that sometimes arises in the mind on the discovery through science of some new wonder in creation, does not proceed from the intellect, but the spirit is awakened by a whisper, and comes swiftly and happily to call ; and it is manifest that this is so, because, given equal intellects with unequal moral sensibilities, and the like action and circumstances, the feeling does not come alike to all ; to some never.

I remember one evening, now long ago, propounding a very dark and intricate-looking riddle to a group of ladies and others very enthusiastic in those matters, and having been accidentally called away to another part of the room, being horribly frightened on my return about an hour afterwards, at finding them all still excitedly and angrily puzzling at and tearing their minds to pieces about my riddle : the fact being that it was not a real riddle, only a little trick of my own ; there was no answer to it, and I could not invent one. The result was a lesson to me in all the *Clefs*, the treble something even to this day fearful to think of.

But is it not so with your Theories ? Do you not, under what you deem the inspiration of a happy thought, or of a quotation from Plato or Anaxagoras or Dionysius Periegetes, or Arouet L. J., or some other such notability, first construct your Theory, and then trust to the branch of Providence known among you as your own cleverness, to prove it ? And have or has you or any or either and which of you, ever in any, and what single instance, succeeded in doing so ? Then, why are you not frightened ? Will no lesson teach you ?

But then fairly enough, though tauntingly, you ask us for our proofs, and we point to yourselves, and ask in our turn, what you have done, and what you are now doing ; and the answer from the high minded among you is a regretful shrug, while from your small hangers on every side, we seem to hear again the flouts and mockings of the children of Bethel who were killed by bears.

But you must get on, and you do not get on, and you cannot get on; and we do not see why you, being in such a strait should be so greatly scandalized by what we offer you. We do not say as you do, "You believe in metaphysics, believe also in us," and then show nothing to believe in; but we present you with a scheme of theology or philosophy in the highest, which fully destroys and levels all the doubts and obstructions which have hitherto beset you; and the only difficulty that we have to deal with, is, that you will not even look at it, because based on a Supernatural Revelation.

No doubt such a Revelation must be proved, and we do not,—hardly indeed much more than yourselves, with your antecedent incredibility prejudices—rely upon, or greatly care for extrinsic evidences, because we conceive that it can and does stand perfectly well on its own merits. But we do contend that the consequences flowing from it are not to be disregarded. If it cannot be reconciled with the nature and position of man, and the phenomena in and around him, or if it adds nothing to his advantage, it must be given up. But if it is entirely suited to that nature; if it tells him in clear and explicit terms, what no philosophy in its own strength or from its own stores has ever attempted or dreamt of doing, how man came to be placed in a world of thorns and thistles; why in his present state nearly all things always afflict him; what he has lost, and what greater and better he may gain, and how; and herein especially if it shows him what manner of spirit is in him, and how to govern and heal that spirit; if it convinces him of sin, which, if it came by the law, (because before the law could be no disobedience), was yet always a running sore in the flesh, and anguish in the soul; if the yoke it presents is easy and its burthen light, and its promises tested and half performed at the first submission; and help or teaching is none beside, its necessity and truth are self-proved. The troubled spirit, all of us who ever think at all know that we have; and the healing is at hand; and all this, though it fills and satisfies all our thoughts and feelings of mind and heart, is yet of too high a character, and too particular and well defined in sum and detail, to be a phantasy of man, or within his powers to invent.

Nevertheless, if you can show us aught better, we will at once forsake all, and follow you. But if not, then as the bird turns from wintry skies to the warm South, so do you to us.

We are loth to quit the philosophers who have so long detained us from our true subject, and so agreeably, that we almost lose the point of the sarcasm of the Younger Brother in Comus; but, there is yet one point to be mentioned here.

The philosopher of the class of those who accept death as an eternal sleep, a euphemism for personal annihilation, has been heard to express a perfect willingness to accept this form of death, and literally *pro bono publico*, for the encouragement of others, satisfied that he has fairly lived his days, that he has by his example and teaching advanced the cause of progress, and will leave his place to successors, worthier if possible than himself, who will always be disregarding themselves and talking about him. It is a fact that he has been heard to say so, and that many have died in the like persuasion, without hope and without dismay, thus as it were arguing to the last.

It was said by no obscure writer, that "the love of fame is the universal passion." There are two death-bed collects, or short prayers; the one for the millions, "Lord, into thy hands I commit my spirit"; the other for the units, the philosophers, "*Vos valete et plaudite*;" each in its way the best that can be framed; for as to the latter, if there be no Lord to receive us, there is no nobler being than man to whom we can commend ourselves, and he can only applaud.

But what if we show that this transcendental content argues a deadness to the true charities of life, an indifference to moral excellence, a cultured intellect indeed, but an ill-balanced mind?

The closer charities of life have in their inception, and during their continuance, no savour of mortality, no thought of endings. We neither offer such terms for ourselves, nor accept them from others. We set them upon our chosen objects without reserve for good and all. The fickle are not true men, being mere pleasure-hunters, self-regarders, and

incapable of true feeling. There is a levity in their natures which places them out of the question altogether. We are not pleading here for inordinate affections: these disturb the moral sense, and bring inevitably their own punishment; but we cannot wisely set entire affections on objects which we know must perish, and may do so at any instant; or if we do, they are inordinate, because disproportioned to the objects, and sooner or later we must suffer for them. Yet this, the philosopher in question must do, if he has any enduring affections at all to bestow, or true feeling for any body in the world, either for himself or others. Then does not this throw something like a shadow upon his perfect content?

But the cultured intellect? Well, here is an unobserved *non-sequitur* in the Introduction to a "Universal Prayer," inscribed "Deo Opt Max," and addressed to "Jehovah, Jove, or Lord," by one of no little note in times past:

Let us (since life can little more supply
Than just to look around us and to die,)
Expatiate free o'er all this scene of man,
 A mighty maze, but not without a plan.

Now this is an impossibility, if we read it according to the intention of the poet; but carries a right sound and practical moral, if we cast him aloof, and, correcting the blunder, apply it for ourselves.

An intellect of one short morning, noon, and eve, that must by one and the same inexorable law change and decay in all, is the sum of our treasures, if we have no souls. The little tapers we call mental faculties, that make together the aggregate intellect, are no sooner at their brightest, than by that same law they wane, flicker, and, at the tolling of the inevitable curfew, go out altogether. The night comes when we can neither work, nor learn, nor teach, but are alone with our own thoughts, and those at the mercy of the moral sense, be that sense what it may. Every offence is the first of a new series, and leaves its mark for followers, and that mark must be washed away, and every cause of and temptation to new offence to come, removed, or it cannot be well with us.

If we can trace in external nature a general benevolent design, ranging and perceptible everywhere, but subject continually to grievous disturbances, such as pain and death, we—by far the chief of all things living upon earth, and reasonable, and surely in some sense moral beings,—can hardly fail to conclude that, for some cause or another, we are in present disfavour with the Creator ; but if in addition to these outward disturbances, we are afflicted far more intensely from moral causes working within us, and if we learn that there is a perfect remedy for these afflictions withheld from none, we may with equal confidence infer, that we are under chastisement for offences, but not, not yet at least, wholly outcasts. It must be our aim then to seek this remedy, which is soon found, though not by observation, being freely offered together with grace to enable us to accept it worthily ; and it reaches us through the moral sense as before defined, which in its own good way it cleanses, restores, and advances to a state of absolute unsullied perfection. Such a state, through our manifold infirmities, we may not at present fully realise in our thoughts ; but towards this perfection, though sensible that it is not a thing of or confined to this life, we know that we may, if we but will it, advance from day to day with immediate and increasing privileges and ever brightening hopes ; for the way is ever open, and there is none beside, and there is no lion in the path whom we need in the least fear ; and it is this high and ennobling state of hope and privileges, and advance towards perfection, and not the dull round of strife, weariness, and vexations, his own short-coming Theories, and the unappreciating stupidities of other men, which the philosopher with whom we are here dealing, is content and desirous to leave ; and in this he is neither magnanimous nor wise, nor very much the reverse, but simply worn out. He may advance to the last moment of his life ; but holiness in a low estate, the holiness that condescends to the *proletaire*, is not to his taste. In his view Dives, if a man of refinement, was not so very much in the wrong : and so his thoughts perish.

But he delivers one parting blow, though with less than Parthian accuracy of aim. He tells us that men take to

Christianity from selfish motives, from fear of threatened penalties, and for the sake of the promised reward, or as they might a Temperance pledge, for the good they are told it will do them.

But who told him this? for *ex hypothesi* he cannot know it of himself. Who told him that the Christian religion was such a bargain and sale affair? Fear makes slaves, but no converts. What we do through fear is bad, though the thing itself may be good. It is only the conviction of the enormity of sin that makes true converts, and when that conviction comes, fear indeed comes with it, but fear of the present, and the relief we demand is immediate in all its forms.

Besides, as to this assertion of his, is it not an argument for the sanctity of self-will, for doing what we like, good or bad, on all occasions? Rather, is it not precisely what he does himself? Does he not choose philosophy because he deems it best for him? He says indeed, and this is the sad part of the case, that he would gladly believe if he could, but that he cannot; but will he assert, that this alleged selfish motive, is an element, or any part of, or has anything whatever to do with the cause his unbelief? But unless it has, what he says is not an argument, but a taunt.

Nevertheless we repeat on parting, that if you will show to us throughout the whole range of Sceptical Philosophy, any moral force whatever bearing appreciably upon conduct, we will follow you. Why not advertize for one? Only remember that the "eternal not ourselves tending to righteousness" spoken of by some of you lately, is our "Eternal," and that He tells us much more than is set down to Him in your books.

But we would here say a few words in all kindness to our half-brethren, who, in pruning their own feathers, have borrowed a few from other fine birds, and have expressed views too largely shared by many who, although not philosophers, are yet neither half-brethren, nor quite ourselves.

We readily accept the term "disembodied spirit" as implying a return of the spirit to Him from whom it came, and who, having provided us with a mortal body, will according to His covenant, at his own time and in his own

way, raise and change it into an immortal one. Of an intermediate state, of the "spirits in prison," we choose to say nothing, not from fear, but through reverence. But we may well rest assured, for it is demonstrable, that the awakening from this life into another, come when it may, whether in time or when this time shall be no more, must to the spirit awakened, in relation to its own consciousness, be as one instantaneous act. We must spring at once, with no sense of an interval, from our old state of consciousness into the new.

This life being but a preparation or trial to fit us for the one to come, the Christian graces which we here attain, must follow and abide with us after our natural death; for neither in motive nor in action are they of this world; they are the same in and under all forms, conditions, and modes of life; yield to no occasion, and are stronger than all surroundings.

But to assign with you our half brethren and your undeclared proselytes all over the world, to the disembodied spirit, or the new imperishable body above mentioned, only the forms, or forms analogous to those of this present mortal body, is a thing for which we can find neither necessity nor warrant. To us indeed it is like flinging away the jewel to save the casket.

That there may be analogies between certain things of this world and certain things of the next, we need not be careful to deny. But whatever they may be, they exist only between the temporary associations, the accessories, the lendings and instruments of the spirit, including perhaps the intellectual faculties, their constitution and arrangement, and things wholly unknown. But the spirit is always the same, and the life to come is but the morrow of one and the same consciousness. The spirit, not made up of parts, but one and entire, may rise or fall, become good or evil, but otherwise it is always the same. It may work with other instruments in other scenes, but is the same worker always.

With regard to all these analogies, or supposed analogies, it may be well to bear in mind the barrenness of our premises; and at least desist from endeavouring to trace them too closely

from the senses and lower portions of our individualities ; from measuring things which, for aught we know, have no common predicable ; from dealing with the ever living as we would with that which is always dying ; and above all, from attempting to soften and compliment the dull unfruitful hopes, fears and pleasures of this gross material life of ours, into types and shadows of spiritual privileges hereafter.

Swedenborg was a very good, a very learned, and a very imaginative man ; and when his intellectual powers flagged through age to the disabling of the acquisition of further learning, he let his imagination, in his case comparatively unfatigued and unimpaired, run free over his acquired stores, and the result, in which he happened to agree with his angel, is what we find ; that is, himself, in every page of his voluminous works. Every revelation is a reflex of his own thoughts, and just what we might have expected from him. We have had many prophets far his inferiors both in goodness and acquirements since, and a like test may be applied to them, by those who have leisure, and think fit so to employ it.

The idol of the day is undoubtedly intellect. We do not so much worship Mammon, as cut him into collops and make off with them. But we all honour intellect ; partly, perhaps, because it is power ; and partly because in so doing we seem or think we seem to grow intellectual ourselves. But intellect is not ourselves, and in every man that lives, it must in due course age and lose its power, and come to the intellectual workhouse at last.

Our intellects in the future state cannot be such or so constituted as they now are, unless the principle of cause and effect, or of perfect adaptation of means to ends, is to be broken into ; and unless we are to retain faculties for which we shall no longer have any use : they are, as at present constituted, perfectly adapted to a life of toil and intense exertion, and not impossibly became so, by some change at the Fall, when labour and pain were first inflicted as part of our present doom, and the destination and order of our lives changed. The process of reasoning, that is, of anything worthy to be so called, is always a laborious, frequently an angry one ; we

are often disconcerted, sometimes baffled, or even wholly overthrown; and there is thus in it always some drawback from perfect enjoyment. Error is the life, the *raison d'être* of all argument, and a state of controversy is a state of war, and subject to all its troubles and contingencies; and why should there be error in a perfect state?

It is, I have been told, a dreadful thing to be confuted in argument, worse some think who have tried both, than a bad conscience; yet wherever there is a dispute, one of the parties to it must be in the wrong, or, what is harder still, get the worst of it; that is, must be put to confusion; that is, must suffer pain. Suppose a controversy in their improved state of being between Dr. Johnson and Thomas Carlyle, and the Doctor not to have everything his own way, what would become of him? and suppose Boswell to be there, what would he do? would he shed bitter tears, or *rat* to Carlyle? and then what would Carlyle do with him?

Our intellects as now constituted are specially and admirably suited for progress; but who shall say that there will be intellectual progress hereafter? How do we know that we shall have anything more to learn? Who now receives the highest pleasure from the intellect? the man of science, or the man of imagination? The one progresses always; the other in comparison, not at all. Suppose Raffaele and Galileo to change their minds, and the latter to wake one fine morning with all the predominating fine sense of form and beauty of the former; and the first named with the harder, colour blind excellences of the latter; which of them, when the first surprise was over, would be least thankful for the change, and which would be the least gainer by it?

We have been trifling thus far, from the extreme awe with which we regard an approach to our true subject. Our purpose being to show a high and worthy purpose in Creation, effected through Christ, the central light of all, we come at once to the crucial test of all modes of faith; and from this point all sects and denominations whatsoever that cannot stand this test, lose to us their individualities, and are in our view but as representatives of one common error; and if we chance hereafter to speak of any one of them more than any

other, we do it only through indifference and for our own convenience, and should we say anything rough of any, we mean it for all of them alike.

The point referred to is this ; that the falling away through disobedience from an eternal Being, is, through or by reason of the eternity of that Being, in and of itself eternal and irremediable ; and that we, having thus fallen, without a Divine Mediator, (that is, divine not only in the sense of being sinless and holy, but absolutely, in essence, uncreate, eternal, separate in Person, though one in spirit, of one entire will with the Creator from the beginning,) there could be no restoration, and there can now be for us neither religion, nor use of any. Without such a Divine Personality, present at, and offering Himself and accepted at the beginning, there can be no Mediator, no redemption. The Creator can neither change nor repent ; nor has He done either ; but He has accepted the divine Person thus freely offering Himself to do that will which man had not done. If Christ had been a created being, he could not have mediated for mankind. He would have saved himself, and have been accepted for his own merits, but, being created, he could not offer to the Almighty the works of his own hands, the merits of his own created being, as a sufficing price for the redemption of other created beings ; or in other words, a created being cannot lay merits of his own before his Creator, can do no work of supererogation. We might with equal propriety say that Abraham mediated through his own merits, for the men of Sodom ; but he did no such thing ; there is a prevalent error as to what mediation is ; he did not mediate at all ; he prayed for them ; and his prayer was accepted by grace for his faith in the uncreate Redeemer, whose day he knew was to come, and with whom he was then conversing as man with man.

Without a Mediator, divine in the sense above expressed, there may be much in theology that is grand and magnificent ; but no religion, no submission but that of fear and necessity ; we might be crouching abjects, but no true worshippers. Under such conditions, we might as well pray to Baalim, which, however foolish, is only unlawful because forbidden ;

and only forbidden, because we are at the same time directed to Him who only is to be worshipped.

It may be said, that if Christ was thus born into the world for the sake of man, He being before all worlds, would have manifested His care and providence for him long before His incarnation. The answer is, that He did so abundantly, and without ceasing.

We must never allow ourselves to lose sight of the perfect Oneness of will in the three Persons of the Holy Trinity. It is indeed implied in the description of Holiness above expressed attaching alike to all the Three; for there cannot be different holinesses, and in each of Them, it must be, not only the same in kind, but equal, that is, absolutely perfect. But with this Oneness of will, the Trinity is revealed to man as standing in certain special relations towards him; that is to say, as the Creator, the Mediator, and the Spirit that aids him to obtain the privilege of that mediation. We may thus, always bearing in mind this Oneness of will, without undue presumption, conceive the first law, and it reads more like a blessing than a command, to have been given to Adam in his state of innocence, by the Triune God; but on the disobedience of Adam a mediation became requisite, and the Mediator came, not visibly, nor at once incarnate, but spiritually to initiate His great work for man. He who by His personal mediation was to bring man back to God, may thus well be conceived to have taken upon Himself the direction of all things requisite to render that Mediation available for the purpose intended, and herein, the preparation and education of men, to fit them to effectuate it on their part; and thus all acts and signs recorded in the Old Testament, directly tending to such preparation or education, may well be considered as incidents to the mediation which He had thus taken upon Himself, and of His own immediate working, to the end, that He who was in the fulness of time to die, should not die in vain.

All extraordinary preparations for His Advent, may thus be conceived to have been in some special way committed to Him, without derogating from the great truth, that by force of their eternal Oneness, the act of One was always the act

also of the Three. Perhaps it may without profaneness be put in this way:—It being the will of the Three-in-One, that they should each stand, and be known to man to stand, in certain special relations towards him, that is, as God the Creator, God the Mediator, and God the enlightening and comforting Spirit; and it being the one will of the three, that a certain manifestation should be vouchsafed to man, or a certain dealing had with him, that manifestation, or that dealing would be made by Him to whose assumed character or office it would be the more specially appropriate; so that in a particular sense, it would be His act, but in a larger and equally true one, that also of the Three. This too would keep us clear of the impropriety of sifting such manifestations and dealings in detail, and assigning them after our own weak fancies, to one or another of such Persons, and at the same time bind us to accept them all with suitable humility, as the act and expression of the will of the One God.

There are many particular texts in the Scriptures that favour the view here taken, but of course we only propose to deal with one or two of them.

We may thus conceive that at the Fall, when it was declared that the seed of the woman was in the end to overcome all evil, the Son whose will it was to undertake to do this in His own Person, and who was then spiritually present with the Father, was also in a special sense an actual and effective party in making that declaration and in giving the promise thereby conveyed, springing as it must have done from His own personal will. But further on this point we care not to go.

We may thus conceive that, the work of man's redemption resting wholly in Christ, everything done in furtherance of, or preparatory to His Advent, was his own personal act springing from His care for man, whom he was to save from the consequences of his transgressions; and in particular, that the trials of and promises to Abraham, whose issue He was to be, but whose Lord He was, were His. There may have been instances where this was not so. Abraham offered acceptable sacrifice to "El Shaddai," which is not a proper name, but an ascription of attributes by which alone God was

then known to Abraham, and is accordingly rendered by us "God Almighty;" and He who accepted the sacrifice, must have been the Triune God; and so also in the vision of the smoking furnace and burning lamp, that passed between the pieces of the sacrifice, *Genesis c. 15, v. 17*, the sign must have been vouchsafed by the same God that accepted the sacrifice. But this or others of a like kind, will not exclude the immediate personal action of Christ in His own person in other instances.

Among the signs vouchsafed to Abraham, we find the appearance to him of the "three men" in the plain of Mamre; and this has been, perhaps very generally accepted, as a visible appearance, or at least a type of the Trinity. Bishop Wilberforce takes it for granted, and is very precise on the point,— "There in the mysterious visitation of the three stranger forms before his tent door, subsiding into the single presence of Jehovah, was already a declaration of the hidden mystery of the Trinity in Unity." *Heroes of Hebrew History*, p. 20. For this reason, and as the chapter of Genesis (the 18th) in which the incident is related, has been specially selected by our Church for the first lesson on Trinity Sunday, we necessarily approach the question with the utmost fear and diffidence; but we fail to perceive in this appearance a perfectly worthy type of the Trinity; and if the Doctrine of the Trinity rested upon it, we should almost fear for Christianity itself, to which we hold that Doctrine to be absolutely essential. The bishop's view of the incident seems to us rather to clash with the later Scriptures; it is not accepted by all who hold fast by the true Doctrine, and it is capable of another explanation. We do not venture to deny, and would gladly accept the position grand and magnificent as it is, but it hardly seems to us to arise naturally or necessarily from the text, or to stand upon other than the "why not?" class of argument, and conclusion.

We cannot enter into Abraham's secret thoughts, or measure his spiritual privileges. We know indeed that our Lord on one occasion said, "Abraham rejoiced to see my day; he saw it, and was glad." And from this we may without presumption infer, that if Abraham in the spirit saw Christ, he

discerned Him as well in His Divine as in His human character ; which he could not do, without also discerning the Spirit ; and if the Spirit, then also the Trinity.

But this is inference only, and without affirming or denying anything on the point, we may reasonably deem the words last cited from the New Testament satisfied by something less than such a full and awful revelation, which Abraham must have been lifted wholly out of himself to bear, and that at a time when he had not been fully perfected, and needed yet further trial of his faith. Abraham was always advancing in faith; ourselves either advance or turn back, but it was not until he had undergone his last grand trial in the offering up of Isaac, that he was, not sinless (we have already referred to this as a distinction pervading the Old Testament), but perfected in faith and obedience, and declared to be so by the Lord Jehovah Himself, "By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son; that in blessing I will bless thee, . . . and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed."

We cannot fathom the depth of our Lord's words, "Abraham saw my day and was glad," but as applied to an obscure and earlier text, we may, and perhaps should, humbly deem them satisfied by Abraham's witnessing in the spirit the restoration of all mankind to righteousness and Divine favour, by one to issue from himself, though short of a full appreciation of the true and perfect character of that One.

We all know that the word Trinity, or any direct equivalent for it, is not to be found in the Bible, and we daily witness the use sought to be made of this, by many, who fully recognising the Scriptures as wise and good words set up in type, object to all dogmatic teaching.

We hardly see how it could well have been otherwise. We must remember that we read the Old Testament in a great measure by the light of the New ; and that there are necessarily many things in the former, that could not possibly be understood, or have been designed to be understood, until the fulness of time for the purpose ; as in the case of particular

prophecies, of which we read so often in the Gospels, where on their accomplishment the words are added, "that it might be fulfilled what was said by" such and such a prophet, until which times they remained dark and beyond the reach of all surmise even to the prophets who uttered them.

It may be observed here, that this last circumstance is no ineffective proof of the truth of the prophecies themselves ; and the more so, having regard to the primary and secondary interpretations of which so many of them, as we now more fully know, were susceptible. Of these, the former may have been readily understood by all ; the latter were for the most part unsuspected and unimagined by the most highly privileged ; the thought of the Messiah entering into His glory through the sufferings of the Cross, was abhorrent to the Jewish idea. We may apply as a test the Messianic prophecies themselves. These, the very life and light of the Old Testament, both at large and in the particular, abound in the Prophetic writings ; yet when our Lord came, he was rightly comprehended by no living man, not even by the most favoured of the Eleven ; it was not until His work was accomplished, that, as declared by Himself at Emmaus, it was seen how entirely and minutely all these had been fulfilled in His person, and in a way that precluded all possibility of contrivance, by Himself or others.

On the subject of the authenticity of these prophecies, which we unconditionally accept ourselves, it should be remembered, that from the latest date of the Books of the Septuagint, the text of the Scriptures had been laid open to the Greeks, and to civilization generally ; and from that time at least, it could suffer neither interpolation nor change in any material particular. At the Advent, the Text of the Scriptures was evidenced by the Copy preserved in the Temple, and by the Septuagint ; the latter, it is generally considered, being the version usually quoted by the Evangelists ; and it is certain therefore that these predictions had been uttered and on record long

before, and were then accurately fulfilled: and thus, having regard to the grand simplicity and unity of the Scripture teaching, the authenticity of particular texts and writings, and of what are now called the unhistorical portions of the Bible, becomes of far less moment: for see what it comes to, in your own downright words and style—"Of the many evidences you offer us, some are not altogether satisfactory to our minds: therefore we will regard none of them."

We have in the Old Testament the fullest assurance of God, the Creator, the Ruler and Disposer of all things in heaven and earth; and we read of a promised Messiah, but except under a veil, we do not discern the nature and character of that Messiah; until He himself came and declared it. With regard to the Spirit, we now, by the aid of later revelations, fully recognise Him as Lord, that is, as God, and in His office as the giver of spiritual life, and that by Him the prophets of old spoke; but we do not find in the Old Testament any open assertion of His distinct personality. We read of the Spirit of God, and of the Spirit of the Lord falling upon particular persons, but only as we do of the Spirit of wisdom, or of prophecy, or of other things of a like kind, and rather as inspirations coming from a Person, than as a Person actually present, and communicating with man.

We are all aware of what took place at the baptism of our Lord; of the "Spirit of God descending from heaven like a dove, and lighting upon Him (Christ) as he was yet standing in the water," and of the voice from heaven declaring at the same time, that He was "the Son of God with whom God was well pleased"; and we can hardly fail, we should put some force on ourselves, not to recognize in this, a simultaneous manifestation of the Three Persons. But we do so by our later lights. If the incident stood alone, we should naturally, and inevitably, refer the emblematic dove and the voice from heaven to one and the same Person, besides falling into all sorts of Arian perplexities, as to the nature of Christ; for it is the Spirit that proves, and, if the expres-

sion be allowed, is the test of the Trinity. We must look to the teaching of Christ himself, for we have nowhere else to look, and we there find that He did not expressly declare the Personality of the Spirit, until late in His Ministry, when He promised that the Spirit should come after His own death, then imminent. This promise, as we know, was fulfilled on the great day of Pentecost, and from that time the Personality of the Spirit thus manifested, that is, by our Lord's promise and declaration, by the visible signs of His coming on that day, by our consciousness of His working within ourselves, and by the light now thrown by all these together on many passages of the earlier Scriptures, not formerly understood, has become a vital article of the Christian faith.

But we would now look at the text, *Genesis c. 18*, running literally as follows: v. 1, "And the Lord appeared unto him (Abraham) in the plains of Mamre; and he sat at the tent door in the heat of the day—2, And he lift up his eyes, and lo! three men (literally a triad of men, but that is merely a common Hebrew idiom) stood by him; and he saw and ran to meet *them*, and bowed himself toward the ground,—3. And said, *My Lord*, if now I have found favour in *thy* sight, pass *thou* not away *I pray thee* (*na*, an interjection indeclinable, so rendered by us) from *thy* servant,—4. Let a little water *I pray you* (*na*, so rendered by us) be fetched, and wash *you your feet*, and rest *you yourselves* under the tree,—5. And I will fetch a morsel of bread and comfort *ye your* hearts, for therefore are *ye* come to *your* servant, and *they* said, So do as thou hast said."

The common and more homely explanation of the narrative has been, that Abraham saw and ran towards three men, and on reaching them addressed one only, as seeming superior, perhaps greatly so, to the two others. This would be quite agreeable to common usage among ourselves, and to the literal context, for it is unquestionable that three persons immediately after this supposed momentary configuration, entered into and were received by Abraham in his tent. This is at first sight the natural view of the

circumstance; but it may be displaced on sufficient authority; and the question is, whether the authority for so displacing it, is not of an *ex post facto* nature, and derived from our present lights obtained from far later and more complete revelations; and whether the view of our late highly gifted bishop may not rest on his private judgment, and be possibly of the nature of a prejudice.

In his view, there was a momentary configuration of the three persons into one, in which Abraham by a perceptive grace then accorded to him, was privileged to a discernment of the mystery of the Trinity. The nearest approach to it in sacred history, is perhaps the Transfiguration on the Mount, in which Christ appeared for the instant in glory, by which the minds of the three favoured Apostles who were alone permitted to witness it, were so dazed that "they knew not what to say," and which they were strictly charged "to tell to no man."

Revelations are generally either in advance or confirmation of earlier ones. But this must have been one, not to mankind through Abraham, but to Abraham alone, as a special grace and privilege, which he too must have been charged "to tell to no man"; for we find no assured trace of it in the later writings of the Old Testament. We cannot predicate that the great truth was known to Jacob, who was so often visited; or to Moses who recorded the incident, but in terms *a priori* unambiguous; nor to the Psalmist King. Even Simeon appears to have known only the Lord Jehovah, and the child he held in his arms.

If this momentary configuration took place, who were the three persons so configured? He who is called, and spoke and acted as "the Lord," and the two who accompanied Him; plainly acting subordinate parts, and therefore, we may infer angels, and ministers; that is, the Creator and the created. God and the work of His hands configured as equals: Can this be?

The Rabbinical writers had a notion, that of the angels which have appeared to man, and which some of them considered to have been instantaneous creations, no one

of them was ever charged with more than a single mission, which performed he has departed. Whether this be sooth or not, we need not inquire ; but we may observe that the first and main object of the visit to Abraham, was in direct furtherance of the high and worthy purpose before indicated, that is, the coming of Christ to draw all men to Himself ; and that the ensuing conference with "the Lord," in which Abraham took upon himself to intercede for the doomed cities, is of no slight import to that purpose, as tending to the exaltation of Abraham, through whom the Messiah was to come, and the graciousness of Him whom Abraham then addressed.

But the missions of the two other persons, the destruction of the Cities of the Plain, and the saving of Lot, (a just man but not in the line of the Promise,) and his family, were things of very inferior moment, and such as, humanly speaking, we might well expect to have been entrusted to created ministers or angels.

It may be observed here, that neither the Father nor the Spirit have ever been beheld in any visible or concrete form by man. Voices have been heard, signs given, visions accorded, and angels have appeared, who have spoken and acted as God ; but the God whom, through the complete word of Revelation, we now recognize in the Triune, in visible form has never stood upon earth. We have been told that no one has seen God, who has not seen Christ ; and it is a Doctrinal truth, that except through Christ, we cannot approach Him. The Spirit, whose working is entirely inward, it is not pretended that we have ever seen, except through emblem ; nor can we conceive any outward representation of the Trinity. A vision of three does but give us the idea of the number three. Murillo's grand picture, loosely called "the Trinity," does but display to us Three persons whom we recognize as Divine powers in perfect accord, but, so far as we learn from the painter's design, then and always separate. The idea of the Trinity in Unity we gain elsewhere.

In acknowledging the Trinity, the only safeguard against errors of faith, we have learnt, not from man, that the

Persons of the Trinity, though always one God, have by their eternal will stood in distinct relations towards us. Pray worthily to God through Christ, and by the will of the Triune, in the instant, ere your prayer is well spoken, the Spirit is with you. But it is the Son alone, who took our nature into Himself, the manhood into the Godhead, Who was born into the world, and died

For our advantage on the bitter Cross ;

to whom the government of all things relating to ourselves has been committed.

We may state here in recapitulation, that as the Mediation was taken upon Himself and accomplished by Christ in His own person, so also must have been its initiation ; and so also, we may conclude, the preparation of the world to accept it ; without which preparation it could not have been effected according to God's design, as declared and manifested from the beginning.

We may again recognise our position, in the manifestation related in *Exodus c. 8*, the first overt act, towards the fulfilment of the promise to Abraham, that is, the call of Moses, and the miracle of the burning bush : it is thus told—1. Now, Moses kept the flock of Jethro, his father in law, the priest of Midian : and he led the flock to the backside of the desert, and came to the mountain of God, even to Horeb.—2. And the angel of the Lord (*Jehovah*), appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush ; and he looked, and behold, the bush burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed.—3. And Moses said I will now turn aside and see this great sight, why the bush is not burnt,—4. And when the Lord (*Jehovah*) saw that he turned aside to see, God (*Elohim*) called unto him out of the bush, Moses, Moses : and he said, Here am I.—5. And he said, Draw not nigh hither ; put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground.—6. Moreover he said, I am the God (*Elohi*) of thy fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob ; and Moses

hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God,—7. And the Lord (*Yehovah*) said—.

We cannot suppose that this story is idly told. Every word must have its own appropriate force, every incident its significance. He who was graced with a message for the good of man, would by the same grace be inspired in truly recording it for man.

The first statement in this account is that *an* angel (there is no definite article in the Hebrew) of the Lord (*Yehovah*) appeared to Moses in a flame of fire, out of the midst of the bush ; but we may infer from the words of Moses himself, in *v.* 3, "I will now go and see this great wonder, why the bush is not burnt," that he saw no visible image of this angel ; nor is it stated in any later passage that he appeared in any sensible form. Then who and what was the angel that so appeared in the bush ? The angels mentioned in the Scriptures, and we recognize no others, have appeared to men in various forms. They have sometimes declared themselves to be fellowservants with those whom they have visited, and refused worship on that account ; at other times we find them called "Angels of the Lord," and yet they have spoken and acted, and accepted worship, as if they had been the Lord himself ; and in some instances, the idea of personality is lost in the nature of the visitation, as in the case of the destruction of Sennacherib and his army ; "and it came to pass that night, that the angel of the Lord went out and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred fourscore and five thousand : and when they arose in the morning behold they were all dead corpses." *2 Kings c.* 19, *v.* 35. It may be possible here to accept the words "Angel of the Lord" as figurative only of a reality, that is, the destruction of the Assyrians through natural agencies, that is, by a pestilence directed by the hand of God : and the same or like construction might be found to apply equally in many other instances.

We should thus probably not much err, in accepting and being contented with Parkhurst's rendering of the word "Maleach," angel, "agent, personator, mean of visibility or action, what was employed by God to render himself visible

and approachable by flesh and blood.”—*Parkhurst, Heb. Lexicon*, p. 368.

But an angel was in that flaming bush, and that angel was “Elohim,” one with all the attributes and sovereignty of God, that is, God. We may take *v. 4*, for an illustration—“And when the Lord (Jehovah, the Three who are always one) saw that he (Moses) turned aside to see, God (Elohim, the Three speaking in the Person of One) called to him out of the bush”;—and this view is quite consistent with the ensuing context.

It has been objected, that God cannot with propriety be said to be His own angel or messenger. But surely if we recognize Three Persons in that God, and those Three by the one Divine Will manifesting themselves in distinct relations towards us, the objection vanishes; and what one of them so manifesting himself, declares to us, may well be treated as the message of the Three. Yet further, there is direct authority for this; for in *Malachi c. 3, v. 1*, Christ is expressly referred to both as an angel or messenger, and as God—“Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me; and the Lord whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant, whom ye delight in; behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of Hosts,—2. But who may abide the day of his coming? and who shall stand when he appeareth? for he is like a refiner’s fire.”—It is beyond all question, that as the first messenger here spoken of, was and has been declared to have been the Baptist, so the angel of the covenant, must have been Christ himself.

We have thus ventured to conclude, that in the manifestations above mentioned, the one, on the occasion of the promise to Abraham, the other, of the call of Moses (the first overt step to its fulfilment), it was Christ himself who appeared.

From the time of the last of these manifestations, throughout the whole of the Jewish Dispensation followed a succession of like visits and signs, working and tending to the same end, that is, the schooling and preparation of the chosen race, and proceeding from the same source;

and these, whether angels or visible signs such as the Schechinah, or the fire from heaven that consumed Elijah's sacrifice, were all the angels and signs of God; and wherever and in whatsoever form they appeared, there also was God by His miraculous power instantly working in and by them. He is present with his ministers in all their ways, even as He is when every sparrow falls. He may be out of their thoughts awhile, but they are never out of His.

We have then an ever present watchful Divine care extended over the Israelites, directing, chastising but preserving, them in all their ways, to the day of the Messiah; and that clearly evidenced, not alone at the moments of signs vouchsafed, but by the direction of events in the frequently long intervals between them. For but consider a little: all the leading events in their history had been predicted long before they happened. The four hundred years' affliction, comprising the servitude in Egypt, was foretold to Abraham in a moment of high favour, even before the birth of the first child of the promise, and long before there was yet such a people in being as the Jews; the Exodus, the possession of the Holy Land, the captivity, the restoration, and above all the Messiah, all occurring at vast intervals of time, were all predicted long centuries before, with an exactitude, and often with a minuteness, far passing the possible forecast of man. We can trace out the rise and fall of empires in profane history, chapter by chapter, in the prescribed way of cause and effect, to the satisfaction of all parties tolerably well. But with the Israelites that is impossible. A strong and high-blooded people in bondage and in a strange land, might well look for deliverance when a sufficiently great leader should arise among them. But why should that leader arise just forty years before the prescribed time? And why, when he came, should they drive him away to fill up the exact period?

But we would do justice in our way, to philosophy in this. The coming of Moses was distinctly a case of cause and effect, and nothing else. Because, upon the struggle

for existence principle of *Fortes creantur fortibus*, Levi must have had such a son as Kohath; Kohath such a son as Amram; and Amram such sons as, first Aaron, and then Moses, who must by the same rule have been slow of speech and the meekest of men; and also such a daughter as Miriam to fret him into a little spirit now and then; and it never could have been otherwise.

All this is strictly and absolutely true; but at the beginning of all this cause and effect, is Providence; the ways of which no man knows until it is Providence no longer. It is easy in these days to show to all who are undevoutly and irreligiously disposed, that there is no such thing as Providence, and that all is phenomenal antecedence and sequence, or what is called cause and necessary effect; but how, if we cannot trace effects which we see, that is, things present, back to their remote causes, can we hope so to trace effects which we do not see, that is, the future? or, in other words, how can we predict the future results of causes thus unknown, or declare events of which we have hitherto had no experience, to happen in far distant days, accurately and minutely, in time, place, occasion and circumstance? how foretell the future if we know not the past, and cannot explain the present?

Yet this has been done. *Il faut s'amuser*. This we presume is your motto; if not, it is certainly your moral. We will throw over to you Moses, the Law and the Prophets, and in fine the entire Jewish history and people, to do what you like with, and will call them, with some of you, *Aberglaube*, or nonsense, or monstrous superstitions, or anything else you please. But about two hundred years before the coming of Christ, there appeared in Alexandria, no mean city, a Book written in Greek, then the chief language of the civilized world, foretelling the coming of Christ, and containing many, and often the most minute particulars of His mission, character, person, sufferings and acts, all of which were exactly fulfilled and realised in Him. How do you account for this? We are aware that we have said this before, but we look to the glory to

accrue to you from your complete and satisfactory answer, when it comes, to work forgiveness for the repetition.

We say that He only from whom the prophecy came, can fulfil ; that when He prophesied, then He designed ; and what He designed, that He effected ; and He therefore must have been ever present in this His own world, working out in His own good way His own design for the high and worthy purpose before indicated. But what say you ?

We have now but to notice a few pet grievances, told forth in a wild sort of rough music, and coming dispersedly from many quarters, but rather aggressive in intention than of any real strength, and not altogether new.

Thus, it is urged continually, that the Old Dispensation was eminently inappropriate to the gracious and merciful character of Christ ; that, as appears from the nature and kind of its miracles, and the deeds and influences ascribed to the more highly privileged prophets and leaders of Israel, it was hard and cruel, indiscriminating in its punishments, visiting the children for the offences of their fathers, and confounding the innocent with the guilty, and throughout irreconcilable with the milder teaching and precepts of Epictetus and the elder Cato.

Just so ; and so far Divine Providence is to blame.

The Old Dispensation was but a preparation, without which the Messiah could not have come. But the preparation was complete at the time appointed, and He came. We do not say that the Jews were better men than they had been at other times, say, under some of their good kings who did not "cause Israel to sin," though it seems probable that at no other time and in no other place, could such men, such fitting instruments as the Eleven, (whom we perhaps greatly err in counting as mere ignorant fishermen,) and the first faithful hearers and disciples, have been found. But the Jews were no longer idolaters. Throughout the whole land of the promise, the Jew, the Galilean and the Samaritan, were all worshippers, not worthily it may be, but still worshippers of the true God, and looking for the Messiah's speedy coming according to prophecy, as they even then correctly read it. There had been no

idolaters among them since their return from the Captivity. This extinction of idolatry determined the usurpation it may be of demons throughout Israel, and the Spiritual Throne on earth was vacant, awaiting the arrival of the promised King; but although worshippers in name of the true God, they had made His word of none effect, and when their King came, they knew Him not and slew Him.

It has been objected too, that the chiefs of the Prophets of the Old Testament, such as Elijah and Elisha, were somewhat prodigal of what may perhaps be called private miracles, inconsequential wonders, in no perceptible way tending to advance the cause for which they were called; and that themselves were often harsh and cruel in their office.

It might be as well to remind these objectors, that no prophet or other person ever received a running power to work miracles at discretion; every miracle is the direct immediate act of God, without which the word, or outward gesture, or action of the prophet, would be a mere idle beating of the air. For the prophet there could be neither blame nor praise in the act, for it was not his own. It was not by the will of Elijah, but by the visitation of God, that the leprosy of Naaman clave to Gehazi and his issue; nor did Peter do more, and that not of himself, than declare the doom of Ananias. If you will discuss the right or wrong of a miracle, there is but one element in the subject, and that is, the will and act of God; and now do so, and as much as you like.

These two, Elijah and Elisha, especially had fallen on evil days, when faith was at the lowest; the land a den of idols, under bad kings; a priesthood false at the core, exercising profane rites, or desecrating true ones; and the people, letter-perfect in a few ceremonial observances, always running off to worship devils; and amidst all this themselves, the only maintainers of the truth left in the land, without help from man, fugitives, continually with prices set on their heads: without special and visible aid and privileges they must have been lost.

• We would take but one of these miracles, a standing

joke with mockers through all time, that namely of the "little children" as they are called, cursed by Elisha, and destroyed by bears, and see what it comes to. The Hebrew words *nearim ketannim* may signify, not only little children, but striplings, or boys not yet come to manhood;* and that translation should be adopted by us which is best supported by the context: and look a little at the circumstances; Elijah had very recently, only a few days before, been miraculously taken up to Heaven. This had been witnessed by Elisha only, but was a matter of faith, that is, of devout acceptance and belief, or certainly pious hope, with all who were on his, that is, on God's side! and it was of the deepest import that it should be so with all, for it was upon that event that the authority of Elisha at that conjuncture of time depended. He had then just entered on his office, and had to that time worked no very special or open miracle, and none among unbelievers. The fame of the ascension of Elijah must have been rife in Bethel, a town not very far distant from the place where it took place, but the report was by the entire city at once rejected and scorned. Is it then so very hard and exceptional a thing, that a riotous and blaspheming crew, drawn from the adult or adolescent prime of the whole unbelieving city, the hard inheritors of Jeroboam's rebellious spirit, (for it was there that he set up his profane altar), should have been so dealt with at such a

* It is conceived that there is authority for this position. That "*nearim*" may mean young men in the full prime of manhood, there is no question. The doubt has arisen as to the word *ketannim*, the plural of *katon*, the primary meaning of which is "little"; but it is often found used in opposition to *gadol*, "great," to express the younger, as *gadol* is to denote the elder of several; as in the case of the twins Esau and Jacob, *Genesis* c. 27, v. 42, where the words as applied to them, are rendered respectively "elder" and "younger," though both at the time in the prime of manhood. The word *nearim* required some qualifying word to distinguish the persons meant, from adults, but there seems no reason why the qualification should be excessively strained. Still if Hebraists will have it so, so it must be; but let them tell us what is the Hebrew for lads, or striplings, neither men nor children, if *nearim ketannim* is not.

crisis, when, according to our construction, Elisha must have been in peril of his life from their violence, and when a strong example was needed in support of a cause which was that of the whole world and of generations upon generations yet unborn ?

But say that we are wrong in our construction (we can hardly be entirely so) recall to mind the words of the *nearim ketanim* and say if they could have been used by "little children," the light shrill echoes and reflex in small of the words and deeds around them, without the direct prompting and encouragement of their elders, thus directly and grievously punished through them, but for their own sins ?

We have learnt from Sceptics to be careless analysts of the miracles related in the Old Testament, for they tell us very fairly that their difficulty is only as to the first step, and that if once satisfied as to that, they will readily concede the rest, and take their stand on the antecedently incredible and impossible no longer.

It were well if certain others would follow them in this. It is neither religious nor tending to religion, to accept a miracle and carp at the details. It is neither wise nor tending to wisdom, to accept one miracle because it is a little one, and to reject another presented upon precisely the same evidence, because it is a great one. In fact such reasoning comes to this : "I believe the first wonder, because, may be, it was not a miracle ; I do not believe the other, because it was." In the present instance of the children it is idle to object to particulars ; for whether we take them to have been little children who could neither resist nor escape, or young men, or lads who might in some degree do both, it is not in the natural instincts of bears to make such indiscriminate slaughter ; and the incident was miraculous throughout ; and the greater the departure from common life the more impressive the lesson ; and the sin of the city was very great.

We would refer here briefly to one other incident, which though not in itself so plainly miraculous in the usual acceptance of the term, was yet out of the line of common

life, and has given needless pain to many ; we mean that of Jael and Sisera. We do not fear to pronounce upon it with perfect confidence. No such act as that of Jael done in these days could be justified : but then no such act could in these days be done ; for it is the motive that gives the true character to every action, and we do not in the present ordering of things receive the privilege of the direct inspiration of the prophets of old. The deed of Jael was either an act of faith of the same kind as that of Samuel slaying the disarmed Agag, and of others of the like kind that may be readily suggested, or it was a great crime. There is no mean.

We may premise that the deed of Jael had been predicted. Deborah* the prophetess had been inspired to tell the shortcoming Barak, that the expedition should not be for his honour, for that "the Lord would sell Sisera into the hands of a woman." Jael therefore was raised for the act ; she too was inspired to know that the cause of Israel was the cause of God ; and being faithful, she could not stay her hand.

We read but little of Deborah in the Scriptures, but from what we do, we learn that she was an inspired prophetess and ruler of Israel in evil times, and that through her the land had rest forty years ; and that she was perhaps second in greatness and privileges to no woman mentioned throughout the Old Testament ; and not improbably the knowledge of this, and the reverence in which, as one so highly and so manifestly favoured by God, she must have been held by Jael, may have strengthened the latter to what she was about to do ; and it is thus a natural conclusion that the same Power which inspired Deborah to prophesy the deed, inspired also Jael to do it.

There is nothing to distinguish the character of this act

* We have often thought it much to be regretted, that our names of baptism should be so often selected from those of the inspired prophets and leaders of Israel. They are often mispronounced, sound strangely and therefore uncouthly in our ears, and being given, as they must often be, to those who grow up to be mean and contemptible persons, are a perpetual provocation to ribald and profane jesting, to the general detriment both of buffoon and hearer. Perhaps few have suffered more from this barbarism than Deborah.

from that of many others on record as having happened during the wars of the Jews, and it was in accord with, and in furtherance of the purpose and policy of this mission, for which there was at all times a full and sufficing sanction. We must take the entire record as it stands, and we cannot accept one of these acts as justified by Divine command in furtherance of the Divine purpose, and reject another, like in kind, circumstance and purpose. We cannot denounce Jael without at the same time arraigning Deborah, the inspired prophetess and victorious ruler of the chosen people, her song of praise, the Scripture Canon, and the whole course of the Old Dispensation.

This Song of Praise is not to be lightly passed over ; not only for its grandeur throughout and the fine artifice of its construction, noted briefly on some points by Bishop Lowth *De Sacra Poesi Hebræorum, Præl. xiii, p. 118 & Præl. xxviii, p. 274*, but because it affords no slight evidence of the fearlessness and fidelity of the writers of the Old Testament in recording facts discreditable to their own nation, that is, in the present instance, to the tribes who held back in the hour of need. Of the sublimity in this ode of the ascription of praise and glory to the Lord, and the imaging forth of His majesty and glory, the Bishop has sufficiently spoken, and any may judge for themselves from the song itself. To this follows in few, but most expressive, words the description of the people and the desolation of the villages, the "inhabitants ceasing in the land" ; then the awakening, not in her own strength, of Deborah and her cry to battle, the praises of the tribes that answered to it, with their chiefs and governors and "those who handled the pen of the writer" ; and then in direct and immediate contrast, not noticed by the bishop, the bitter contempt and shame, aggravated by the very homeliness of the language used, cast upon the slothful home-keeping tribes and others who remained behind ; against the unstable and never excelling Reuben for "abiding in his sheepfolds to hear the bleatings of the flocks;" against Gilead for abiding beyond Jordan, Dan in his ships, which none assailed ; Asher on the sea shore within walls, which none were besieging : then the battle and the flight of Sisera almost at one instant, the curse

of Meroz and its inhabitants, because they came not to the help of the Lord's cause, and the blessing of Jael, set between that and the fierce derision launched at the mother of Sisera, vainly dividing the spoils in her thoughts. What victory not of Jewry, ever had such an ode of triumph?

But the mission of Israel could not have been one of peace either for itself or others; because with all their wondrous privileges, its people at large were scarcely better than those whom they were appointed to root out and destroy. Like the recoil of a weapon in unskilful hands, their blows fall back upon themselves. The mission of the Jews was not assigned to them for any merits of their own, but inherited from Abraham, himself found the most perfect man in his generation; through promise made to him at a time when in the ordinary course of nature, or without a miracle, they could never have come into being. It was a mission for a single purpose, to prepare a place and time for the coming of Christ, and could not be distributed among or shared by nations; or perhaps we may say, that it was not so shared in mercy, lest the whole of mankind should be destroyed for worse shortcomings than those of the Jews themselves. The Jews therefore were to be preserved and strengthened for their mission, and they were so abundantly. They could not be rewarded because of their terrible offences, and they were afflicted, grievously, almost persistently, yet visibly in some proportion to their sins of rebellion and disobedience. For them any continuance of miracles of grace and favour would have been misplaced. Such miracles of that character as were accorded, were either vouchsafed to the few who on occasions were found faithful, or on their repentance for the ceasing of plagues brought on the people by their own sins and stubbornness.

But at all times the work of the Dispensation went on; and it may be observed, that the powers given to their leaders and prophets for the time being were in all cases adapted to their places in that work. Thus, to Moses were accorded those most agreeable to the character and requirements of the great leader and lawgiver of all; to Joshua, those of the military chief who was to bring the

people under his charge into, and establish them in, the promised land ; to Samuel, those of one of a more priestly character, but strong and secure in power and influence ; to Elijah and Elisha, those of men of like character, but oppressed and fugitives in evil times, until we come to the spirit of prophecy vouchsafed to the greater and lesser prophets, whose words we find in the Canonical writings, down to the very last utterances of Malachi, declaring the nearer approach and true character of the Messiah.

The prophetic spirit ceased with the last named, because its work was complete. All had been declared that was needful for man to know. He well knew all that was in man, who said, "They have Moses and the prophets ; if they believe not them, neither will they believe though one rose from the dead." These are words for all time ; true as well for us as those to whom they were spoken, as also for those who died long before. The Scriptures, though written at long intervals at all times contained every thing that it was fitting and designed for man from time to time to know, and to seek for more would be to tempt, perhaps to provoke the Spirit. The lost writings referred to in the Scriptures are perhaps lost to us without real detriment.

The woman of Samaria at the well spoke the common belief of her time when she said, "I know that Messiah cometh ; when he is come he will tell us all things" ; and she spoke truly. He did come, and He did by Himself and his Apostles tell us all things ; and His word must be accepted in its full integrity, without either addition or diminution. We must have no strange "literature" or philosophy here. It cannot be changed.

But one thing you may do. You may destroy it altogether, as the priests of Baal would have destroyed Elijah and his Master with him, if they could have caught Him ; and when you have done this, if you can entirely from your own stores and observation construct and teach us anything better, whether denominational or intellectual, and whether supported by miracles or syllogisms,—why then your turn will have come.

We are in rather a hard case just now in relation to our "spiritual fact" or soul ; on the one hand, we cannot view it as "a phenomenon which refuses the yoke of ordinary physical laws," without first encountering the serene unobjecting "content" of a very distinguished Professor of Natural Science and Lecturer on Sundries to accept it as a piece of poetry ; on the other, we are not quite prepared to close with the Sage (Σχολαστικός) in Hierocles, who, having a house to sell, carried one of the bricks about with him for a specimen of the elevation and acreage ; that is to say, we cannot go into a laboratory and see a gas liquified here, and a germ boiled to death there, and think that we are viewing the infancy of the soul ; nor can we, on merely seeing the outside of a dwelling by any means that we know of divine the age, complexion, stature, and general habits of its inhabitant.

Our aim has been to show that where there is no succession, there is no time ; that where there is succession, there has always been something before the first assignable step in that succession, which could thus have no beginning in time. Time therefore, together with the Creation, to which it is an incident, must have sprung out of eternity by the action of some eternal Force. But if that were a dead Force, it must have been a dependent one, and have had its own beginning in time, because there was something before it ; and it would be only re-introducing the same old difficulty, to contend for such a thing.

This eternal Force then must have been a living one, and must have combined in itself all agencies now or ever at work throughout the universe, by which at its own eternal will and pleasure, it made and created all things both visible and invisible ; and as at the first act of creation nothing existed but itself, so now and always there is not, and never has been, any matter, form, sense, consciousness, spiritual intelligence, or any thing whatever in heaven or earth, that has, or has ever had any existence except by and in the will and consciousness of that living Force, the Creator and Disposer of all things.

"Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, to wit, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind; that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind, or in that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit."—*Berkeley's Works, Vol. 1, p. 20.*

Upon this we take our stand, and are at peace; for we have found an Eternal Mind, the Creator and Ruler by His own undivided will and power of all things in heaven and earth, who also has declared Himself to us. Being such as He is, He could not have created the world but for some worthy object, and that object He has provided in man as re-habilitated through Christ, who being Himself truly the Son of God, has by taking the manhood into Himself, made His redeemed co-heirs with Himself by adoption, and, as such, sharers of the glories and perfections of His Kingdom.

IN THE BEGINNING

REMARKS ON CERTAIN MODERN VIEWS OF THE CREATION

PART V.

BY

RICHARD HILL SANDYS M.A.

Of Lincoln's Inn Barrister-at-Law

Dissentientis
. exemplo trahenti
Perniciem veniens in ævum.



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IN THE BEGINNING.

PART V.

In quâ diversi niteant cum mille colores,
Transitus ipse tamen spectantia lumina fallit ;
Usque adeo quod tangit idem est, tamen ultima distant.
Ovid. of the Rainbow.

THERE is more in these lines than may at first sight appear, or than was perhaps intended or suspected by the Author, who, if not as Poet, certainly as Cosmical Œconomist, would well have graced, and indeed properly belongs to, these latter days.

No one, however minutely gifted, or however advanced in all positive knowledge, can safely take upon himself to distinguish black from white, or to declare how many colours there are in the rainbow ; there are none specifically ascertainable, and therefore logically, and if there be grace or merit in plain speaking, none at all ; and Homer, as has been well decided lately by our nearly first of critics and quite first of woodcutters, was quite right, being colour-blind, in not saying that there were. You cannot place the point of the finest needle on any spot within it, and name its colour. You cannot say where one colour begins, or where another ends ; from crocus to violet, from rose to lily, from light to dark, from sugar to salt, from yes to no, all is in all things, communism, usurpation and change. You can no more predicate specific colour at any point of the most pretentious rainbow, than you can with pen or pencil draw a line on paper that

shall be a right line and nothing but a right line. The colour is somehow there, and the line is somewhere there, and that is all you can say ; try it as you will, all is one, and one is all ; and you are never quite right, and yet must be hard up indeed if you are always quite wrong.

The rainbow has no outside whatever. You cannot in all space needle out an atomic speck, and predicate that on one side of it is rainbow, on the other not. The poetical *mille colores*, so far from being a Post-Homeric exaggeration, is the feeblest of approximations to the truth ; as the colours within blend, and seemingly destroy each other in an incomprehensible series of vanishing differences, so do those without insensibly mix with, and seemingly, but only seemingly, lose themselves in the infinite sky or space beyond. In fact there is no such thing as an atom of specific or definable colour any where.

Now, the rainbow is, by courtesy at least, a positive fact ; for we see it, and can almost tell what it is not made of ; but its constituent colours belong to the infinite, that is to say, to what, by scientific necessity, we call the infinitesimally small on the one hand, and to the infinitely large on the other. It is certain, that we can only arrive at a very weak and shadowy appreciation of this infinite, by persistently multiplying or dividing the finite, that is, by the manly process of continually extending or contracting certain ideal boundaries in our thoughts ; but the shifting idea we thus play with, is not that of an infinite ; for then it would shift no more.

But further, still keeping a little longer, in the interest, as we shall presently show, of true science viewed as the hand-maid, or maid-of-all-work of Philosophy and her lodgers, to our representative instance, the rainbow has a visible beginning, and as it commonly dies a natural death, a sensible ending in time ; but we cannot distinguish the exact moment of either. Neither again can we ascertain when sound begins ; because, being, as it is, the effect of continuous vibrations of some certain media, it cannot be the first or any single agitation of the conducting medium directly following on the first impact of the motive cause that produces it ; especially as we know that these vibrations only produce sound within a

certain range, and that, if either too quick or too slow, they cease to do so altogether ; though not to all alike, for there are some, especially among the aged, who cannot hear very high notes, such as that of the chirp of the grass hopper, or the snore of the dormouse, which the late Dr. Macculloch once told me, was the highest in nature that he was acquainted with.

Again, light, the co-ordinate or feeder of sight, travels ; and travelling necessarily takes time ; therefore we do not see the very instant we open our eyes, and when we do see, every object remains even an appreciable time on the retina, as any rocket, whirligig, or thaumatrope, or the mere act of winking will suffice to assure us ; and here again the infinitesimal, or smaller infinite, mocks our ken.

As it is now in the course of being clearly, and not in the least dogmatically, established, that the finite is the beginning and ending of all we can possibly know, and that the infinite, being outside that beginning and ending, is also outside all our knowledge, we desire to be allowed to show our loyal acquiescence in this rectification of boundary, by a few way-side *vivas* of admiration in our own unscientific vernacular before finally curling ourselves up to rest in the shell of the finite.

The parallax, or apparent change of place of visible objects, is a pet phenomenon in astronomy, and various other sprouts of science. The planet Venus, for instance, does not hold precisely the same apparent place in the heavens when seen from the spot on which we are now standing, that she does from one some hundreds of miles off ; and the difference has several times been accurately observed and calculated, on the occasions of her transits across the sun ; but the law of this difference must be a general one, and if it applies to a distance of hundreds of miles, must equally do so to one of a single mile, or of a furlong, or a fathom, or a foot, or an inch. This indeed is the secret of the Stereoscope, by which we are enabled to see partly round an object, and which, but for the transits of Venus, might perhaps never have been invented, resting as it does mainly on the laws of parallax.

But familiarity breeds contempt, and this poor planet is quite unequal to the occasion, and we must go much far-

ther. The parallactic angle of Sirius, supposed to be the nearest to us of the fixed stars, has been ascertained at the distance of the two points at the opposite extremes of a diameter of the earth's annual orbit round the sun : then the rule above referred to applies, and we must be poor creatures indeed to doubt that, so much having been already done, as our instruments improve, the angle of the parallax of this star, as observed between some lesser intervals of space, say, between two spots on our own globe, as for instance, between Greenwich and New York, or between one side of Greenwich Park and its opposite, or between the right hand or eye and the left of any given astronomer, will, or may hereafter and all in good time, be observed and duly formulated ; and that, when that has been done, the like angle of some other star already, or hereafter to be discovered, double, or any number of times the distance of Sirius, may also be ascertained and formulated with equal accuracy ; and then that of another, and another after that, and so on. Next, suppose a strong-minded lover of science and positive results, to set himself resolutely and conscientiously to make these calculations, so as to come nearer and nearer to the conception of a triangle with two of its sides infinitely extended, and its base infinitesimally contracted, so as to be no more than nothing, and yet always something ; and then suppose another lover of science with analogous gifts standing at his side, to set himself with equal resolution and conscientiousness to calculate the rim of the sky or space around him, " the grand circle of which the centre is everywhere," by dropping the central idea as officious, and piling up in his thoughts an ideal sky or space, whether star-studded (as in all reason it ought to be) or not, beyond the one he sees, or thinks he sees, and then another beyond that, and another, and another, and so on, and then ? who shall say what the results might not be ?

We have proposed this in the best interests of both science and philosophy, because whoever has at all noted the course of modern lecturing and Associations, must long ago have been satisfied that the more minute, that is, the smaller our knowledge on every subject, the nearer we approach to that of the First Cause, whether it prove in the end to be everything or

nothing, and whether a cause without an effect, or an effect without a cause, or sometimes one and sometimes the other.

Has it ever been fairly considered, that the irregularity of the arrangement of the stars as seen by us, is conclusive that they are not infinitely distributed through space? The Milky Way, for instance, has observable bounds; but in things material contained in space, a bound anywhere to a part implies a bound somewhere to the whole; and beyond this ultimate bound is space without stars or other contents; but space without contents is nothing, or at least, only something that may be, will be, being only a parasite of matter, appearing and disappearing with it; but if there is no space, there is no place; and thus the primitive atom, protoplasm, or other entity as per nomenclatures, existing nowhere, hooked itself on to nothing, and thus became by degrees the visible world around us. At any rate, we may leave it to those whom it may concern, that is, to those who take the materialistic view in all things, to account for the immense holes left in creation.

But to resume: we are peremptorily assured that what we have stated above are the sole means and sources, and the inexorable bounds of all we know or ever can know; and we are thus being gradually walled up, with a crust of bread and a pitcher of primitive water, and bidden to be thankful. Whatever the subject, whether the Invention of the Cross, or its disillusionation; whether the detection of the original protoplasm, or the determination of loose-lying æons into precise epochs, or the self-working of the preconscious into the conscious,* or the deadlock of the spiritual and molecular facts,† or the antique Fetish, Dheva, Deus, or Shining, improving itself into the God of the Sect called Christians, and then returning back to its earlier hyperhypostasis, there is nothing that is not so bounded; means and appliances beyond these are none; nothing anywhere, but what you call the victories of Science and Philosophy, but we find to be restlessness, monotony, failure. It is just the case and argument of the mouse that ran up the clock, to see what made it tick so, and then ran

* *Part 4, p. 14.*

† *Part 4, p. 27.*

down again on its striking one ;

Μῦς ὁδε ᾠρολογεῖον ἐφήλατο δεινσοφίστης ·
Τοῦτο τορῶς ἐβραχ, "Ἐν." · κ' αὐθις ὄγ' ἄψ ἔδραμεν.

The argument is briefly this—all our knowledge is derived from the senses ; and the percepts, and therefore also the concepts of the senses, taken in their widest meaning, are in themselves finite ; therefore there is to us no infinite ; and we are all that is, therefore there is no infinite ; and all beyond this is mere delusion and unrighteousness. Yet we may well be content, for we can construct all we want out of the finite, and have no need of the infinite, which we may take up or let alone at pleasure ; and why then should it not be our pleasure to let it alone ?

But the infinite is always about our ways, and the thought of it will and does come to us continually, for good, for evil, or for nothing ; and the dread of that nothing, is to the unprivileged worse than every thing. From this we seek relief, and for that purpose place ourselves under you, as teachers whom we highly revere, but do not in the least understand. Sometimes indeed we venture to confess, but always with a diffidence and humility at least equal to your own, that you seem to us to talk words ; as when one of your Hierophants highly commends Epicurus as the wisest of men, for holding "that death is no concern of ours, because until it comes it is nothing, and when it comes we are nothing ;" whereas it is only the coming that concerns us at all ; for the present is the past the instant it comes ; and so also in some of your happiest and most peremptory conclusions, some necessary considerations seem to be not very inconveniently dropped altogether, so that your Σοφία, though doubtless always what she says she is, gains something of the look of her thread-dropping sister Λιποσοφία ; as for instance, when you ask in a way far more imposing than any assertion, "Can that which is the cause of life and thought think and feel ?" you take for granted that there was a cause of life and thought ; whereas the entire contention is that there was none, because life is the cause of, and was before, all things ; and again when you argue with so much force and vivacity, that the infinite cannot reveal itself

to the finite, because the one is finite and the other infinite—but we will give your own position in your own words.

'Αριστον μὲν ὕδωρ.* The elements of all knowledge are positive facts, and there are no positive facts other than such as come in our way; and these come to us through the senses, but, "all that is supplied to us by the senses is finite, and whatever transcends this is a mere delusion. The word is well applied to several serial correlative concepts, but not to an absolute exclusive concept; if the senses tell us that all is finite, and reason draws all her capital from the senses, what right have we to speak of an infinite?"†

This may be found quoted with marks of high approval by divers very distinguished Comptistes and others, and it looked so smooth and fine at first sight, that we were almost caught.

But what is that in us which receives ideas, and is conscious of these percepts? And what was it before those ideas and percepts, by which it became sensible of time and space and of things finite, came to it? for time is only succession, and space the multiplication of place. There must be something that perceives, before there can be percept. Has that something nothing in it subjective? Has it no life of its own? Are the ideas which visit it themselves life? Might we not just as well say that light is sight? Percepts are common to all with like organs of perception, but concepts vary in the individuals. The former in themselves are neither good nor evil, but are moulded into either by the concept, which is

* Chief of nature's works divine,

Water claims the foremost line.—*West*.

This is the best and only translation that we remember at present, of the opening words of Pindar's first Olympian Ode. By water is to be understood, the original element of all things. Nature is called by implication, divine, through the Christian prejudices of the translator. In an evil hour, some one added on

Water, water everywhere,

And not a drop to drink.

† There is no definite article in Latin Grammar; but Latin Literature draws all her capital from this Grammar. Then what right have you to speak of a Greek definite ὁ ἡ το, to a Latin scholar who is nothing but a Latin scholar, when the natural and just conclusion to him must be, that there is no ὁ ἡ το anywhere?

ever on the watch, as the hawk for its quarry ; then what is that which before the percept came, was, and was potentially good or evil, that is, possessed some primitive quality not yet associated with material things ?

Given for the sake of the argument, matter as a concrete reality, and the visible world as a compound of atoms, and we have at once an allowable serial concept of infinite atoms spread through infinite correlative spaces, the unattainable total concept of these last springing, so to speak, first and continually outwards from the four walls of the room in which we happen to be ; and thus and so far as we have atoms or concepts of atoms, or parts and pieces to multiply or divide at pleasure, your position fairly holds.

But is that all ? Is there really nothing in this ever vexed world of ours, but what is subject to the law of these serial fancy-drawn parts and pieces ? The word "spirit" conveys a sufficiently definite idea. By common consent founded on common experience, there is such a thing as spirit in or pertaining to man, and you yourselves do not say that there is not, but only that it is not what we take it to be. Be it then what it may, and suppose for the sake of the argument, that it is only a quickening of atoms bound up in certain integuments, which we call the body, and that when the integuments give way, that is, when the body dies, the spiritual atoms disperse, and there is no longer anything to quicken, or in other and your own words, when the "molecular fact" ends, the "spiritual" one, which during the natural life was always coming and going, sleeping and waking alternately, also ends with it, yet in the meantime, in itself, in its properties, modes, and actions, is there not in it something that does not always or necessarily savour of the finite ? We take it for the present, as we have a right to do, at its best and highest, and free from the contagion of the grosser senses, and apart from the dull frivolities of common life. Being at one with the will, for they cannot be separated, though the latter may be acted upon from without, it works with the intellect as an instrument, or as a master directs it, but it is not one with it, nor does it at all resemble it. The intellect may be bright and clear, or dull and inapprehensive, and may suffer

fatigue and weariness, but likes and dislikes, sorrow and gladness, are of the spirit only. The spirit receives, and is variously affected by ideas derived from the intellect, as well as from the senses, but this affection is apart and distinguishable from both of them.

According to some, our ideas are the impressions or shadows of things that are or have been ; and this is just where so many mistakes come from, and get made into patchwork counterpanes to cure agues ; a mistake is made, and instead of being thrown away, is pieced on to another, and another, and another after that, and so on, and then the whole is stuffed with flock and emptiness, and made a show of, to conceal the want of good warm blankets within.

A distant object is dimly discerned by two persons traveling together on the same road, and they both take it for the same thing, and then one of them shuts his eyes ; the other on nearer approach and as they pass finds that it is really something else ; but the one who shut his eyes has got into an argument and will not take his companion's word, and as the object cannot now be seen, ends as he began, by maintaining that it was what it was first taken for. Next, suppose ourselves to be Literary Inquirers desirous of learning the truth of the matter ; in this conflict of evidence we could decide nothing ; for there would be no reason whatever why we should not refuse to take the word of either, and determine that it was nothing at all ; and indeed we should be bound so to do, because instruction, like bitter medicines, is no good unless well shaken, and here the more we shook the question, the more the object would disappear. Now it was the man that kept his eyes open, that was the cause of this *embroglio*, for if he had said nothing about it, we should have accepted what the blind man told us. True, he would have told us wrong ; but it would not have been found out, and might in the end have answered all the purposes of truth. And this will be found to dispose of the Scriptural question, for good and all.

But in all seriousness, the "eternal, not ourselves tending to righteousness," of a certain distinguished Free-lance, skirmishing apparently on his own account, for he neither leads

nor follows lead, what is it but a vanishing idea of a personal God, a speck where an idea has been, rather than an idea itself, left by stripping Deity, step by step of all attributes? The principle seems to be, that as we clearly must not have an anthropomorphic God, and can form no conception of ourselves of one that shall not be more or less anthropomorphic, therefore he must be without form altogether, and so the idea of God perishes.

But we insist that the intellect is not the only feeder of the spirit, as it certainly is not that of the consciousness, and that the spirit receives impressions and, what from the poverty of language we are enforced to call, ideas from the unseen as well as from the seen; and it seems to us almost conclusive on this point, that the gifts of the spirit are not measured, certainly and accurately measured, by the notions of the intellect. But if so, whence come those tokens from the unseen? We possess a consciousness informed by reason and sentiment; the former by line and rule, teaches us that an object is beautiful and desirable; the latter has assured us of it long before; the one is always arguing and drawing diagrams; the other has neither speech nor language, but its voice is heard. The occasion sudden comes to all. If the spirit tells us that a deed or thought is good or evil, and then reason comes limping up afterwards to say, that he inclines upon consideration to think that the spirit is right, where do good and evil dwell? In the spirit? or in the fag-end of a syllogism? And what much has reason to do with them? It will be said, that we act in most cases without reflection, from habit; which may be true enough, but habit is of the spirit, as well as of the intellect, and as the spirit is good or bad, such will be the conduct at all times, and such the man.

For our own parts, we consider that here is to be felt the true force of the "design argument," on which we propose to say a few words presently, for we cannot see how two such essentially different things as spirit and intellect should have been so perfectly adapted to each other in man, and that man placed in a world so perfectly fitted for the exercise and advance of each, except through and by the will and power of a personal designer, who can be none less than God, the Crea-

tor, adapter and maintainer of what we will call for the present, two worlds, the seen and the unseen.

We can seldom trace or account for the course of our thoughts, much less for their source. The sudden breaks by which we are so often, without any will of our own, wrenched from one subject of thought to another wholly different and unrelated, are things never wholly within the control of the strongest and best regulated minds. We are not sure that the idea of the infinite is not as definite, as that of many finite things. Suppose an impression of certain peril, imminent from some quarter, from some cause and in some form unknown; here is an idea without form and without definite bounds, bringing us speedily round to the same sort of impractical delirium as the infinite absolute does, if we allow our thoughts to dwell upon it too long. Here then is an idea, boundless and incomprehensible, being in fact the total concept of limitless imaginable concepts at once, a boundless apprehension of injury from things not known, of which we have had no experience and have never formed any previous idea, and yet finite because ourselves are finite. What were the sheep in Cowper's "Needless Alarm," afraid of, alleging, as they did, that they had never heard such sounds before? And why did they run round and round the field so often? and why to the left rather than to the right, or to the right rather than to the left? Conceding that they were woolly-pated incomplete developments, still was not their dominant idea that of the infinite? But if so in proportion as their knowledge of the finite is less than ours, so would their idea of the infinite be less scrimped, and more familiar.

If it be true that the intellect receives all ideas originally from the finite, and from no other source whatever, and that its perceptions are therefore to be considered as necessarily bounded by that finite, how does this apply to the spirit, which has no necessary relation with the forms of the finite which we call time and space, nor with many other known phenomena of the material world, and has relations with other things and forms far different? But if the spirit be not always limited by the finite, its proper and full range and

privileges are to be sought for, not there, but in and throughout the infinite.

And is it not so? Is the spiritual consciousness always in relation with finite ideas? Is it never lifted out of these pragmatical "serial finites" of yours? Are the words of St. John the Divine, "I was in the Spirit on the Lord's Day," so utterly incomprehensible to us? Did not Handel, and do not many lesser than Handel, know better than that? The body of the Apostle lay entranced and senseless some few hours in Patmos, but by what measure of time can his vision be reckoned? that vision which, as well as not, may have been an instantaneous spiritual impression, a glory not of time?

By the law of our being it is not good for us to be alone; we cannot remain lonely, we must seek associations. The sickly recluse from his kind, working against the appointed purpose of his life, is always unhappy, and yet feels that he is never alone; and be he the worst man that ever lived, it is a mercy that he should so feel. For ourselves, we believe unreservedly, that in any reasonable being, the sense of an absolute lasting seclusion from all other life, is impossible. The idea of such a state of perfect unvisited solitude, of being forgotten as it were of all creation for ever, would be worse than that of annihilation itself. But for good or for evil, it is impossible; the spirit as it clears, must seek its source, not to be absorbed in, but to be in communion with it in its proper home. If it will not, or cannot do this, it seeks on the instant to flee in terror, but in either case it is never alone. If it could be, it would quickly seek to return.

Feeling and exercising ourselves as spirits, we naturally attribute kindred faculties to others like and known to ourselves; and then to others unknown to and only imagined by us, greater and more highly gifted than ourselves; but these to us are but fancy-woven figures in tapestry, with all the graces within the possible reach of our conceptions. But, if the truth did not come to us first from Revelation, we come at last from the consideration of the one entire visible universe around us, to the idea of one central (it is here that you fail) creating and governing Power. There is no scope for the imagination here. We cannot people the unknown universe

from our own speedily exhausted fancies ; much less can we from anything in ourselves assign determinate form to this Power. We acquire this idea not from any frivolous manipulation of "several correlative finites," but from an impression of unity, of One force, the Maker and Maintainer of one universe of worlds visible and invisible for ever. We cannot help ourselves. There is no prejudice where there is no choice. The idea is itself that of irresistible conviction, and comes to us at once, at a thought, and once come we can no more lose it again, than we can that of its witness, this visible world on which we are placed.

We do not say that this knowledge, for such it is, comes to all ; on the contrary, we may tell you presently to whom it will not come, and why ; we will only add here that the idea of such a God being, and not also in constant watchful communion with his creatures, is to us inconceivable, and that this alone sufficiently disposes us to expect and receive a Revelation, yet this is not a prejudice, but a direct and necessary consequence flowing from assured premises.

But we are now upon a question of possible concepts, in answer to your challenge of our right to speak of an infinite at all ; our position being, that although now and for ever incomprehensible by us, the Eternal in His wisdom and of grace, by His works and in His dealings with us, makes Himself more and more known continually ; yours, that eternity being outside all "our possible concepts," there is in all reason an end, first, of an actual, and then of a potential eternal altogether.

We cannot hold with you, that we are so isolated in this life, that all our ideas are derived from or bounded by our percepts of the visible or sensible outward world, because we conceive, and it is a matter of trust with us, that the Force which gave us a spirit (we will call it with you a "spiritual fact" if you prefer it), will also fully provide, to overflowing it may be, for all the proper requirements of that spirit, as completely in all respects as it supplies our material wants, and that as that spirit must from its nature at times deal apart with the unseen from which it came, there must be ideas in us at those times, springing directly and wholly from that unseen.

We are not driven to maintain that these ideas exist in us wholly severed from and without any co-operation of our intellectual perceptions, but only that they blend with and enrich them, not with any outward traceable imagery or open vision, nor with aught that comes from observation, but with something self-asserting and filling every void with a new sense of pleasantness and peace, which without it would not have been. Such we may well deem to have been the calm of the last moments of our late Bishop Wilberforce, whose lines through life had so often lain in troubled waters, his last admiring gaze fixed on the visible beauties of the scenery around him, and by them drawn to the thought, not to him unaccustomed, of the Unseen, and thus engaged, taken in an instant painlessly away to be received of that Unseen.

Yourselves now and then claim something of this privilege for yourselves. Scores and scores of times we have known you making holiday to visit and observe these beauties, and heard you breaking out into a sort of demi-semi-religious laughing chorus, and paying out your stock phrases, "How beautiful this is! How thankful we are to the first cause, if there be one! How good he must be and how good and happy we be!" and so on.—But you want the privilege of the good Bishop's calm. He who alone can be truly worshipped will come to all when truly sought, but He will wait the caprice of none, learned or unlearned. If you will bear the truth we will tell you that what you feel at these times is but the play of the animal spirits suddenly working on more or less cultured minds; there is in it neither stability nor truth; holiness or tendency to real holiness there is none; you are for the instant but as a sort of intellectual lambs frisking in a meadow, or meditative kine that have found their way into a luxurious clover field. So far from being anything desirable, it argues rather a dangerous state of mind; it is a mere step on one side to look at an offered olive branch of peace and conciliation; you look at it, admire, vote it *απροσδιονυσον* (unfestive), and are presently wilder or more dismal, as the case may be, than ever.

Spirit of Truth, whose promised power
 Inspired with language not their own*
 The builders of the Church, whose tower
 Received in Christ its corner-stone :

Thou stir'st with Prayer's refreshing breath
 The lips of Sorrow : O, freshen mine !
 Nor let me (magnet-drawn to death)
 Resist or grieve thee, Force divine !
 JOHN STAFFORD SPENCER.

We will present as an illustration, what we know you will not accept as a fact. On the great day of Pentecost, the sound as of a mighty rushing wind was heard, and

* "And when the day of Pentecost was fully come, they were all with one accord in one place. . . . And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance. And there were dwelling at Jerusalem, Jews, devout men, out of every nation under heaven. Now when this was noised abroad, the multitude came together, and were confounded, because that every man heard them speak in his own language. And they were all amazed and marvelled, saying one to another, Behold, are not all these which speak Galilæans? And how hear we every man in our own tongue, wherein we were born? We do hear them speak in our tongues the wonderful works of God."—*Acts II*, v. 1—11.

With these passages, contrast the following :—

"And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech. . . . And they said one to another, Go to, let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly. And they had brick for stone, and slime had they for mortar. And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top *may reach* unto heaven ; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth. And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded. And the Lord said, Behold the people *is* one, and they have all one language ; and this they begin to do : and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth, and they left off to build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel, because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth : and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth."—*Genesis XI*, v. 1—9.

Thus Sin confounded, thus Grace restored, the language of man.

J. S. S.

the appearance as of cloven tongues beheld, by "all met with one accord in one place"; and all present heard, each in his own language, from the mouths of poor and despised Galileans, words of wisdom and power never before uttered by man; but the full thoughts which were in these Galileans and which compelled them so to speak, the hearers did not know until themselves received it from the same Spirit that inspired the speakers.

Let not this seem strange to any. Neither Apostle nor preacher, be it the Archbishop of Grenada, before his conversion by Gil Blas, or Barrow, or Bossuet, or St. Augustine, or even St. Paul himself, ever yet converted a single soul. It is not they who do it. The speaker may be fully inspired, but unless the very same spirit that fills him reaches also the hearer, nothing is done; and if it does reach him, it comes to him not from the preacher, but direct from the source, and is the immediate working of the Spirit itself. The most eloquent preacher may attract and maintain the attention of his hearers, and may strike the right chord, but unless there be something more than mere attention, unless the weight that checks the vibrations be lifted off the chord, there will be no response. The preacher does well in his office; the hearer must fail in his at his own peril. He must attend, and he must search himself and the spirit that is in him, and according as he does this, all or nothing or worse than nothing will be done; but if all be done, it is not done by the preacher, nor is the merit with him, for he has done his bounden duty and no more; but something has passed from the Spirit that set the preacher his task, and assisted him through it, to the hearer direct. This is one of the greatest, and at the same time plainest of truths. The hearer has ceased to rebel, and grace has found him at an acceptable time.

These Revivals, these *hic et ubique* brawling fanatics! this more than Fescennine licence, this barbarous bellowing that works on the brain just like strong drink, and nothing more, this *Βίωv Πρασις*, this mock auction of souls! "Dearly beloved sinners, unless you

are fully converted by the time the clock strikes twelve, when we close our performance, you shall be fully damned." Is this your notion of the Pentecostal movement, or of the *αγαλλιασις και αφελογης καρδιας*, of the gladness and singleness of heart, *Acts, c. 2, v. 46*, of the first converts of the Apostles themselves? Did you ever hear or read of such things in those times? Look at the Transfiguration of Raffaele; look, if you dare, at the boy, the possessed boy at the foot of the mount in the centre of the picture, at the sorrowing and perplexed man who is guarding, the pitying woman who is directing him, and then look round you; and what see you there? Is that the Paraclete? Is that your reading of the lowly, fervent, accepted prayer for grace, "Lord, I believe, help Thou my unbelief?" Is there no long-suffering in the Word? Is he to be denounced for a tame line and rule preacher, whose words, be they of strength and bitterness, or of mildness and persuasion, enter the thoughts, there to bear fruit, though it may be at some even far distant time? Do not they serve, who only stand and wait?

It cannot fairly be said that these Galileans, the first recipients of this Spirit, spoke or acted from an unidea'd impulse. They spoke of an eternal Personality pervading the universe, the Creator and Ruler of all things, and of one whom all had lately beheld, made and fashioned as a man in all things like themselves, yet as possessing all attributes proper to such a Creator and Ruler: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made."

The idea of a resurrection from the dead commands that of one rising to die no more. Such a one lives henceforth for ever in time so long as time is, and also eternally apart from time; and that is the true conception of Him who so died, and who arose again on the third day.

We can only approximate to the idea of endless time by the use of your serial finite correlative concepts, that is, by continual additions; but we cannot go on counting for ever, and therefore practically, or except when we are very idle,

we do not count at all. Until we begin to count, we have not the idea of succession, that is, of time, present in our minds, and are as if in eternity. We cannot, it is true, with any clearness apprehend the concrete idea of an eternal "Now," without beginning or succession, because we have the idea of time in succession so strongly impressed upon us by nature and habit, that we cannot get rid of it ; but thus much we may reasonably do : by stripping time in our thoughts of its material accessories, we may advance towards the idea of a spiritual world, and thence to that of life or consciousness without succession of ideas, by which alone we become sensible of time, and from that to the reasonable conclusion that there must be such a thing as eternity, although our own existence in such an eternity as distinguished from time, as it is beyond our experiences so also except as a necessary deduction, is it beyond our comprehension. Either time or eternity must be, for it is absurd to speak of universal annihilation ; and succession in all its forms is the attribute of created things only, and for them only was time created and is now maintained ; the first act of creation being the first term in the series.

We do not receive the privilege of this spirit, with the fulness accorded to these Galileans, who were chosen out of all the world for special and immediate service ; but what we do receive less abundantly, brings with it the same spiritual idea of one eternal spirit, without parts, and far beyond the reach of any tame series of correlative finite concepts of parts.

Thus far we would venture ; what we look for and have been promised, is spoken of as a " Father's house with many mansions," and that implies a place prepared for us, with degrees of privileges to be continued for ever, not in eternity for there is only one Eternal, and in eternity is no advance and no degrees, but in time, another time it may be, already begun and running its course in yet another world, prepared and maintained for us by God, who although Himself eternal, and not subject to time, is yet the Lord of it.

Who are you with your serial correlative concepts, and where do you come from ? It rather seems to me that we have met somewhere before. I remember as well as if it had

happened only yesterday, many years ago, when I was only a sprout, a mere nursery chick, trying it on with my old nurse, my *Sabella nutrix*, my *divinâ motâ anus urnâ* one summer afternoon in the laundry, as she was working her Problem of "getting up the fine washing at home." I wanted to know what was on the other side of the sky, and we got on very well together, concept after concept, above the ceiling, above the garret and chimney pots, up to the clouds; and then beyond the clouds, beyond the moon, beyond the sun, and at last beyond the stars, and then the good old soul picked a quarrel with me for upsetting her tub, and sent me packing.

She might have told me well enough, for she read her bible, only she could not arrange her thoughts; and so I turn to you, who can arrange all thoughts at all times and find all truths as easily as common people can a needle in a haystack; and you tell me, first, that I have no right to know, because my intellect is too ridiculously small; and then, having established that point to your own satisfaction, you go on to discourse to me of serial correlative finite concepts and so on; that is, you a great philosopher, tell me in many hard words, what I, a representative child, told my old nurse in a few easy ones; and then too I find that after all, your infinite is not a real infinite, but only something sliceable, something made up of parts and dependencies, of material forms, and material attributes only.

There is and can be but one Infinite, and that an Infinite including all things in Himself, both the seen and the unseen, the spiritual and material all co-existing in Him at once, now and for ever. Whatever we can conceive of form and quality in things created, exist in Him, because He is the First Cause of all; but created things are the works of His hands, and we cannot transfer qualities proper only to them, to Him in His essence, because they imply parts, limitations, divisions, successions, changes, beginnings and endings, and He is always One.

You are unequal to the occasion. You can never rise to the thought of the absolute Unity of the Godhead, because you are always looking down for Him who is everywhere, in some

corner or another, among the chips of your workshops ; (there are no chips in creation) because you are always watching for Him in some sort of vaporous exudation at your feet, oozing and spreading, and turning and winding, here a little and there a little, through all space ; and this you tell us, you expect will one day sublimate into the real thing : and then, agreeing together thus far, you quarrel among yourselves, and split into sects—" I am of Anti-Apollos, and I am of Anti-Cephas, and I am of Gallio," and so on, and so continue for days and days together, until you judge it time to begin again with something new.

There is no God but our God. We do not present Him to you, as all-wise and not also all-powerful, as all-powerful and not also all-righteous, as all-righteous and not also all-merciful. He is all these in their absolute perfection at once, and because of that perfection they are not distinguishable in Him, but are as one single attribute. He did not invent the laws that maintain the world, for invention is one of several limited faculties, but He ordained them. In Him rest and action are one. He willed, designed and created all things at one thought. When He willed, then He designed ; when He designed, then He created ; but all by one act of inseparable grace, wisdom and power. We trace and distinguish these in His works, and give them names drawn from certain experiences of ourselves within ourselves, but in Him they are all one, present in and through eternity. The Trinity we confess in Him, is one of Persons, not of operations and accidents ; not one which we puzzle out by some sort of self-analysis, by which we discern in the end, not Deity, but only an exalted image of our own created selves, but one of three Divine Persons in one God.

Plato,* who is said to have had something to do with the getting up of the Fourth Gospel, puts a sort of specimen

* The Jews thoroughly despised all Western culture. They maintained that the Greeks were mere *fures sapientia*, and more especially, that Aristotle accompanied Alexander the Great to Jerusalem, and stole all that is good for anything in his works from certain writings of Solomon, which he found laid up in the Archives of the City. *Cosri ubi supra*. Now the writer of this Gospel was surely a Jew, and if not the Apostle

question with great solemnity. ἄρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὅσιον ἐστὶ φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὅσιον ἐστὶ,—*Euthyphron*, p. 21, “Is holiness loved of the Gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved of the Gods?”

There is some fun in this dialogue. Socrates is under prosecution for impiety; Euthyphron is prosecuting his own father for killing his slave, because he thinks it an act of piety, or holiness, and pleasing to the Gods so to do. Socrates suggests, that possibly the Gods, being many, may not be altogether agreed as to what is holy and what is not, and that in Euthyphron's case especially, Jupiter, who beat his father Saturn, might very probably highly approve of what he was doing; the latter, who was beaten, as strongly object; and then at last, after a little characteristic quibbling and cross-questioning by Socrates, Euthyphron runs bodily off in the middle of a question in great discomposure.

Both Plato and Socrates, that is, both Plato's Socrates and Xenophon's Socrates, and Socrates as he was, well knew how to darken counsel. The question as regards our God, vanishes at once. Socrates argues, that something precedes all action and all passion; that is true with us created beings with whom all is succession; but if there be but one God, then if he be holy, that holiness exists in his will, that is, he is holy because it is his will to be holy, and this holiness and this will are in Him eternal perfections without beginning or ending, change or shadow of turning, nor one more so than the other, the two being inseparable; and as all things exist by His will, which is holy, this holy will is properly the sole law of our moral being, and precedes, accompanies, and follows all action and passion in all His creatures, and the question is cold, scholastic, and frivolous.

But some of you, most of you, perhaps all of you, dislike, or as good as dislike, the ascription of will to the first cause, and maintain that, conceding one only infinite, there can be but one design, which design must necessarily be the one we find;

John himself, some favoured follower of his, and taking colour wholly from him, who had been taught in all things by Christ Himself, and not by Plato.

and that consequently, as necessity excludes will, and if will, then also personality, what is called the "design argument" is and is now generally admitted by all intelligent believers to be an atheistical one."

You flatter us a little in thus allowing a share of intelligence to any of us, but for our own parts, we greatly prefer your stripes. No intelligent believers have ever said that the "design argument" was an atheistical one; but they do say, that it becomes so in your hands, because you altogether exclude the demonstrable moral or spiritual element, and with it all evidence disclosing a moral end and purpose in Creation to be effected by moral means. Without this moral end and means our interest in the question is gone, and we would listlessly follow you, if you did but advance in anything like order, even to the very jaws of the Sphinx.

This moral purpose, of which the first evidence in order is the "irresistible consciousness" within ourselves spoken of by one not altogether unknown in some of these questions, assures us of an unseen spiritual world; and the fitness and agreement of this external seen world with that inner unseen one as united means to effect that purpose, effectually disarms your complimentary taunt of its sting.

We believe that it is in this direction that the truth is to be sought and found; and that all Genesis and Anti-Genesis arguments are of little worth beyond this; that that Book declares, not argumentatively, but with authority, that God created the heavens and the earth; and that as that Book is the opening and key to the understanding of the entire Scriptures, which we find self convincing even on moral grounds alone, we willingly accept that declaration, and with it the mystery of the Sabbath and other mysteries as of Divine institution, for the causes there assigned.

This purpose, namely, the advance of man in goodness and holiness, has not been effected, but yet has not been wholly defeated. There has been a disturbance. We have no secular evidence that enables us to show how this has happened, and you will admit of no other; and we are content therefore to take it here as a matter of observation, that there is a per-

ceptible generally diffused tendency to such advance, and that it has been and is by some means disturbed and hindered ; and further, that the effects of this disturbance have extended in and through the natural world, and to other beings than ourselves, who could have had no part in causing it.

That there is now such a thing, whether a development or not, as a moral sense, some power of discerning between the right and wrong in conduct, is not now in general very much disputed ; only the name is by some objected to, and by others, the sense itself is accounted to be something transitional, suited to our present state of development, but to be replaced by, or enlarged into something wiser and better hereafter. For this we are to wait ; but so long as we certainly know that we may safely do a wrongful act to our advantage, and do not do it, we must possess what we may properly, and have full right to call, a moral sense. This position cannot indeed always be tested by actual conduct, because we all act from mixed motives, and often from unreflecting habit stronger than all other motives. But as a simple proposition the fact is so. Without some such sense very generally diffused among the leading races, it is hard to imagine how social institutions could have been formed in the first instance, how they could have been maintained, or how advance ; how the "family instinct" could have been preserved or forwarded, or the individual protected from day to day.

Your position seems to be, that the social instinct, and the necessity of some sort of society, are at once the source and limit of all moral restraint. This we suppose is on the principle of having too much of a good thing. But be it as you say ; that instinct which you say is the cause of the restraint, must have lain hidden in the germ until the occasion found it, that is, until the being possessing it found itself in society ; and then by degrees this instinct developed into a sense and knowledge of the whole duty of man to man. If this be sooth, in the working of this particular instinct so developed, there are doubtless many admirable things, and not least among them, the weakness of the motive by which men, without hope for the future, have been led to do great and noble

acts to their own detriment and even ruin. But is this all? Is this instinct, the cause of this man to man morality, the definite absolute limit of all other morality? Is it more than a part and parcel of a fuller and more complete morality? Suppose a new occasion find it, suppose a new state of things and with it altogether new relations and obligations to arise, are we not bound to conclude that this germ of instinct will have strength enough in itself to take new forms adapted to this new state? Can we in reason do otherwise? Must not the moral sense exist before the occasion? Suppose it should turn out hereafter, that there really is a God requiring of us obedience and worship, marking out the ways in which we should go, and a future state. We would not be so idle as to beg this question; but vast numbers of the wisest, greatest, and best among us, have acted in the belief of such a God, and openly taught and practised a morality, not only different from, but often wholly opposed to this social instinct, man to man morality. Whence did these men derive, and why have they accepted this new commanding morality of theirs? You will not let us say from reason or natural instinct, for those you claim for yourselves, in your own right; then it can only be from some objective force, or influence from without, which has effected so strong a conviction, and worked such a change in the inner sense, as entirely to overthrow the old limited morality and replace it with itself. You have accounted for your own morality; can you account for this? You will say that it is founded on error, and that error and truth run in parallel lines, and never meet. At any rate it is a practice against a theory, in a matter in which it is death to halt between two opinions, and we propose it as both possible and credible, neither traceable to, nor to be limited by any mere social instinct or its tame and insignificant consequences. At least set these two moralities side by side, and let them fare as fare they may, in a fair field and with no favour.

But we have to deal at present with the "design argument," which is a much simpler one. If it shall fairly

appear in the result of the inquiry, that life or sense, and intellect, are merely developments of some pristine and simpler form of matter, and the moral sense in all its degrees, only a result or offspring of this sense and intellect, thus met in that material concrete of amorphous dancing atoms which we call man, and with that sense and intellect working together to some limited temporal end, we shall be prepared to allow that the design argument is but a weak tumultuary ineffectual ally, ready to lend itself to either side, or, if you prefer the expression, atheistical. There is in such case but one world, and that a material one, which is as it must be, and could never have been otherwise, the effect of the pullings and tearings of insensible forces, and not of any directing mind.

But if on the other hand, this moral sense be found to be something acting upon, but wholly distinct from this lower sense and intellect, not existing in, but always present with and exercising perpetual direction over them ; if it be found, growing and waning in its own strength, and keeping therein no proportion with that of either of them, yielding us continually thoughts and ideas that cannot be referred for their origin to the intellect or aught material, there must be what we will call for the present two worlds, a seen and an unseen one, and the perfect fitness of the one for the requirements of the other, is conclusive of a combined purpose, and if of such a purpose, then of a personal designer, and equally so whether we accept matter as a reality or not, and the "design argument," throwing off the useless props and spars that incumbered it in the dock, floats free and clear into the stream, in the sight and with the approval of all.

We ruin all by taking an unworthy view of this moral sense, and this is mainly owing to our not being permitted to call it by its right name, the implanted love of God.

The intellect is but a liminary power, subject to all brain casualties, and altering and failing with it ; and as it is thus a thing of organs and their workings, may, it is easily

conceivable, be replaced in another life under altered conditions, by another, like or unlike itself.

But the moral sense, whether at rest or in action, must be perfect, or sin and sorrow will find it, and death is at the door ; so long as it has any true life, it must strive towards perfection, or it is but as a drop of healing in a sea of death ; and it is this alone, that leads to the true idea and full assurance of God, His being and purpose. Without this we have but a vague sense of some restless Force, which has already been the cause to us of much pain and suffering, and may be of much more, and our best course in such a case must in all reason be to make a friend of evil, and worship all the devils we can find. For our own part, we know not, we believe not, we conceive not, that there can be holiness in man without a full and abiding sense of God's immediate presence, and of our immediate personal communion with Him. If there could be such a thing, it would be holiness in an eternal solitude, at which the mind revolts.

But further we insist at this point unhesitatingly, though it may put us out of the pale, that in all these questions, the absolute ascendancy of Christianity over all other systems of religion whatsoever must be so far assumed, that if the Christian religion be not true in all its main points, none others can be so in the least of theirs ; and that if men cannot, or will not accept the religion of Christ, they can have none other, but must be left to their own philological allegories and dictionaries ; and further, that in the inquiry into the Theosophy of the far east now so common, and so loudly expounded in so many ways, the proper object should be, not the discovery of truths which we already possess, much less their rectification, but only the source, modes, and consequences of this Theosophy at different epochs, and these only as historical or philological facts of interest, or, as means by which we may trace the sources of error at various times, their special characteristics, and how and whence derived.

After all is said, it can never be proved that the idea of God is not a traditional one, and if so, derived origi-

nally from God Himself. When the idea of a Creator by whatsoever means is once attained, then that of a threefold operation in creation, the will, the design, and the act, and the subsequent personification of those three, followed by a shadowy blending of them into one, is within the reach, and agreeable to the modes of thought of the human intellect ; and whether this be an aboriginal idea springing up in divers places, or a travelling one, whether we find it in Plato, or in Egypt, or the far east, or any, or either of them, is of little importance. It is not the Christian Trinity, for there is in it neither Christ, nor the Holy Spirit, nor any fixed scheme of redemption, or reclaiming of the lost, and is but an ineffective shadow.

But from the moral sense and its workings as above stated, necessarily comes the religious idea, which you feel you must get rid of before you can hope for peaceful lives : and to do this, you either present us with a lesser morality not open to the objection, or, if bold enough, reject morality altogether except as a sort of *ex post facto* prejudice, desirable occasionally as a matter of convenience for its immediate result, but by no means to be made too much of ; but both of these on being looked into with a little attention coalesce into one and the same.

But how far will this little secular morality take us ? And where does it come from ? We will assume development as regards the physical and intellectual world, in any terms and to any extent desired. Then man, an animal seeking pleasure and abhorring pain, must, according to the condition of his being, live in the society of his kind. To do this, he must establish and maintain this society ; and this he soon finds he can only do by some acts of self denial, and to this he is brought, first by a natural instinct, and then by reason, weak enough at first, but aided at last by habit, growing by degrees to a second nature. But there is as yet in all this, no morality and the true reading of the precept is, not, "do as you would be done by," but "do, or you will not be done by."

First in this state comes the softening influence of the "family," an instinct which we possess in common in

some degree with many of the inferior animals. But neither in this is there any true morality; for although it might, we do not say that it does, open the way to and favour the advance of other gentler tendencies as the circle of kindly feeling enlarges, yet as it is selfish in origin, aim, and object, without some new influence visiting and acting with it, selfish and unmeritorious it must remain.

We cannot help at times giving our own views on some of these matters, even when such views are supported solely by an authority not admitted in the argument, that is, by the "monstrous superstition"; but if we are thereby enabled to hit the mark, and our positions are self proving, we know not why we should not do so.

Until selfishness be, we do not say wholly uprooted, for that in the abstract is impossible, but adequately subdued and under proper control, there can be no good thing. We do not say that every thing done from selfish motives is bad, but only that it may be indifferent, and cannot be good, or meritorious service. Of ourselves, this subdual of self is impossible; it can only be done by its being lost in some higher feeling, that is, by the acceptance and perfect and unhesitating reliance on the power and goodness of One who has the government of, and right to command in all things, and who will do all for the best, even of ourselves when seemingly most deserted. With this is the consciousness that He is always present, and in communion with us, and in our most perfect state what we do according to His pleasure is an act not done for thought of reward, as a motive, but of a necessity springing from, and aided by, that communion. There is no merit in us. It is He that prompts the deed, and by His grace compels it, and He only that makes it good, even though, as in the cases under the Jewish Dispensation referred to in an earlier Essay, sometimes jarring with our human notions of right and wrong under secular conditions only.

It is not to be doubted that heroic acts of self denial and courage have been and are done abundantly by men who have accepted only this lesser morality, and without

hope, or thought of reward, either now or hereafter ; but fear is a cowardly thing, and flees like the devil himself at the first resistance ; they have done these things from innate spirit, perhaps an hereditary ennobling one, from the play of the animal spirits, for the fun of the thing, through pity or compassion, or emulation, or self admiration, from training and habit, for he who would win a Victoria Cross in the field must be courageous at all times, or from a thousand other motives of a like nature. But unhappily these good deeds, as we cannot well help seeing from day to day, are consistent with much lax general morality, and even defilement. When the doers of these deeds are free from this impeachment, we regard these deeds, as we would the dawn of the good faith, and themselves as our own ; where unassured of this, we are slow to judge, and thinking of infinite mercy, hope for them to the last.

But then comes " Culture," and the instant the word is uttered, self admiration springs up on every side, and goes round and round, with a sort of "Auld lang syne feeling" like the merry glass fillings for a popular toast. This culture refines and enlarges the intellect, and therefore, it is said, necessarily improves morality, and must in the end set all things right. We would say with Horace, who was sometimes quite a gentleman,

Doctrina sed vim promovet insitam,
Rectique cultus pectora roborant ;

if we did but know what *recti cultus* were, and also what is to be done, if the *vis insita* should turn out to be not quite what it should be.

To call upon men of culture to test their position by ballot among themselves might be too cruel. Of notorious instances to the contrary, it would be idle to speak ; of those less so, invidious ; of the general lot, absurd ; for no one need care very much about general lots of any kind.

But culture is a very indefinite and many-sided thing, and is often applied to studies in which morality has no concern, but is taken for granted, as a thing already fully

explored and understood, very much upon the principle, that a good watchmaker, being a master of the laws of springs, wheels, and scapements, must necessarily be a good casuist.

But morality in its highest acceptation, that is to say, religious morality, is the life of man, and is deadened by disuse ; it must either advance or languish, and leave its place to a usurper, brilliant, strong, inexorable, going forth conquering and to conquer, but colour-blind, nearly quite across the rainbow.

But as death visits palace and cottage alike, so also must this morality, the only sure preparation for death, dwell in each indifferently, nor more nor less in one than in the other. That which visited and in its full perfection sustained and adorned the first martyr Stephen, came also in due course to the young man called Saul, who was consenting to his death, and we know the high culture of that man.

But then you are great in asking, "Can that which is the cause of life and thought itself live and think?" To this we answer ; not if life and thought be what you call "molecular facts," or properties and motions of matter and nothing else ; but that you have not proved, and we did not know that you even wished to prove, but understood you only to propose in your playful Agnostic mood, as a triumphant doubt, never, never, never to be solved.

If life and thought be wholly material things, and nothing else, then indeed the effecting cause, whatever it may be, can possess neither of them, because until the concrete matter has been by some process quickened, there can be neither life nor thought anywhere, and when that has been done, the life and thought must be in the matter thus quickened, just as the working of a watch is in the watch, and not in the maker who put its parts together and set it going, but does not go himself.

But who told you that there ever was a cause of life and thought, themselves conceivably the cause of all things ? In our own case we have a clear consciousness that they began in us with our lives, and must have had a

cause ; but we have also a clear idea that there were life and thought before our own, and for these we find no beginning, and if no beginning, then no cause.

E nihilo nihil fit. This is the pet canon of Philosophy, and the one that is most frequently broken. Life and thought have no one single form or characteristic of matter ; therefore they cannot come from matter ; but unless Berkeley be right, there is nothing else from which they can come ; but it is impossible that Berkeley should be right : therefore they come from nothing.

We must repeat a little here. In the relations of the two worlds, "the spiritual, and material or molecular facts," we cannot but observe that there has been a disturbance in the former one, by far the more excellent of the two ; and that this has been followed by a corresponding one in the latter, the inferior, dependent, and, as we may show, preparatory one. That there has been such a disturbance in the former, we cannot doubt, from our own consciousness, from the antagonism and fierce contention of principles within us, from our sense of a fall, and desire and incapacity to rise, and from our inward conviction that we have offended and are now under chastisement, but not absolute castaways. This we assert to fully agree with the phenomena around us, and all the conditions of our present state, and to fully account for them.

To such beings as we are, fallen, and still always offending, an outward world suited only for enjoyment would be quite inapplicable. We cannot as children of the Fall at all realise what may have been the Paradisaical state of our first parents ; nor are we taught to look for the return of such a state, but for one much higher and with far greater privileges. But of this, if we fairly search our spirits, we may be sure, that if the whole earth were now an Eden, we should quickly make of it a Garden of Armida ; and where there is always pleasure and sloth, there also is always cruelty, hardness and shame. Nor would any degree of refinement prevent this, but rather much the contrary. Culture works upon, and may enlarge

and improve the mind, but alters not the character of the man. The refined voluptuary is no whit better than the coarsest sot or glutton; and their true analogues in the opposite sex are, of the one, the painted harlot simpering in the saloon; of the other, the dirty strumpet cursing and swearing in the gutter; and such is properly their moral rank respectively.

It is not when we turn the mirror on ourselves so as to fully view the evil that is in us, that we complain of the injustice of the dispensation under which we are placed. It is more frequently the philosopher under the irritation of some logical discomfiture that has been observed to do that. We complain of the injustice of man, but not of Him who placed us under man. We defend ourselves before men, because we too are men, and the best of men has always a mote in his eye, or if not, we can always say that he has, but this before our unseen judge we know that we can never do.

But then it is said that conscience and all the rest of it is a mistake, an *e nihilo nihil*, an unreality founded on unreality; that conscience is only a prejudice, a wrong reading of circumstances, a canine flogged dog rudiment in our nature, excessively developed; that the Pagans had it not; that their Gods had it not; that entire races, trades, and professions possess it not; that roses were found on the tomb of Nero; that it is not usually named to ears polite; that it has never been realised, and is now generally disregarded, and that by a little perseverance in certain lines of conduct, it is easily smoothed over, and with very little scandal; and that vice in conduct is neither better nor worse than a mistake or a vice in argument, and that the latter is often the worst of the two.

If you will produce to us a man who shall fully come up to your mark on this point, but not rise to the height of our prejudice, and whom both of us can entirely or at all esteem, we will give up this question, and study circumstances with you. As to your canine argument, my dog's rudiment conscience is my conscience, for he will do whatever I tell him, be it good or bad, and so too will

my cat, until I happen to offend her, and then she argues the question after her fashion, decides in her own favour, and will do so no more. Unless they did this, the one would not be true dog, nor the other true cat; and as this is a good arrangement for all parties, I conclude that both true dog and true cat always have been, and will abide under the law of "Thus Far"; the law that checks the storm and brings the rainbow into the sky, and is indeed the life of all order throughout Creation; and that they will never acquire the grace of knowing right from wrong, for which we see for them neither need nor opening. The Pagan Gods, or some of them, seem to be coming back with treasures and experience from the far East, and are beginning to speak again for themselves; and as to Nero's roses, that is no more than what is now being done in bronze and marble, inscriptions and mottoes, in and through our highways and byeways, on pillar and post, every day of our lives. Too much deference to polite ears paralyses fair endeavour, checks conversation, and favours the morality, and provides a universal "Thieves' Kitchen" for the entertainment of those quiet persistents in decent-looking evil courses, who are the characteristics and plagues of peaceful and prosperous times.

If the conscience be only a deceitful prejudice, it must be so in all its degrees, nor less so in relation to the vilest actions and thoughts that can be perpetrated or conceived by the foulest imagination, than to those lesser and lighter ones, which have such an air of grace and pleasantness as to look almost like virtues, and which we so freely forgive in ourselves; and so between Lais and Lucretia the difference is not after all so very great.

If this life be intended for the discipline and cure of our moral nature, the question may arise, whether we are so placed in this world as it is, that such discipline can reasonably be expected to have its due effect, or to speak more pointedly, whether the coarse, earthly pains, penalties, temptations and pleasures that surround us, must not inevitably and effectually crush out and destroy all the higher and purer thoughts, which alone can prepare us for a better state of existence, and

leave us fitted only for what and where we are ; whether, in short, this beggarly earthly tenement of ours, can possibly be the dwelling place of an immortal spirit.

We cannot on the first broad view of things, say very much for ourselves as we are at present. We share the earth and its belongings, with the lower orders of animal life, and possess all analogous needs and longings, and have thus to strive with them for existence. We are the lords designate and yet the weakest of all creatures. We cannot face the elements without rugs and wrappers. We cannot fly. We cannot swim, except only a little, and that ridiculously, and not in our own proper motions, and just enough to drown by. We cannot leap like the flea, nor run like the horse. We cannot in fair field catch a runaway cow. We have speech, and we have reason, but they are scarcely ever on speaking terms. We have neither horns, hoofs, fangs nor claws, to fight with, and are overmatched in strength and activity by nearly all living things, although between them and ourselves there, is, a natural war, and they are always on the watch to destroy and torment us ; and perhaps as a rule, the smaller they are, the more effectively they do it ; and then besides all this, we must toil or starve ; and then come weariness, pain, sickness, wounds and death, mind-weakenings, wailings and gnashings of teeth ; and with these, all social and natural plagues, thieves that break in and steal, moths that corrupt, dust that blinds, sights and sounds that affright and distract, and all the pains and penalties that man and nature inflict upon us, through wrong and violence .by fire, flood, pestilence, legislation, finance and famine.

This is an indictment of many counts, often preferred, but one which we have neither means nor skill to try properly. We know and can conceive no higher or better creature than man, that is, a being possessed or composed of body and soul, with such faculties as we learn from experience to belong to them respectively and no others. If we would present to ourselves the idea of an angel, we do but take that of a man and adorn it to the best of our ability with all admirable powers and graces within the

range of our human experience and possible conceptions, so that after all, we have but an image of a glorified man. We can do no more. We cannot assign to him a single perfection or quality not potentially belonging or appropriate to beings with mind, soul, and body such as our own. We speak often enough of a spiritual body, but it is a far away idea, and when we try to look into it a little, always comes out a sort of natural body in some indefinable way etherialised. All admit, somewhat scholastically perhaps, for it does not directly concern us, that the Creator, if a personality, might in the exercise of perfect and absolute wisdom and power have created, and that there may be now existing, beings and orders of beings different from ourselves, and placed in worlds and under conditions unlike our own ; and we most of us willingly ascribe to them all conceivable and, in the way of admission, inconceivable perfections, and any thing else that may be required of us. But we know nothing of them ; not even from Revelation, where they are always represented as appearing in some assumed natural forms ; and it is agreed that they are altogether beyond the reach of rational discussion ; and the present question is necessarily and properly limited to this : whether in and notwithstanding man's degraded state, and the roughness and hardness of all things around him, this outer seen world is or is not perfectly suited to his present needs and to prepare him for another state. It is in this view only, that the "design argument" has any value with us. We do not doubt that God might, had it so pleased Him, have effected His design in relation to man, by other means than those He has adopted, for we can not take it on us to limit His wisdom or His power ; whether He might have done so by better means, we cannot follow the fashion of the day to inquire.

There is a difficulty sought to be thrown in our way against which we do not care even to protest. It is argued, that it is not compatible with perfect goodness that such a wretched and corrupt being as man should have been ever created ; and we are not permitted to show that

there has been one man who was perfect in all things; nor to refer to the cause by which man became such as he is, that is, to the history of his Fall and Redemption. This, to us who are so assured on these points, gives a sense of unreality to the whole question; but we willingly accept the conditions, with this proviso only, that, Fall or no Fall, all men have more or less, and however weak in some instances, a spiritual prompting within them to a better course of life; that they disobey this prompting, and are perverse from daily impulse and long habit, and that they suffer for their disobedience, and are thus in a state which we count as one of discipline, to bring them to a better and a perfect state.

We must live in this world of ours; and to do this at all, we must subdue the earth and its contents and occupants to our needs and service: and first as to our foes of the field, and our incapacity through physical weakness to meet them on equal terms:—It is true, that we have reason on our side, which supplies us with weapons to destroy or tame them; but that might hardly suffice, if their habits were but a little different from what we find them now to be. If, for instance, the fiercer kinds were to come against us, as they might if they chose, in battalions; if the stronger carnivora were to close upon us in herds, like the insignificant jackals; if the wild bull and bison and others of their kind, were to attack us in full force at once in front, without scampering round and round to gain courage to look at us, and warn us not to come too near for fear of a fight, or even if the foxes in any well-preserved country were to join their forces, and take to chasing hounds, we might be in an evil case.

But it is not so. The fear of us and the dread of us is upon them all. The bear and the humming bird are the only two kinds among them that are consistently courageous in their dealings with us. As for the larger carnivora, they prowl about our dwellings and inclosures at night in all their strength, to get a pick out of our unarmed flocks and herds, but ourselves, unless they catch an unfortunate straggler by himself, they carefully

shun, and are only terrible to us in self-defence. They are afraid of the human voice. If a lot of drunkards were to enter the Lion House in our Zoological Gardens, and give one of their stupid hurrahs, the caged monsters would crouch in terror. A tame lion at a Temperance or Revival Meeting, would be frightened out of his life. The man-eating tiger is sophisticated, having learnt by some chance or from tradition, what we are good for, and is doubly fierce; yet even thus, however hungry and fastidious, he never comes straight upon us, but prowls round and round, as he used to do when he was only a cattle stealer, alone and in the dark, until he finds some safe and solitary prey, and can spring secure.

All these kinds part with their original instincts and characteristics very slowly, and there is most commonly a very observable tendency to resume them. I remember to have read somewhere of a cross between the dog and the wolf, but several degrees removed from the latter. He was perfect dog to look at, and had all the habits and pleasant ways of a fully domesticated dog, but with one exception; he would never come straight to call, but always made a kind of shambling bend by the way, as if obeying under protest, or as if the wolf-instinct to come unawares, or to be off and away on his own account, were unconsciously working within him; and under favouring circumstances, doubtless he might in his issue become once more true wolf.

With all these we are necessarily at war, and from them we often suffer desolation, wounds and death; yet even this is no unqualified evil, as it at least enforces on us habits of watchfulness, perseverance and courage; and although these may not be actual virtues in themselves, for they may be employed in a bad cause, yet certainly without these can be no assurance of the ready and prompt exercise of any other.

But further, we have need of the services of those kinds which we have domesticated for our own use and purposes, and we cannot do without them; and to this end, and for our purposes and for no needs of their own, we find in them superadded to the fear and dread of which we have spoken, and co-existing with it, a strong attachment to ourselves, the

very objects of that natural fear and dread ; by- the united force of all which, a simple child, scared itself by a feather, and afraid of the dark, may drive or torment, and be a very gad-fly to a large herd.

We may notice here in passing, the manifest pride and pleasure with which the pet cat and dog parade their newly born kittens and pups before their masters and mistresses, and as a general rule to none beside.

It will hardly be disputed, that it is chiefly this kindly instinct that secures to us their services. We have but to figure to ourselves, the effect of a sudden withdrawal of this instinct and consequent resumption of savage habits ; the farm yard in mutiny ; the poultry flown to cover ; the kine wild on the hills, with bulls bouncing and bellowing all around ; not a beast for the plough ; no such thing as an ox ; not a horse for the harness ; donkeys biting and kicking like Zebras ; pigs refusing to be fattened, and grown cleanly and lanky, routing up our woods for roots and shakings ; not a mad dog* to be had for love or money. We should be simply undone.

Thus far we find special adaptations by nature for our benefit, but then we come to the subject of work and labour, called in the antiquated black letter of our early days, "duty" ; and this is said to be a "mean white," or nigger sort of thing, degrading and unsuited to a spiritual being like man in his proper and normal state of dignity and ascendance, from Louis the Fourteenth in whom it was considered by St. Simon, the model "Duc" of his times, a trait of greatness of mind, that he was on one occasion heard to say, that he almost thought he should have had to wait for his carriage, which he had ordered just before, down to ourselves, and only fit for those below us, the stone-breakers and oakum-pickers in a Casual Ward.

* Hydrophobia would seem to be a privilege of canine civilization. It is not practised by the Lazzaroni at Pera, and is unknown among the Esquimaux, and probably in all places where Nature provides her own drinking troughs, and there are no muzzles, no pettings, no dog-doctors.

This is just the old story of Hesiod and Socrates. It is a principle in Literature, that every thing Greek must be worth quoting, and it is, as a rule, quoted accordingly, and we quote Xenophon now, because he was not Plato, and because what he gives us from Hesiod, is capable of a double construction. Hesiod wrote, *Εργον δ' οὐδεν ὀνειδος*, work is no disgrace; Socrates quoted Hesiod's words in this sense; but the Athenians his judges said, that they meant, "No work is a disgrace," that is, that evil works are better than none at all, and so, being a moral people, they let him have a good talk with his friends, and then quietly put him to death.

We refer here with perfect confidence to the letter of the poor needlewoman given in our first Essay, in proof of the dignity of labour, its entire compatibility with the highest spiritual thoughts, and suitableness at the same time to our present state and conditions. We can add nothing to it. We believe that no declamation can come near to it. We forget the poor surroundings, the garret, the bare walls, the dim taper and discomfort, and see only a fellow creature of no mark in the outer world, raised by her own thoughts far above it.

We all work, for we all think, and listlessness, a euphemism for laziness, is the most laborious of all work. The question is, in what disposition of mind our work finds us, and in what it keeps us. What aggravates it to the poor labouring man is too often a thought that the Tenth Commandment bears rather too hard upon him, who has all the world to covet from, a sense of injustice springing, rightly or wrongly, from an idea long fixed in his mind, that too much of the work of the community has been thrown upon him for too little reward, and, what is worse, a long hoarded secret resentment of the indifference, superciliousness, and mockery of many of those, who, not working, or at least not being seen to work themselves, are visibly enjoying, without any show of acknowledgment, the fruits of his, the poor man's, labour. It is this that has made us truly "Two Nations"; breathing the same air, warmed by the same sun, chilled by the same frost, eating the same bread, and talking the same irreligion, but with no interlacing sympathies. Great, and more espe-

cially, sudden calamities are altogether exceptional. Some touching tale is told us, and for the instant *mentem mortalia tangunt*, and we give of our superfluities while the subject is fresh in our minds, as perhaps the Priest and the Levite in the parable might have done if properly applied to at the right time. So also are our Sisters of Mercy and other distinguished examples of each sex exceptional altogether. But the general rule is as above stated, and he has used his eyes to little purpose, who, having lived at all in the world, has not observed that it is so, and that the mischief is an increasing one. If a gentleman meet a party of workmen returning home from their work at the exact time to a minute as per contract, not one of them will even look at him. They will give him his proper side of the pavement, and make way for him as they might turn aside for a post or any other obstruction ; but that is all ; they neither disdain nor respect him ; they simply pass him by. Were he to accost them, he might get a civil answer or he might not ; were he to do more, with the law on their side, he might not be very much to be envied in the result. They are entitled to much, but are seeking more, and are now, as they consider, in training, and biding their time.

Much of the unsightliness of labour is from another cause, a common fault. The working classes are neither better nor worse than ourselves ; but they are coarser. We are all of us always thinking ; with them at their labour, as with us at our ease, a train of idle and evil thoughts is continually rushing through our never well-regulated minds, and these with them find expression at no infrequent intervals, in language, coarse and offensive to us, but well chosen and pleasant to them, and as weariness overtakes or any vexation falls on them, in yet worse ribaldry, threats and curses, not half of which they really mean. This is the true unsightliness of labour. Yet are they not so bad as they seem. Some are not so at all. They are not so well-spoken as might be wished, but let occasion arise for assistance and charity among themselves, and they are never found wanting.

But let not the man of culture assume too much. He works retired and alone, but his work is strife. There is

always a theory to be upheld or uprooted, a policy to be denounced or explained away, a fact or date to be disputed, generally some one to be laughed at, and always his own position to be asserted, and it takes a great deal of anger and spleen to do all this properly. He is well-spoken, because he is forced by his position to be careful in what he says, and how he says it; his malice is delicate, *crimina rasis librat in antithetis*, but if there be curse or ribaldry in the heart, it matters little that it is not uttered. A lie is an overt act, but a man thinks a curse, to all ends and purposes.

We may be sure that it is good for us to labour, because too much ease is painful; because labour tempers and breaks the storm of the passions; because we are fitted for it in all our limbs, faculties, and proportions; because it is pleasant to watch progress, and, not least of all, because it is a delight to rest in season, for we would of course have moderation in all things. To think of divine things is the highest privilege of man, but to be doing so at all times is beyond the privilege of the most exalted saint. He too must have rest. The man of secular culture alone takes no true rest. He has sworn to himself that he will first solve his problem or die; and he does neither.

But then comes the question of physical pain, and here you, our opponents in this thesis, are truly grand; your compassion for yourselves and others is boundless, exhaustive, sublime. You strike your foot against a stone, and you grieve, not for yourself, but for mankind, including brutes. If, you ask us, we for offences have deserved to suffer pain, what have the innocent beasts of the field done? Why should an innocent puppy be born crying like a sinful baby? Why, if David sinned in counting the people, should the people who could not help being counted, and whom David himself called his sheep, be punished? And why do you tell us (we do no such thing) that pain is necessary for us as a warning of something to be done or avoided, seeing that it is not a here and there exceptional thing, but comes to all, and that some it never leaves? And then you go on to arraign Nature at large; "She might have done without pain altogether, as good governments do without church establishments or capital

punishments ; she might, if she had chosen, have suppressed the carnivora, or given them better manners ; she might have taught the locust moderation, the ichneumon fly to spare the caterpillar, the caterpillar to pass the green leaf ; she need not have given certain small creatures domestic habits ; the laws of gravitation might have been different ; falling bodies might give notice of their coming beforehand, or lose some of their specific gravity by the way, so as not to crush us as they do ; earthquakes might have been so contrived, that they might be carried away by electric wires to safe places ; the philosopher might have been enabled to shut his ears as he does his eyes, against all distracting noises and impediments ; there might have been no such things as irritant poisons, or they might at least have been provided with proper mineral or vegetable labels, as the case might be, annexed ; she might at any rate have tipped the deadly yew leaf with nettle-stings or something of the kind, to keep off the harmless colt ; she might have tempered the surfeiting clover to the sedate ox, and alcohol to him that would cheer his heart ; she might at least have spared our sensibilities. The Attic maiden (Procne the swallow) should not molest the cheerful grasshopper.

Ἄττιθι κόρα μελίθρεπτε λάλος λάλον ἀρπάξασα.
 Τέττιγ' ἀπτήσιν δαῖτα φέρεις τέκεσιν ;
 Τὸν λάλον ἃ λαλόεσσα, τὸν ἑυπτερον ἃ πτεροέσσα ;
 Τὸν ξένον ἃ ξείνα, τὸν θερινόν θερινᾶ.
 Ὅυχι τάχος ῥίψεις ; ὅν γὰρ θέμις ὀνδὲ δίκαιον,
 Ὅλλυσθ' ὑμνοπόλους ὑμνοπόλοις στόμασιν.

Euenus.

Thus translated, if I remember rightly, but I am sensible of a hitch here and there, by Praed, or one of his school :

Attic maiden, honey fed, why bearest thou away
 The harmless prattling grasshopper, to thy callow brood a prey ?
 Both pretty songsters, winged both, both visitors together,
 The summer bird, the summer fly, both fond of summer weather.
 Ah ! let it go ; it is not right, it's surely very wrong,
 That the conversant in song should die by the conversant in song.

This question of pain among the lower orders of life, has never been handled by any who have not returned, according to their predispositions, either glorious or dispirited, but always baffled ; for our own parts we only desire to hazard,

that is, to make, for we hazard nothing, a few remarks in the outskirts for form's sake, and according to and quite within rule. We may premise, that we cannot altogether subscribe to those, who would argue the first cause into "a formative moving principle following the line of least resistance," because we do not well see whence came anything to resist, or whence anything to be resisted; nor, if it be only a principle, why it should be a principle, or why it should move, nor why a creative force which could have had no beginning, should age at last into a destructive force, which must have had a beginning, because according to your own Socrates, there must be something to destroy before destruction can be; but with this exception, and such other as you in the plenitude of your invention may provide us with from time to time, we are ready and willing to accept everything that on your side may be unanimously agreed on.

We observe first in the animal world, a perfect subordination of one kind to the use and necessities of some other or others, throughout the whole dispensation, and we see as yet no natural cause in action why this state of things should ever determine. But as this somewhat militates against the Theory of Development, it is of course arguable all round like anything else. That it does so militate we suppose may be collected from this, that if one species, now the natural food of some other species, were, in the struggle for existence, so to develop itself as to turn the tables on the latter by becoming the stronger and fiercer of the two, either the first feeding kind must find some other food less given to development or perish. If for instance, our common lurking runaway rat who, as it is, will always eat a baby when it can catch one alone, were to develop yet stronger and fiercer proportions and qualities, our whole system of rat-catching would need to be reformed; and in the meantime, as our babies would never be safe in their cradles, nature abhorring a standstill, would have to provide for the waste of baby life by making mothers more and more prolific at every family event, and that would make babies a casualty crop, to the utter confusion of all political and domestic economy; and besides, how is the fondest of mothers to find sensibilities for ten at a

birth? We should have to reform our nursery hymns, say as thus,

Εὔδετ' ἐμὰ βρέφεια, γλυκερὸν καὶ ἐγέρισμον ὕπνον,
Εὔδετ' ἐμαὶ ψυχὰι, δέκ' ἀδελφεοὶ, εὖστοα τέκνα,
*Ὀλβιοὶ ἐνἀΐσθε, καὶ δλβιοὶ αὖ ἱκοισθε.

Theocritus Heracliscus, v. 7.

O rest ye my babes, the fond heart of your mother
Has a charm, shall preserve you, ten darlings from sorrows :
Aye, sleep thus in tangles, the one with the other,
'Till you wake from ten dreams to ten happy to-morrows.

In truth, it is hard to see how the struggle for existence in one species should work a proportionate change in another, without the interference of some new force, that is, without some new act of creation or miracle ; for development, if it be a natural law, must be a general one ; and even if you master this law as to one species, you have straightways that of all others to deal with, the ratio of increase of one being that of decrease of others.

The beasts of the field are as much things of rule as the plants and herbs. It is as natural for them to kill and devour, as it is for the plants to take in oxygen and give out hydrogen at one time, and *vice versa* at another. The beasts have neither virtues nor vices. The lion is neither cruel nor kind, neither charitable, nor, except by fits and starts, selfish ; he knows nothing about pain, but what he feels himself ; he does not spare his prey, because he is moved to take it, and is not moved to let it alone ; and he takes it, not to kill, but to eat ; the killing is an accident, and beside the true question between him and his prey ; and this is clear, because if he is not hungry, that is, not moved to eat, the question does not arise, and the prey remains unkilld. The reek of blood brought into a stable, was said by Goldsmith, a naturalist in his own simple way in his own simple days, to demoralise the horses in it, much as a ghost of any pretensions might one of us ; and perhaps for the same reason, that is, because there is nothing in it ; but the vulture enjoys it, and the vulture is only an industrious scavenger with wings, half-bald and not at all washed, at work in his vocation, and quite as good a creature as the horse, if we would but think so.

There is doubtless much suffering in animal life ; but if there were wisdom in the creation of man, we do not well see how, he having rightful dominion over the earth and all it contains, and being such as he is, the subject races can be other than what we find them, sharing, in their degrees, the same material pleasures, and subject to the like material pains and accidents. The problem none has ever solved : but we would go further ; we doubt if the attempt so to do be not arrogant and presumptuous, and if the only true answer be not the Divine one, "What is that to thee ? follow thou me."

We are under a hard commandment. We are to be merciful towards all animals in thought as well as in deed. We are directed not to muzzle the ox that treads out the corn, or to seeth the kid in its mother's milk ; if we are not merciful, we are pronounced to be not good, and we are the only cruel creatures on the face of the common earth. Nor do we in this tax any private party. We are all cruel ; by field and flood, at home and abroad, by rod and line, by whip and spur ; and we are the only creatures that kill for the mere pleasure of killing ; and how can we presume to face this question, when we persistently reject the plain and true moral to be drawn from it ?

One thing we may be sure of ; the Creator cannot be unequal ; He cannot be both just and unjust, merciful and cruel ; what He is once, that He is always, and if we find provisions of mercy running through this seeming course of suffering animal life, we must conclude that all is under a merciful care, and that He will and does provide and turn all to the best in His own good way, be we never so impatient, and grow we never so more and more learned and ignorant. We would discard all humorous fancies on the question, as to their being automaton and without feeling and so on ; but we must not be too sentimental. The balance of enjoyment as weighed against pain among them is immensely in their favour. If their votes could be taken beforehand, they would all to a fly, elect to take life at all risks, rather than never be. Vast numbers of them never know pain at

all, and among those that do, it seems hardly to check their mirth. They will eat in the very jaws of death; they know nothing of death or the dread of it. They fight it is true, and often savagely, but everybody knows that there is a pleasure in fighting when the match is at all equal. All healthy boys fight, and give their not in general very cogent reasons for doing so afterwards; and so also would girls, but for the prejudice of education. The irrationals are cautious rather than fearful, from a painless instinct. Where there is no immediate peril or threat of peril, the most timid and defenceless of animals are as bold, careless, and happy as the strongest lion. What can be more contemptuous than the toss of the head of the browsing sheep, who has been staring at you on three legs ready to run off into space at your first demonstration, as you pass away without hurting him, and he is satisfied that there is no danger? Free from immediate pain and in good pasture, they are as happy as kings, and more so, for they have no thought of the morrow, and Voltaire has told us, that we ourselves are never unhappy but when we reflect. The most ill-used of our drudges with a bundle of hay before him, is at peace with all mankind. We cannot for our own parts, with any consistency maintain, that the brute creation do not feel pain, inasmuch as many years ago we left off angling solely because so many of the fish we caught would gorge the hook, and take that opportunity of letting us know very plainly, that they did; and we have read too of men of science and determination whose chief study it has been to explain where pain in animals begins, and how long it can be made to last.

The sum of all we know in this matter is, that the lower animals have many enjoyments and a few pains; that we are their chief tormenters, and that for this we must surely answer. This is the final conclusion, and this the moral; and the moral is to us more important than the conclusion.

But, poor brutes, *oderint dum metuant*, it cannot be helped; and we must now come to our own case, which concerns us more nearly.

About the origin of moral evil all have probably heard much more than is good for them. We know that it cannot

come from God, because He hates it; and He could not directly create what He hates. But it is in us, and it proceeds from our hearts, and our conscience assures us irresistibly, that we have well earned all the pains we suffer. As there is good as well as evil in this world, we infer from the phenomena in and around us, that we are in this life in a state of trial, and if of trial, then necessarily of preparation for another and better one to come; and then we ask if pain be really to us an unqualified evil. Consider a little the once-a-week religion of vast numbers of those generally accounted among the better sort of us: if these well-to-do worthy men were exempt from all pain and suffering, what would become of them? They are, as they tell us, in His kingdom nearly two hours every week, and do His will respectably at all times; they have no fears about their daily bread, which has never failed them; they freely forgive all trespasses, and only retaliate for the sake of form and example, and so forth; what can there be to tempt such men as these to do amiss? and if pain be abolished, what evil is there for them to be delivered from?

Take away pain, and what is left us but a mingled yarn? We might self-indulge to the heart's content, but enjoyment would pall on the sense for want of contrast, like a picture without shade, if such a thing could be. We should lose many of our best and highest qualities; emulation, patience, endurance, courage, self-esteem; and with these all kindly offices and social charities would become disused and forgotten things. The Cardinal Virtues would lose all tone. We should lose the grand but not unamusing spectacle of the epicure at a feast, longing almost to insanity, but refraining for fear of gout.

But *amato ludo*, if pain has no moral effect, it is not a chastisement sent in mercy, but truly and absolutely a foretaste of final wrath. We would not however very strongly urge, that it is an effective check to that licence which is so perilous to all, for it is not by such coercion, that the will is attracted to goodness. We may remember, that even the tenth great plague of all, failed in the end to soften Pharaoh. Pain may assist by the removal of accustomed and besetting temptations, but is not of itself the beginning or assurance of moral health.

The secure lodgment of one vice makes easy the approaches of others. On the other hand, good thoughts come neither by chance, nor of ourselves, but are in all cases the free gifts of a ministering unseen spirit or influence, and if duly received, are strong to save. But they are not duly received. We often think that we are, and are thought by others to be softened by pain and suffering, when we are in reality only tamed by them. We in part discern the ugliness of the pleasant past, and make sickly resolves within ourselves, not to return to it; but we are only half-hearted in the matter, and repent, not in dust and ashes, but with reservations, and comparisons and excuses, and all the politic flatteries of self-love, and always with much self-pity; and thus it is, that we may observe so many rise from the bed of pain and sickness, for the instant perhaps really better men than they were before; but they have crouched to pain, not overcome it; they have throughout lacked earnestness, and once more at ease in the old familiar scenes, and amid the old surroundings, and with like opportunities, the old temptations are temptations still, and the stronger and more dangerous for the slight interposed restraint, and a worse lapse is inevitable.

But pain declares its purpose unmistakeably to all, and only fails through the stubbornness of men themselves, and notwithstanding its too frequent failures through such cause, brings still to many the true healing sorrow of the spirit; and our position holds, that pain and suffering were designed and operate for the correction and discipline of fallen and sinful beings. The trite argument that pain is merely a natural phenomenon by which we are enabled from experience to avoid or counteract things naturally hurtful, is of very narrow application; because as means for such a limited purpose only, it is so often vastly disproportioned to the end, the remedy is worse than the disease, the protector more cruel than the foe, and in many instances it is quite ineffectual. There must then be a further purpose, and that is discernibly a spiritual one, that is, the one above stated. But He who gave the spirit, created the body, and we have again two worlds, the seen and the unseen, united and acting together

in perfect harmony to one end, and in accordance with one design, and that certainly in part, a spiritual one; how then can it be said that the "design argument" is an atheistical one? Is it not rather Atheism of the will to say so?

But it may be thought that the endurance of pain with patience and fortitude can favour only the development of the sterner virtues, leaving all gentler and finer graces untouched; that the enduring Prometheus of Æschylus could never have acquired from his sufferings in Caucasus, the Christian charities and goodness assigned to the triumphant Prometheus by Shelley.

We need concern ourselves but little about this, as there is so much more in the case.

We do right in counting the pleasures of sense among the blessings of life. Our natural appetites under proper direction and restraint are not in themselves sinful. If they are, God created sin, for he created them. Sin comes with their abuse; and as their seat is in the lower senses, which in themselves know neither restraint nor moderation, and are ever stronger for indulgence, with the first wilful abuse, however slight in appearance, there soon comes with rapid steps, and very soon irresistibly, all that is monstrous, vile and abominable in the deeds and imaginations of the worst of men. Nor is any man who once wilfully indulges in any excess, whatever promises he may make to himself for the future, and however well he may keep his secret from his fellow men, ever safe from this consequence. To sin no more in act is nothing, for as Jeremy Taylor has truly said, men unregenerate re-act continually in their thoughts the sins they have discontinued through age.

To regulate and direct these appetites and resist all tendencies to excess, must be a thing worthy of the highest being of whom we can form any distinct conception, that is, of man at his best, and the watchfulness and continual exercise of the higher qualities of mind and spirit requisite to enable him to do this effectually, cannot but ennoble him in the act, and raise him day by day to yet greater privileges and perfections. It cannot therefore be said, that there was not a

spiritual design in thus subjecting man to the temptations of the senses and appetites; and again there is a harmony between the seen and the unseen, and again the taunt of Atheism fails.

But there is yet another view of the question, open to all believers without reference to the Creeds of Churches, but to them only. If the passions and appetites provoke to excess, and excess to yet worse evil, there must, considering our natural weakness, be real peril, and if peril, then in many cases there must, *à priori*, be sure and irretrievable fall for many. But there is a warning spirit ready at call to moderate and guide, and powerful to restore. There is strife within us, it may be slight, or it may be hard and long enduring; but the strife itself is gain, for it is the movement of good within us, and if we but truly will it, that good will prevail, for the aiding spirit is the true "eternal not ourselves tending to righteousness" before spoken of, and that eternal is everywhere, and if everywhere, then also with us. Thus the earthly appetites,—not in themselves evil, but assigned to us for our trial, and if kept within rule having nothing in them degrading,—are in the not very far away end, the cause of good. Even while we are taking our just toll of the seen the spirit of the unseen is never far off, and we have once more the union of the two worlds.

We shall not always have to strive with these appetites so far as they are incentives to any thing evil. They have their mission, which will some day be fulfilled. By the law of our being in this life, they listen to rebuke and lessen under restraint, until at last men arrive at that promised state of being when they will provoke no more, and all will be perfect peace.

But passing from these to the nobler senses of sight and hearing, what do we find? The beauties of nature delight us at the first glance by the mere variety and distribution of objects, their forms and outlines, the alternation of light and shade, and, not least, by the arrangement of colours, which is exactly that which best meets the requirements of the optic nerve, the organ of sight. And here the coarser kind stop;

they are pleased for the instant, they know not how or why ; they stare and laugh, and laugh and stare ; they eat, drink, and are merry ; very harmless perhaps, but the truly vulgar are always exceedingly tiresome.

But the eye gives its message to the mind, and the mind to the spirit, and at once, if all be well, if the lesson be rightly received, higher thoughts, feelings and aspirations of heart and mind become engaged, and among the better cultured, often in such sort, that, did not the natural beauties which first awakened them still retain their delighting charm, the seen might well be deemed passing away wholly into the unseen.

Without nature can be neither fine art nor poetry, and without some sense of these, the beauties of the former would be emotionless, and flit from the mind like a dream, which we forget in the very act of awakening. There must be associations with thoughts of our own within us, or they will do little, they will not abide. A single instance of common life may be allowed us here, and will perhaps suffice. A sunny harvest field, with reapers, sheaf-binders, and others at work, amid cheerful cries, light laughs and snatches of mirth, is a pretty object, and the eye wanders at will from point to point, resting perhaps here and there on a few favoured spots. But thoughts arise ; it is a harvest scene, the crowning of the year, and we think, all of us, of the gladness and happiness it will bring, and some of us, of the goodness of the Giver and His graciousness in all things. From this point, the thoughts of all, of all that is who view it aright, and of whom only we now speak, diverge, each recalling his own instances and following his own train of thought, but all coloured with the same feeling. Now, all this may be unconsciously stored up in the mind of each to the end of his days. It is possible, probable, and has almost been demonstrated, that no good thought is ever lost, but abides within, to be some day recalled entire, and always aiding in the good fight to the last. That the sting of evil thoughts and deeds so abides, there is no sinner that does not know, or that will not some day find. All this is implied in the idea of conscience and responsibility ; for if all memory of our thoughts perishes,

of what can we be conscious? for good or evil, for what responsible?

We have taken our illustration from the harvest field, but we would not be supposed to confine ourselves to that or like subjects. Scenes of gloom or terror, indeed nearly all things in nature, not plainly *αισχροα*, unseemly, more or less concern us, and may be made to awaken sentiment and carry their own moral.

But these thoughts and pleasures are aided, renewed and heightened by other means.

That we are by nature imitative and lovers of imitation, we need no Aristotle to tell us; a child with its first Noah's Ark, will do this quite as well as the Philosophers, *τουτο τοδε*, "this is that." An imitation pleases, because it is an imitation; we are always conscious that it is an imitation, and without that consciousness should receive little if any pleasure. The imitation must not be too realistic, and it must tell its tale. A stuffed dog with glass eyes is the thing itself, but yields little pleasure; the same dog painted by Landseer, or better still, by Snyders, gives us much, because, as we are thoroughly conscious, it is not the real thing, but an imitation of nature as nature, presenting the animal at its best, or with its traits proper to the occasion well brought out, in some action, or expressing some feeling proper to its kind, giving tone and character to the work, and telling its own tale. The Landseer dogs indeed, wonderful as they are for the most part, are not unfrequently painted ironies, saying one thing and meaning another. We have the dog limned to perfection, but with the human eye, and with it the human expression, and impossible human motive and sentiment altogether. We do not say that the dogs are absolutely untrue, for dogs have curiously weird looks at times, but the suggestion is; and thus we get a fable without a moral, where we look for simple nature, a false idea where we should look for truth.

Like others not of the Academy, we claim as of common right, and are always ready and willing to discuss terms and all the principles of the fine arts, with all comers, at any length, fully and at large; but we cannot always be sure

that we apply them properly, not having as yet arrived at that clearness of idea on the subject, where judgment begins. But yet we do not feel altogether out in the cold in this matter. Assuming that the right perception of such mysteries as colour, light, shade, breadth, spottiness, distances, aerial perspective, visional horizon and so on, in a picture, comes by nature, as indeed it must, for the things themselves exist in nature, and that it has not yet come to us and is beyond the reach of our lecturing powers, yet so far as regards our present purpose, the subject, invention, composition, and general treatment of the work, is common ground and open to the free comment of all. We may always say to the artist "Painting is akin to Poetry, and both are founded on nature. If you have studied many good pictures and have painted some, we too have studied good poetry, and, maybe, have written some bad, and are at any rate free to do so whenever we please."

Nature is truly the base of all fine art, and especially of that of painting. Provided the eye be not outraged by ill colouring, bad drawing or other short-coming of what we may perhaps call the silent requirements of the art, much of the rest is in ourselves. A man of perfect taste cannot be pleased with a bad picture, or in high art, fail to be pleased with a good one. A good landscape is always in a great degree a study of nature by one who thoroughly appreciated it, and who can thus take us to the place itself in our best mood, and please, and keep us in that mood. It is but a few lines and splashes of paint that we are looking at, but they represent the absent, be it our harvest field, or a barren heath, or a storm at sea at a given moment, and by a few broad suggestive traits, at once bring before us the whole scene with its choicest associations and awaken and detain our interest; we take in the scene presented, and fill up the action and sentiment from our own ideas, but suggested and elevated by the painter's genius and skill. It is thus probably, that landscape illustrations of descriptive poems of the highest class such as *Il Penseroso* and *L'Allegro*, not unfrequently fall short of their intended

effects on the minds of those who have read and are familiar with the poems, though the same illustrations may fairly hold their own with others who have not. To the former indeed they are but as patchwork. Their minds are already stored with a higher and fuller ideal by the poet, which the one-viewed illustration of the painter necessarily disturbs or weakens, and the result is tame and disappointing.

The painter must give a sentiment to his work, and that sentiment must be something that concerns and comes home to us. A landscape without some indication of human life is in general no more than an art-study, or, where it aims at being anything more, the absence of life is supplied by some dumb accessories appealing directly to the spectator, who thus becomes in feeling associated with the subject. But in landscapes proper there must in general be some living figures, and they must be chosen and arranged so as to indicate and maintain the feeling of the work; and they must be human, or we shall not be very greatly interested. The Niobe of Wilson has been well denounced by an Aristarchocrat of fine art, because amid all its magnificent delineation of nature, rarely if ever surpassed, the interest and feeling of the piece, is directed to and maintained by two impossible puny figures, shooting from a cloud at a few other puny figures standing to be shot at in a corner. So also in Salvator Rosa's Mercury and the Woodman; the Woodman might be well enough, if he were only doing something woodman-like, because the scene is in a wood; but Mercury is nonsense. It is not denied that there is a story, and that the story is well enough told, but we cannot afford such a magnificent back ground, for two such pygmies. It is like an epic without a plot, or the Town Mouse and the Country Mouse, nibbling their odds and ends on a magnificent chair of state, all gold and purple.

We may refer here to several well known analogous failures in this respect, where the subject is a beautiful landscape, and the sentiment is indicated by certain groups of classical figures in small, dancing or what not, after a

fashion long passed away, and which interests us no more. We have thus nature as she is, and man as he is not. We have no free ideal, and are chilled where we would be interested.

Take again the well-known picture of David at the Cave of Adullam. The cave is good, and the landscape is good, and the figures are good, and they are in the right place; but why David? and why David's robbers, when the robbers in *Gil Blas* or any others would have answered the purpose quite as well, and left us free to take in the full effect of a fine landscape, without the idle interruption of an incident necessarily from its want of due proportion to its accessories, ill expressed? If you would present us David at the Cave, do it so that we may peruse him fully, so that we may see how he, the chosen and anointed king and future light of Israel, looked and bore himself in trouble and adversity, trustful when all seemed lost; and let him be your central attraction, and not a mere afterthought, a puny do-nothing fill-up in a corner. What if *Del Piombo* had given us a distant view of the *Raising of Lazarus*?

We entirely except here the *Embarcations of St. Ursula* and the *Queen of Sheba*, where the action and the scenery are in such a complete harmony, that we almost seem to hear at once the light ripple of the waves, and the murmur and the movements of the action.

Neither painting nor poetry, worthy of the name, can be perused quickly. They require present study, and some previous culture. Reynolds, not himself very capable of the highest art, quickly detected and denounced the sham enthusiasm of pretenders viewing the Italian masterpieces of *Raffaello* and *Micahel Angelo* for the first time. He knew, and the longer he lived the more he knew, that those masterpieces required much patient thought and many revisitings, before they could be duly felt and appreciated, yet he who cannot highly and truly appreciate them is an outsider of true art.

In studying a work of art by a great master, we are receiving grand and ennobling ideas, from one more gifted than ourselves, and are raising ourselves towards his ideal, though we may rarely fully attain to it; and so engaged, it cannot

but be, that we must be thereby improved and refined in thought and feeling; nor can this effect upon us ever be wholly thrown away or lost.

We would now but refer very briefly to two well-known examples of the highest art, the two Cartoons, the Charge to Peter, and the Miraculous Draught. The incident represented by the former is well known to all, and a crowning article of belief of all Christian churches. We have heard of and read it many times, and when we chance to turn to the right place in the right chapter of the Bible, shall either read it again, or pass it over. But we have never worthily realised or pictured it in our minds, and our impressions of it are weak and unemotional; here we have it set before us by a great genius, second to none that ever lived, if not the very first in his line of art, holding thus far, a common belief with ourselves, and full of his subject. The figures are strongly idealised, above the measure of men as they are, and yet true to the nature of men. It is by the expressions and actions that they become our kin. There never were or could have been such men as those here depicted, but for the moment we feel assured that there have been, and that they are now standing before us. The expression common to all is precisely that which would have been displayed on such an occasion by such men as we know them to have been, and in equal degree and kind by no others of any condition, or under any circumstances whatever; for none have ever been so privileged. But together with this common expression, is also the natural and requisite variety of character. There is no monotony; no two are quite alike. We may distinguish Peter (there is a little Papal rendering here) on his knees, he has received his charge, signified in type by the keys, as only he could properly receive it; John, seeing nothing but his Lord, and pressing eagerly forward, before the others but not too near; and even, as we certainly can in De Vinci's Last Supper (beyond all question the finest painting the world ever beheld), Thomas the doubter, earnestly gazing and gathering his robe, but not yet advancing, and as if under the eye of his brother Apostle, who is looking round towards him. The principal figure, a little apart, not in the midst, (that old accustomed familiarity and condescension is now of the past),

erect, the only one erect, for He the Lord, is giving His last charge to those chosen servants and companions, by whom He was to be seen in the body no more, though always with them in the spirit, to the end of the world ; the wounds of the Cross indicated but slightly, for all suffering with Him was then ended, and His glory at hand ; the feet, which were never to walk the earth again, motionless, and hardly seeming to press the ground ; the expression divine in its contrast to that of the Apostles, and the whole idea that of one present in the actual body, and yet an apparition.

In the cartoon of the Miraculous Draught, there is an immediate victory of the ideal over the real, the very disproportion of the accessories only leading us the more quickly and surely to the true motive and sentiment of the whole. The figure of Christ* is perhaps the divinest form ever presented by art. The idea of sudden impulse and act of adoration and earnest entreaty is wonderfully given in that of Peter, but he hardly seems to us to be saying, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord"; there may be some expression of terror and sense of sin, but the dominant one is that of advance, rather than a disposition to flee.

These are not offered as art criticisms ; for those we look for direction to such as we judge to be best qualified, nor if we were competent would accurate criticisms so well answer our present purpose, but they are given as our own thoughts and impressions on the view and study of these works, and of art and nature generally, and common to and equally within the easy reach of all that will, of the cultured first, and then of the uninstructed, for there may be light even in the darkest cottage. We are speaking here only of well directed studies that elevate the thoughts and enrich the mind, and their privileges.

But this is not the only inlet to these or the like privileges :

* The countenance is not very unlike that in the Cameo generally known as the Gem of Tiberius ; both are in profile, which is generally inexpressive, and in the latter very much so. We seldom catch the profiles of those around us, and when we do, only for the instant. In the Cartoon, the idea of Divinity is indicated mainly by the calm and dignity of the gesture and attitude.

when once the savage begins to die in a man, there is not a sight, or sound, or touch in nature, from the wondrous ocean to the puniest rill, from the loftiest Alp to the falling leaf, from the kindest trifle to the most heroic deed, that will not aid and strengthen. But without a true living religious idea, all is incompleteness and vacuity ; always there is something wanting. Socrates was great in his death, but surely something cold ; he believed that he was about to be admitted among the spirits of the illustrious and happy dead, but he had no special love for them, or absolute joy in the thought. Now compare the religious, and especially the Christian idea, with any irreligious one whatever. Let anyone frame to himself or recall his conception of that conscript substitute for deity, the Philosophical ideal of a perfect man. Every one can approach to this, for all can conceive one resembling but greater than himself ; but ideals may differ. That of the philosopher may be something truly grand, wanting only in this, that it cannot save his soul alive, and so his glittering fountain drops with a sullen splash, and all is over. By a perfect man we understand one perfect in mind and spirit ; the body is sufficiently perfect, if it carry him through his few short years of natural life.

The question has now come round to this ; are all privileges and perfections, present and to come, the result of jelly-and-ape developments of material molecules under the impulse of insensible and scattered forces which had a beginning, or the work of a Divine Personality, itself the beginning of all things ? If the first of these views be accepted, then this follows as a strictly logical consequence ; these insensible forces, by laws of action, reaction, and the conservation of energy, give, take, modify, and conceive certain aboriginal impulses ; but not at will, for the case is that they have no will, and do not know what they are about ; and they have thus in the course of millions upon millions of years, by means unknown to themselves, developed in us sense, intellect, and will, these together leading up to certain powers, including that of interfering with the course of nature, that is, of working miracles at will. We cannot put a spade

into the ground without disturbing that course, and thus working a miracle ; the furrow we drew in our field, would never have been a furrow without us, and it rests solely in our mind and will at this present moment, whether from that furrow shall arise wheat that nourishes, the lazy root that nourishes not, or the poppy that kills. Now the will, a governing element in this power of ours is completely developed, and the intellectual and physical, that is, the ministerial ones are coming in force not very slowly after it ; and these together constitute or set in action the principle of selection, and the law of the strongest, and this power having by the united force of these elements become thus far developed in us, and it being certain that intellect must be stronger and better than non-intellect, there is manifestly no reason why we should not henceforth begin to take the direction of all future developments, of ourselves first, and then of things in general, entirely upon ourselves ; and, as this process must of necessity continue for ever, with results always in Geometrical Progression, we may by a more rigid attention to our own proper business, some concentration of energy, absolute persistency, and other ways and means recognised in philosophy, raise and improve ourselves and all around us in the course of a very few generations to any kind or form of perfection we may desire : a state in which, like Solomon in his glory looking down on the Queen of Sheba; or the lilies of the field in theirs, looking down on Solomon; we in our turn may look quietly down upon men as they now are, much as men as they now are look down upon the poor despised ape. All this we believe to be strictly logical : we confess it to be a plagiarism or disguised quotation from the best authors, and the conclusion by all the laws of why and wherefore, is such as it is.

But as that conclusion is not our conclusion, we desire leave to add yet two or three words before curfew.

We do not even yet see how sensations can arise from any material organism only ; but assuming this, and that the intellect is also merely a development of matter, we fail to perceive why it should have developed

qualities and powers more than are needed for material purposes ; or finally, why, if a little morality and no religion at all will suffice for all purposes of ordinary life, there should be so much of both in the truest and highest sense, continually running to waste.

We must return for yet a little space to nature and art ; our position, which however we can now only briefly indicate, is this ; that the entire outward and visible world around us, perfectly adapted as it is to preserve and perpetuate life upon earth, and teeming with beauty and grandeur in all its parts, would be no better than a feeding trough to us, were we not provided with proper faculties of mind and especially of spirit, to enable us to perceive and feel that beauty and grandeur ; and as that feeling, refining continually with fair exercise, raises our thoughts more and more to an unseen or ideal world, it is impossible to suppose, that those faculties can have developed out of that material outer world from which in our best moods, they so irresistibly withdraw us. There is much fitness in the external world for all its cognate ends and purposes, but no beauty, unless there is a full sense of beauty in us ; and as this sense of beauty continually prepares and draws us to the unseen, there is thus quite as much evidence of the unseen, as there is of the seen world. Is it not truly a home feeling, that thus draws us to the unseen ?

To return to our illustration : there is first the mere pleasure of sight, the chief and most refined of all our senses ; next the arrangement of colours and light and shade so as best to please the eye, without regard to objects, and this probably is a gratification shared by the irrational creation, and to this, but not to very much more, they are for the purposes of the argument freely welcome. Then, in art, comes the innate love of imitation, of which nearly all we can say is, that it is innate, and conduces to some of our most intellectual pleasures, and when associated with strong inventive and imaginative faculties, often passes with them into genius of the highest order. Aristotle's position *ὅτι τούτο τοῦτο*, or that it is the pleasure

of being able to say, "this is that," seems about as far as we can go ; but we must exclude the idea of discovery as an element of this pleasure. Unless a work of art impresses us with some likeness of the thing imitated at once, we seldom care to look at it a second time. There are doubtless hidden beauties both in nature and art, which we may altogether miss at the first view, and which only come out after much study and observation on our own part, and the judicious criticisms of others, but when they do come, they do so at once, at a thought, and our gratification is increased tenfold ; but it proceeds from the beauty discovered, which from that moment becomes our own, "a joy for ever," and not from the act or process of discovery, which has indeed a pleasure of its own, but not the one in question.

The next element is the association of ideas, which in its higher workings is wholly intellectual and spiritual, and though not of the unseen leads us very quickly to it.*

Many in their eagerness to bridge over the gulf between man and brute, have argued that some at least of the latter possess this power of association, but it seems fairly questionable whether this supposed association in them, can be more than an act of memory ; at the most, it can but be the suggestion of one brute idea by another.

* Nothing has been said here of the effect of music, owing to an early discouragement. I remember many years ago, when very young, having a conversation with the late George Rudall, the eminent flute-player, a man of thought and intellect. He wanted to learn how far I had true feeling and capacity for music, and with that view questioned me as to the extent to which it excited ideas in my mind. I was forced to confess to something like a phantasmagoria, and he told me, regretfully, for we were good friends, that I was no good. Music works on the mood and excites ideas, but if those ideas are too vivid or too crowded, they take too much lead ; we become too much lost in them, and largely or wholly fail to take in, or follow the harmony to which we think we are listening. The ear receives and is soothed, but we are in a reverie or idle dream, and are hardly, if at all conscious of it. I have seen enough of true musicians to be fully aware, that there is no deficiency more easily or surely detected, than this is by them, and I think I am more afraid of them than of any other persons whatever.

But how is it with us ? We will only take two or three instances. A good picture must not only present us with an imitation, but convey a sentiment, which may be either ludicrous, inclining us to laughter, simply pleasing, or affecting, or sublime. The best, well, the most characteristic Morland we remember to have seen, represented a single figure, a very fat, dirty hog lying in its sty. It was well drawn, the proportions, or rather the acquired disproportions of the great ungainly beast well preserved, the bristles and patches of the bare hide here and there were, and as they naturally should be, well rendered, and as the object was supposed to be close to the spectator, the colouring quite natural, and so far it was a close imitation of nature as it is ; but so far also it was dumb, and might have been a mere dead thing, and the pleasure, if any, would have been such only as may be derived from the "this is that" imitation principle before referred to, and no more than we might receive from looking at an Upholsterers Illustrated Catalogue of chairs and tables ; but the animal's eye, half closed up with fat, was towards the spectator, and the painter had managed to express in great perfection, the sulky alarm and irritation of such animals in having their privacy intruded upon, and the effect thus produced by a dab of paint in the right place was ludicrous in the extreme. Now it is not an intellectual pleasure to inspect a hog in a sty ; but from the mixed causes above noticed, it is, and perhaps a not very inconsiderable one, to look at a picture like this ; the effect being perhaps a little aided by the contrasting ideas of a hog in a sty, and our own superior cleanliness and appointments, the ease and comfort of the occasion, and the handsome surroundings of the room in which it was hung.

We do not mean to say that the representation of dead or inanimate objects may not be truly artistic. In the Dead Warrior of Velasquez, in the National Gallery, the desert cave ; in the Death of Chatterton, the miserable pallet, the uncorked phial on the floor, the dawn rising on

the wretched surroundings, awaken in all the deepest human interest. But the tale may be told by less means. There is a Gerard Dhow of an old velvet-covered chair, much frayed and worn, and vacant ; that by itself is nothing ; but the painter has scattered around a litter of books, and other accessories, so disposed as to bring the studious occupant or late occupant, to our thoughts and suggest for him a character and history.

In landscapes our thoughts rise in general above hogs. We require to be pleased and interested ; where we are not so, the fault is not unfrequently in ourselves, we are stupid and idle, or clever and captious ; a good picture is thrown away upon us. The imitation is more or less conventional, sometimes wholly so. Two artists of different schools may give us views of the same subject, which shall be equally good and equally true, and yet quite unlike each other. All that the painter can say about it seems to be this. "If the sun and other lights, which I cannot paint up to nature, be supposed to look like this, the fore-ground and other objects which I can paint ought to look like this."

But whatever he does, he must be alive, he must give us some sentiment. Whether it be one of Copley Fielding's wide spreading downs with sheep scattered about nibbling, or Wilson's aforesaid, without the stupid little God and Goddess in the clouds, whether Rubens' Chateau with colour, or a Gaspar Poussin without, he must in some way interest us. The æsthetic pleasure received through the eye, passes with its associations to the mind, but the thoughts and ideas it raises in us are our own, varying in each according to his degree of culture, and rising often to the highest of which our nature is capable.

Now refer once more to the Charge to Peter : we have here represented to us by the art of man through the eye, the most momentous event to us that has ever happened upon earth. All but the utterly uninstructed must have some feeling for what they are viewing, and in some it stirs and commands the whole being. That you will say, is because they believe, and cannot help themselves, and

this great work of art only does the office of a rudely made crucifix in the hands of some of the weaker sort. That is not quite so ; that is dethroning art altogether. An irreligious man with a fine eye for art is religious for the moment, though he may not believe. We will say more ; there are some who gladly yield themselves to the influence of fine art as a substitute for the religion for which they secretly crave ; many who mistake that influence for religion itself. A work of art like this cartoon may mingle with and strengthen a thought already in the mind, but yet claim a victory entirely its own. But further, this has little to do with our present argument.

The seen leads to the unseen, passing through the eye to the mind, the seat of intellect, and thence to the spirit, the living soul. But this could not be, unless they were mutually adapted for the purpose. They must therefore be accounted for. The action of the intellect is a succession of actions in time ; the intellect itself is of the body, and must change with it. But the spirit is one and entire, and in our view abiding always in the Divine Mind, in the sense we have before stated, may so abide without our consciousness, until that consciousness shall be restored, as it is our trust and belief it will be. But now it is an informed consciousness : by whom or what is it informed ?—By the senses ?—In part, may be—By ideas presented to it by, or through the intellect ?—Again, in part, may be—But what is that sense ? and what that intellect ? and what that, which is so informed by them ? You have but one answer to this, whether philosopher or peasant. “Sure then, it is just a way things have.”

But you undertake, as indeed you are bound to do, to account for all this ; and you tell us, that all things were once a fine homogeneous vapour or system of atoms, so minute and void of appreciable form, as to be able to steal into being as it were, without any act or aid of creation at all ; and that all this afterwards developed into the world as it now is, both sentient and non-sentient ; and that this development is the effect of a certain aboriginal autochthonous motion appetency or tendency, per-

vading this vapour or system of atoms ; and that this aboriginal motion was in some cases aided by a certain other subordinate motion, seemingly chance-scattered among individuals, and maturing in them into a power of selection, by virtue of which the strongest as usual got the best of everything ; and that this is the true history of man and beast, who have all developed in this way ; and then you add, that this will all come quite easy, if we will but bear in mind that, all things having come originally from a homogeneous source, there can be no such things as essential differences or distinctions of species ; and that any kind of creature may when required fuse with or pass into any other kind at any other time ; and that in fact, *simile* is *idem* all through the world, and all creatures that live, had thus a common ancestor, or common lot of ancestors, oozing out of the aboriginal vapour aforesaid ; then condensng into a sort of dew-drops ; then into jellies, and finally like leeches in Ceylon after a shower, leaping merrily off in their own strength, to possess and people the world with men and women.

Be it, if be it must. There are no more absolute despots than the leaders of Orchestras, and the heads of schools of Philosophy ; but the latter are always more angry and peremptory, because they always doubt. For ourselves, we have found what we have taken for essential differences and distinctions of species, working together continuously to an end which is not yet, and have concluded that they always since their creation did, and always will do so, until that end is accomplished. Absolute fusion we no where find. Oxygen and hydrogen are not absolutely fused in water ; there is mutual action and a result ; but they lose neither their identities nor original properties, though hidden for a time, and with a very little of your science, you can always separate them, and bring them back to their simple forms ; and they are there once more, pure oxygen and pure hydrogen, free and unstained from their previous contact. Where there is impulse, there at the proper time is always the requisite check. We know not if there be such a thing in all

nature as rectilinear motion ; there is always some deflection from some external cause. Can you tell us, where an ocean wave begins, and where it ends, and when ? Every wave acts upon every other wave, and every flap of a shrimp's tail, makes one that will reach to the lowest deep, and from Pegwell Bay to Newfoundland, and then come back again, and so we know not when, if ever, it will end. Yet with all this infinite lacing and interlacing of waves and wavelets, there is no fusion ; there is action and reaction, each holding its own to the end, if there be an end ; but the ocean rolls and rests, in storm and calm, as it did in the beginning, unchanged and secure.

Here we conclude. Our purpose has been to offer remarks on Theories ; but we knew from the first, that no real issue could ever be joined between the Materialist and Spiritualist. They work on different lines, and can never meet. The Materialist thinks he is searching for the First Cause ; he is doing no such thing ; he is striving to discover the earliest form of that matter which he takes to be a substantial reality ; and he does wonders, in almost every direction but the right one. There must, it is plain, be form beyond his powers of conception ; whatever therefore he may in the end discover, it can be but form, and form with other form beyond it, and he is thus as far from the first cause as ever. There is no evidence that our mental faculties or the laws of thought have ever changed, and they are the same in all, differing only in degree. But suppose them to be infinitely enlarged, and that he, the Materialist, were to discover the first form or cause ; he would do so, only by stripping the universe step by step, of all material form or quality, until he arrived at last at life, that is, Spirit, self-asserting, eternal and boundless ; coming thus close round to our position, who say, not that God is in all things, but that all things are in God.

We on our parts accept this Spirit freely and at once. We have spoken above of two worlds, but that was in the way of illustration only, for there is but one, and that a world

existing in the Divine Mind, who of His own will and by His own power created and maintains all things, and of His own free grace imparted to man his separate consciousness and the breath of life by which he became a living soul. We think we cannot do better than conclude here with the words of Berkeley already quoted, "All the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all these bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind ; that their being is to be perceived or known ; that consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind, or in that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit."

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